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ABSTRACT
ON A FOUNDATION, WIDE IN SCOPE: THE HISTORY OF MOUNT
SINAI HOSPITAL: 1903-1987

by
Michele M.E. Radi

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016
Under the Supervision of Professor Amanda I. Seligman, Ph.D.

This research studies the history of Mount Sinai Hospital in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a
private, nonsectarian Jewish hospital. It was supported by the Jewish residents in
Milwaukee through their philanthropic efforts for eighty-three years. In 1987, the hospital
merged with a Christian hospital, but in 1992, hospital administrators announced that the
establishment of operational practices designed to maintain the Jewish identity of the
current hospital. I sought to answer the question of why a Jewish identity mattered to the
new hospital after the merger. This research reveals that the Jewish identity of Mount
came from the strong Jewish support in the early years, not from a large Jewish
strict religious practices, or a majority of Jewish patients. I argue that the hospital
represented a sense of collective action between two conflicted groups within the Jewish
population of Milwaukee. These groups were divided along socioeconomic class and
ethnic differences. The hospital provided a communal place for all Jewish residents to
perform acts of charity, including fundraising and volunteer work. I argue the relationship

ii

between the Jewish population and the hospital was symbiotic, in that the hospital
provided opportunities for Jewish doctors to establish practices and also provided
economic opportunities and gave the Jewish population an icon for their charity efforts. I
argue that the hospital historically treated more Gentiles than Jewish patients, but was a
Jewish hospital by way of the Jewish collective action and support. I argue that the
collective action of Milwaukee Jewish residents gave Mount Sinai a Jewish identity.
However, changes in funding options for indigent care decreased the Jewish presence at
Mount Sinai. It decreased as the need for fundraising for direct patient care decreased.
After the creation of Medicaid and the expansion of Medicare, the direct financial support
and the volunteer hours donated to Mount Sinai by Jewish residents decreased. As more
affluent members of the Milwaukee Jewish population moved away, the Jewish
participation at Mount Sinai diminished. I argue that the announcement about establishing
a Jewish identity at the former Mount Sinai in 1992 represented an attempt to preserve
the history of the traditional Jewish presence at the and to remind the residents of
Milwaukee of the contributions of the Jewish people.
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Dedicated to the Jewish people of Milwaukee,
Past, Present, and Future
and
to Rabbi Victor Caro z’l,
who dreamed of this hospital, but did not live long enough to see it bloom
Also, to my grandma and Aunt Barbara, who
dreamed of better things for me
and did not live to see any of this happen
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INTRODUCTION
In a September 2, 1988 article, the Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle reported changes at
the former Jewish hospital in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Mount Sinai Hospital merged with
Good Samaritan Medical Center ten months prior. The new facility, Sinai Samaritan,
remained at the former Mount Sinai Medical Center site, at 12th Street and Highland
Avenue, in downtown Milwaukee. The post-merger plans included the expansion of Sinai
Samaritan’s Jewish linkages. To that end, the hospital erected a menorah in the hospital
lobby during Hanukkah in lieu of Christmas decorations and closed clinics on major
Jewish holidays. Sinai Samaritan President Albert L. Greene noted that “We have said all
along that we have intended to maintain Jewish tradition at the Sinai campus.” At the
same time, the article noted that the Board planned to remove the iconic Star of David
from the front of the hospital. Sinai Samaritan donated the Star to the Karl Jewish
Community Center Campus.1 This commitment to “maintain” Jewish traditions at Sinai
Samaritan Medical Center in 1988 came at a time when much of the Milwaukee Jewish
population lived outside of the city, taking their synagogues and the Jewish Community
Center with them. At the time of this announcement, the majority of Sinai Samaritan
patients were not Jewish. The removal of the Star when hospital administrators
announced the preservation of Jewish identity for the former Jewish Mount Sinai Hospital
after it merged with a Christian hospital seemed incongruous and contradictory. Why did
the commitment to Jewish traditions matter after a merger with a Christian hospital? Why

1

Newspaper clipping, “Changes for Sinai Samaritan,” Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle, September 2, 1988, Box 1, Folder
7, Mount Sinai Collection, Jewish Museum Milwaukee Archives, Milwaukee, Wisconsin (hereafter cited as JMM
Archives).
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remove an iconic part of the building that signified a Jewish identity? I sought an answer
to those questions.
The existing literature of the history of the Milwaukee Jewish community did not
provide a great deal of specific information about Mount Sinai Hospital. Historians Louis
J. Swichkow and Lloyd P. Gartner published their seminal work, The History of the Jews
in Milwaukee, in 1963. It described the history of the Milwaukee Jewish population in
great detail, but only mentioned Mount Sinai Hospital on twelve pages. The information
included about Mount Sinai did not offer any insight as to why the Jewish people of
Milwaukee would want to keep a Jewish identity at Mount Sinai when many Jewish
residents lived outside Milwaukee. In fact, their research noted that Mount Sinai Hospital
was a nonsectarian hospital from the start. It consistently treated more Gentile than
Jewish patients.2 The discussion of the hospital in this important work does not delve
deeply enough to answer the question of identity. It described the history of the hospital
in terms of dates–when the hospital opened, when the hospital relocated to its current
location–and pictures of the different structures.3 The question about the importance of
expanding Jewish identity at Mount Sinai remained unanswered. Historian John Gurda
grounded his 2009 book One People, Many Paths: A History of Jewish Milwaukee in
Swichkow and Gartner’s work.4 He included information about an additional forty-five
years of Milwaukee Jewish history. His work mentioned Mount Sinai Hospital a total of
fifteen times, but only three references added to the overall history of Mount Sinai. Both
of these sources contain a great deal of historical information about the Jewish people of

2 Louis J. Swichkow and Lloyd P. Gartner, The History of the Jews of Milwaukee (Philadelphia, PA: The Jewish
Publication Society of America, 1963), 201.
3
Swichkow and Gartner, The History of the Jews of Milwaukee, 97.
4 John Gurda, One People, Many Paths: A History of Jewish Milwaukee (Milwaukee, WI: Jewish Museum Milwaukee,
2009), 48.
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Milwaukee, but the history of their hospital is limited to significant changes at the
hospital. Both works discuss the history of the hospital building. These books place the
history of Mount Sinai Hospital in the context of the Milwaukee Jewish community. The
dozen or so mentions of the hospital come tangentially to the overall history Milwaukee
Jewish community.
Swichkow and Gartner and Gurda detail a contentious history within the Milwaukee
Jewish community. East Side and West Side Jewish groups did not form a cohesive
community in Milwaukee. Conflict within the Milwaukee Jewish population stemmed
from differences in ethnicity, class and religious observance. Yet, members of both the
East and West Side Jewish population supported Mount Sinai’s nonsectarian mission for
eighty-three years and sought to preserve a Jewish identify after a merger. In order to
answer the question of why Jewish identity mattered for a nonsectarian hospital in
Milwaukee, I decided to focus on the history of the hospital as it relates to the Jewish
population in Milwaukee. That is, instead of inserting the history of the hospital in the
larger Jewish history, I used the history of Mount Sinai Hospital in order to study the
Jewish contributions to the hospital and the history of the Milwaukee Jewish population. I
believe that this allowed me to use the work of Swichkow and Gartner and Gurda about
the Jewish community as a foundation for describing their contributions to the hospital.
The change in perspective revealed additional information about Milwaukee’s Jewish
population.

3

SELF, IDENTITY, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
It is important to be clear about terminology and meaning; specifically, identity,
community, and population. For the purpose of this research, the term Jewish identity
denotes the social, behavioral, and individual understanding of what defines “being
Jewish.” Jewish community refers to the collective activity of the Jewish population in
Milwaukee in support of Mount Sinai and other charitable entities. I argue that a
combined Jewish community effort, first by the East Side Jewish population, sustained
this hospital through most of its years of operation as a nonsectarian institution. Members
of the West Side Jewish population also contributed to the hospital. The support from the
two Jewish populations contributed to the Jewish identity of Mount Sinai, a sense of
ownership and assumed responsibility that made it their hospital. The term Jewish
population describes East and West Side Jewish groups living in Milwaukee. Identity
describes the socially constructed reality, using ethnicity, and norm behaviors and beliefs
of Jewish individuals to describe and quantify what makes them Jewish. Jewish
community collective action signifies the efforts of Jewish groups and individuals in
Milwaukee, and population refers to the geographical location of the different groups.
The term Milwaukee Jewish identity is defined as the combined collective action of the
Jewish community, the social characteristics of the Jewish population in Milwaukee, and
their relationship with the city.
The literature pertaining to Jewish identity falls into two broad categories: the
creation of a Jewish self-identity, and the understanding of a collective Jewish identity.
The two categories overlap in that the literature of both Jewish self-identity and the
collective identity state the creation of each involves a process of using a set of criteria to
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establish an understanding of what makes an individual or a collective “Jewish.” The
Jewishness of individuals is measured using the answers to a selected set of questions
about personal practices and beliefs, collective Jewish identity is measured by the actions
of a Jewish population in a specific location.
The concept of self is the foundation for both individual and collective Jewish
identity. Sociologist H.S. Himmelfarb used the terms Jewish identity and Jewish
identification to emphasize the role of self in the matter of identity building. He believed
that Jewish identity is “one’s sense of self with regard to being Jewish,” as part of the
overall self-concept. Jewish identification, on the other hand, was defined as “the process
of thinking and acting in a manner that indicates involvement with and attachment to
Jewish life.”5 Individuals accepted “Jewish” behavioral and social expectations that they
identified as “Jewish.” This formed a sense of Jewish identification, defined by
Himmelfarb as an integral aspect of creating a Jewish identity. This “self-identification”
simplified the process of creating a working definition of Jewish identity.6
Sociologists Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann described identity as that which
is “formed by social processes. Once crystallized it is maintained, modified, or even
reshaped by social relations. The social processes involved in both the formation and the
maintenance of identity are determined by social structure.”7 That is, in order to answer
the question as to why a Jewish identity mattered for Mount Sinai after a merger with a
Christian hospital, the term Milwaukee Jewish identity must be defined. I argue that the
relationship with the hospital sustained and maintained a sense of an individual’s Jewish

5 H.S. Himmelfarb, “Research on American Jewish Identity and Identification: Progress, Pitfalls, and Prospects,” in
Understanding American Jewry, ed. Marshall Sklare (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1982), 56-57.
6
H.S. Himmelfarb, “Research on American Jewish Identity and Identification,”, 56.
7 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge
(New York: Random House, 1966), 173.
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identity through Mount Sinai Hospital by way of their collective actions.
Collective action stems from a sense of group identity. Scholars have defined
collective Jewish identity in the context of measuring the strength of an individual’s
attachment to predetermined attributes and participation in their communities for Jewish
causes and concerns. The literature revealed that one of the more common goals of the
process of assessing an individual’s Jewishness was creating a scale that measured how
“good” a Jew the individual was using the scale of any number of statements and
questions, rather than the individual’s understanding of being a good Jewish person.
These scales also used questions about Jewish collective action in charitable and religious
groups to measure the strength of the attachment and commitment to Jewish collective or
group identity. The various lists of rating one’s Jewishness included many of the same
items including religious traditions, participation in Jewish organizations, and Jewish
education. Sociologist Ralph Segalman noted that the use of scales is problematic in that
the definition of who is a “good Jew” depends heavily on the interests of those creating
the list of desirable Jewish attributes. Scales have used facial features, dialect, manner of
dress, and ethnicity to determine whether a respondent was, in fact, a good Jew. Other
scales measured religiosity, political affiliation and created lists of various beliefs and
behaviors which were considered essential traits for an individual to have in order to be
considered Jewish.8 Those lists are influenced by the author and any sponsoring groups
or interests, resulting in a list of carefully selected parameters that often measure a
specific aspect of Jewish identity, namely religious, cultural, social, organizational, or in
some cases, a combination of these and any other theme or themes each author selects to

8

Ralph Segalman, “Self Hatred Among Jews: A Test of the Lewinian Hypothesis of Marginality of Jewish
Leadership,” (PhD diss., New York University, 1966), 93.
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measure identity.9 Segalman explained that one weakness of using scales of any kind to
measure Jewish identity is the assumption that a single scale, no matter how exhaustive,
could in fact definitively measure an individual or collective sense of Jewishness.10
Sociologist Simon N. Herman rejected the notion that Jewish identity could be measured.
He believed that such studies measured an individual’s sense of Jewish identification, and
not a comprehensive sense of Jewish identity. The scale score of any individual in a
research project highlights “the process by which an individual comes to see himself a
part of the Jewish group. . .But very few of them are studies of Jewish identity, of what
being Jewish means, of what kind of Jew and what kind of Jewishness develop[sic] in the
majority culture.”11 Like Himmelfarb, he advocated for research that does more than
attempt to measure an arbitrary strength or weakness of individual identity. His research
defined Jewish identity using two distinct contexts: either a pattern of attributes
characterizing the Jewish group, or the relationship between the Jewish individual and the
Jewish group and the “reflection in him of its attributes.”12 In the case of Milwaukee’s
Jewish population, a sense of identity came from the hospital, Mount Sinai represented
the contribution of the Jewish population to the city.
Research on community collective action contributes to the creation of group identity
by studying the participation of Jewish people in specific social institutions or activities.
Sociologists Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum evaluated the Jewishness of
“Lakeview,” Illinois by measuring participation at synagogues, Jewish day schools, and

9

Ralph Segalman, “Self Hatred Among Jews,” 92.
Segalman, “Self Hatred Among Jews,”, 98.
11
Simon N. Herman, Jewish Identity: A Social Psychological Perspective (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications 1977),
28.
12 Herman, Jewish Identity, 30.
10
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support for the state of Israel.13 Sociologist Herbert J. Gans measured suburban
Jewishness using the availability and knowledge of Jewish food, and creation and
membership in formal and informal Jewish organizations as criteria for Jewishness.14
Using predetermined scales or lists of characteristics limits, and in some cases, excludes
members of the population studied. What of the Jewish families not sending their children
to a Jewish day school? How can one account for the Jewish members of a community
that do not attend services?
The answer to the research question about the Jewish identity of an institution comes
from an understanding of the Jewish identity of the population that created it. The
complexity involved in the formation of individual and group identity definitions noted
above is important when considering the task at hand, that is, how to measure the Jewish
identity of a hospital. Mount Sinai Hospital was the collective achievement of the
Milwaukee Jewish population. The answer to any questions about the Jewish identity of
Mount Sinai Hospital have to come from the history of the Milwaukee Jewish population
and an understanding of their Jewish identity. They established the hospital and supported
its mission.
I viewed the existing literature on the history of Milwaukee Jewish population as a
guide. The definition of Milwaukee Jewish identity for this dissertation started with the
history of original Jewish immigrants and an understanding of what made an individual
Jewish. Philosopher Michael Krausz noted two specific considerations about the
construction of Jewish identity, descent and assent. He defines Jewish descent as the

13

Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum, “The Friendship Pattern of the Lakeville Jew,” in American Jews; A Reader,
ed. Marshall Sklare (New York: Behrman Inc. Publishers, 1983), 176-78.
14 Herbert J. Gans, “The Origin of a Jewish Community in the Suburbs,” in American Jews; A Reader, ed. Marshall
Sklare (New York: Behrman Inc. Publishers, 1983), 158-64.
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means of ascribing a status upon an individual as Jewish, either by birth, born to a Jewish
mother, or conversion regardless of any beliefs or religious practices. Descent makes an
individual inherently Jewish, but does not describe what being Jewish is in practice.
Assent is the means to characterize an individual as Jewish based on the acceptance of
Jewish identity by an individual.15 Assent is the social and behavioral aspects that reveal
the lived Jewish life. These traits are integral to the creation of a definition of Jewish
identity. Krausz believed that the search for a definition of Jewish identity can only be
understood in terms of an individual or collective understanding and acceptance of
“constellation” of traits, beliefs, practices and features that exist over time.16 It was
assent, rather than descent, that defined Jewishness. Because of the various experiences
of Jewish communities, Krausz posited that there is no single historically correct Jewish
identity discourse. There is no definitive scale, list, or history as to what ultimately
defines Jewishness and Jewish identity.17 Psychologists Perry London and Allissa
Hirshfeld described scales as incomplete in the understanding of Jewish identity in that,
“So, we cannot know from them what bearing Jewish background has on aspects of
personal identity that are not consciously Jewish but may have been profoundly
influenced by being Jewish, albeit unconnected to the Jewish community.”18
The concept of a Milwaukee Jewish identity then, requires an understanding of the
history of the city’s Jewish immigrants. This dissertation examines the “constellation”
created by the founding members of the Jewish population and carried on by Jewish
residents in Milwaukee today. I constructed three core traits of Milwaukee Jewish identity
15

Michael Krausz, “On Being Jewish,” in Jewish Identity, ed. David Theo Goldberg and Michael Krausz (Philadelphia,
PA: Temple University Press, 1993), 268.
16 Michael Krausz, “On Being Jewish,”, 272
17
Michael Krausz, “On Being Jewish,”, 273.
18 Perry London and Allissa Hirshfeld, “The Psychology of Identity Formation” in Jewish Identity in America, ed.
David M. Gordis and Yoav Ben-Horin (Los Angeles, CA: Wilstein Institute, 1991), 46-47.
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using the literature of the history of the city of Milwaukee, namely Swichkow and
Gartner. Jewish immigrants in Milwaukee are assumed to be Jewish by descent. However,
they differed in religious practice and ethnic customs. They arrived in Milwaukee from
different European regions. Their differences led to conflict between the two groups. That
conflict is one of the defining features of Milwaukee Jewish identity. It should be noted
that this definition of Milwaukee Jewish identity is limited in that Swichkow and
Gartner’s work is almost exclusively from the perspective of the original immigrant
population arriving from Western Europe in the nineteenth century. However, the conflict
between the two groups is also a defining feature of Milwaukee Jewish identity. Social
stratification is an integral part of Milwaukee Jewish history. The East Side Jewish
population established themselves in business and in the professional class. The West
Side Jewish population settled on the West Side and was initially poor. The differences
between the two led to social distance between them. East Side and West Side did not
socialize. They did not live together and they did not pray together. This early segregation
had a profound effect on Milwaukee Jewish identity. To be from the East Side was
desirable; it was not advantageous to claim a West Side status. These statuses were so
strong that they remain a part of Milwaukee Jewish identity in the twenty-first century.19
The creation of the hospital also represented the second and third attribute of
Milwaukee Jewish identity-philanthropy and sense of commitment to the city of
Milwaukee represented by the support for the health care for the indigent. I argue that at
the time of announcement of a continuing Jewish identity at Sinai Samaritan, the goal
was to an attempt to preserve Jewish history, or heritage rather than identity. That is, the
hospital represented their historic support of the hospital as Milwaukee Jews for
19

Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011.
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themselves and their fellow citizens.

MILWAUKEE JEWISH IDENTITY: THREE HISTORIC TRAITS
I have identified three core components of Milwaukee Jewish identity; ethnic origin,
defined as either East and West Side Jewish population, philanthropy, defined as
collective action in charity work, and a sense of commitment to the city by way of
maintaining Mount Sinai Hospital for eighty-four years even after many Jewish residents
moved away. These three traits form the foundation for a sense of what constitutes a
sense of Milwaukee Jewish identity. These traits are not meant to impart any sense of
being a “good” Milwaukee Jew based on any predetermined scale. Instead, they are an
attempt to describe the traits that Jewish residents of Milwaukee socially constructed and
maintained to express and define their Jewish identity. I used data from interviews with
members of the Milwaukee community, both Jewish and Gentile. This allowed for a more
diverse understanding of Milwaukee Jewish identity; Himmelfarb noted that many Jewish
identity research projects often excluded Gentiles. The inclusion of the perspectives of
Gentile nurses in particular provides insight about how they viewed the Jewish
contributions to Milwaukee through the work at Mount Sinai.20 Interviews with members
of the Milwaukee Jewish population revealed that of these three components, the East and
West side labels were both ascribed on those born in the city21and achieved by those who
moved to the city.22 Current members of the Jewish community in Milwaukee applied
these statuses to new community members. In the 1970s and 1980s, new immigrants from

20

H.S. Himmelfarb, “Research on American Jewish Identity and Identification,”, 66-67.
Dr. Harry Kanin, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011.
22 Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011; Dr. David Amadari, Interview by
author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011.
21
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Soviet Russia were called Russian Jews and West Side Jews by some of those
interviewed.23
The Milwaukee Jewish population originated from distinct regional groups; Western
and Central Europe, commonly referred to as German, and Eastern European, which in
Milwaukee refers to Russian. Cultural differences between the two resulted in a
segregated Jewish population. The first wave Western Jews arrived first, and formed a
social identity among themselves. The second wave arrived and found that some of their
cultural practices and religious traditions did not fit with the socially constructed Jewish
identity in Milwaukee.
Like other urban areas, these cultural and religious differences between Milwaukee’s
Jewish populations divided the group. The issue of nomenclature for the two immigrant
waves is important. There were two large waves of Jewish immigration to the United
States in the nineteenth century; one started in 1848, the second in 1888. For this research,
I refer to the groups as first and second wave immigrant groups. The history of the first
wave of Jewish immigration to America is linked with Milwaukee’s Germanic
immigration. Jewish and non-Jewish immigrants from the Germanic regions in Western
and Central Europe arrived together and established a neighborhood on the East Side of
the Milwaukee River.24 The economic opportunities available to Jewish immigrants in
Milwaukee made Mount Sinai possible. The wave of Jews arriving in the recently
established city the late 1840s and early 1850s joined a familiar Germanic culture.25 The
first wave of immigrants to arrive in Milwaukee left Europe after supporting a failed

23

Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011.
Bayrd Still, Milwaukee: The History of a City (Madison, Wisconsin: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin,
1948), 112.
25 Swichkow and Gartner, The History of the Jews of Milwaukee, 110.
24
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revolution in Europe.26 The immigrants who settled in the German neighborhoods of
Milwaukee were from Germanic regions that had failed to unify a German nation and
secure civil rights in the revolution. The histories of the Jewish and non-Jewish German
immigration are so connected in much of the scholarship that the initial wave of
immigration in the 1800s is colloquially known as the “German” wave of “Jewish”
immigrants.
The first wave Germanic Jewish immigrants in Milwaukee are identified here as
East Side Jewish immigrants. This label continues to be salient in Milwaukee as a means
of tracing family history and country of origin. In interviews, members of the Milwaukee
Jewish community used these terms to describe their family histories as well as members
of the current Jewish community.27 Many of the East Side Jewish immigrants were
secular in their education and eventually adopted American Reform Judaism once in
Milwaukee. Sociologist Calvin Goldscheider argued that in the case of these first wave
immigrants, “Their socioeconomic background, social mobility, and prior exposure to
secularization resulted in rapid integration in American society.”28 These immigrants
were from urban areas and sought to acculturate in their countries of origin. The accepted
the social norms and mores of the dominant culture, and many practiced a less traditional
form of Judaism. They did not want to live apart from their Gentile neighbors: they
wanted to live as European Jews, not as Jewish Europeans. To assume Jewish immigrants
in Milwaukee wanted to assimilate is erroneous, despite living in Germanic
neighborhoods, they did not intermarry, nor did they stop identifying themselves as Jews.

26

Dr. Harry Kanin, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011.
Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011.
28 Calvin Goldscheider, “Demography of Jewish Americans: Research Findings, Issues, and Challenges,” in
Understanding American Jewry, ed. Marshall Sklare (Brandeis University: Transaction Publishers, 1982), 9.
27
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Once they arrived in Milwaukee, many were able to acculturate quickly with their
fellow immigrants, greatly facilitated by the fact that many of their Gentile cohort
accepted them as fellow Germans in manner and dress.29 Several of those interviewed
refer to the East Side Jewish immigrants as "assimilated" but this was not the case. It is
true that those first wave Jewish immigrants that settled alongside Gentiles in German
neighborhoods were almost indistinguishable from their neighbors, but the fact that they
retained their Jewish sensibilities indicates that they did not fully assimilate. Sociologist
Milton M. Gordon uses two hypothetical groups, the “Sylvanians” and the “Mundovians”
to illustrate his concept of assimilation. The Sylvanians are citizens of the “host country”
and Mundovians, new immigrants. Gordon believed that the new immigrant, in a series of
stages, eventually accepted the dominant cultural practices of the host country and thus
underwent both structural assimilation by accepting entering primary groups with
Sylvanians, and identification assimilation, where they took on a shared sense of being
Sylvanian.30 Sklare and Greenblum argued that by taking their place in German
neighborhoods and remaining almost indistinguishable from their Gentile neighbors, they
were “assimilated.”31 I argue that in the case of the first wave of Milwaukee Jewish
immigrants, those who settled in German neighborhoods did so without adopting
different religious beliefs. Members of the East Side Jewish population settled with
Gentile German residents without converting. The most salient indicator of the
importance of retaining Jewish religious practices in the Milwaukee East Side Jewish
population is the ongoing attempts to establish synagogues. East Side Jews lived among
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Gentiles, but they did not convert to the dominant Christian religion; rather, they
eventually created houses of worship in order to practice their Jewish faith.32
The three core characteristics of Milwaukee Jewish identity– the ethnic origins of the
East and West Side Jewish populations– collective philanthropic action– and a
commitment to the people and city of Milwaukee– are the foundation for the Jewish
identity of Mount Sinai. Sociologist Calvin Goldscheider noted that in the study of the
value of living in an area with strong Jewish institutions and networks, the characteristics
of Jewish identity in smaller Jewish populations are largely absent from the existing
literature. He stated that scholars have yet to ask whether living in areas with Jewish
institutions enriches Jewish solidarity and kinship. He questions the use of traditional
scales to measure Jewish identity and advocates the study of collective Jewish action on
their cities.33 I argue that Mount Sinai did have a positive impact on the lives of both
groups of Milwaukee Jews. The East Side Jewish financial support, their commitment to
relief work, and service to Milwaukee are all at the heart of Mount Sinai’s mission.
Members of the West Side Jewish population received care at the hospital. The hospital
received support from both groups as the West Side Jews gained upward socioeconomic
status.
The original Jewish population of Milwaukee came from Western Europe, many
from regions now known as Germany. These Germanic East Side Jews established the
cultural foundation for later Jewish immigrants. By virtue of being the first Jewish settlers
in Milwaukee, the Germanic Jewish immigrants created a system of beliefs and behaviors
that they imposed on later arrivals. I argue that this group established a basis for the city’s
32
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Jewish identity. The second wave of Jewish immigrants arriving in Milwaukee had little in
common with the first wave.34 Many of those interviewed referred to these immigrants as
Russian Jews. In fact, however, many Jewish and Gentile immigrants came to Milwaukee
at this time from all over Eastern Europe, not just Russia. They created the West Side
Jewish community in the Haymarket neighborhood. However, unlike the East Side Jews,
the West Side Jewish immigrants arriving in Milwaukee did not settle in a Russian
neighborhood, or a Polish neighborhood with non-Jewish immigrants. They arrived after
1888 and established a Jewish Eastern European enclave because of the anti-Semitic
feelings of the other Eastern European immigrants in Milwaukee. The Jews who started
arriving in the late 1880s were more observant and less secular than the first wave. Many
came from shtetls in Eastern Europe and Russia.35
The West Side immigrants experienced anti-Semitism from other Gentile immigrant
groups. They also suffered the disdain from the East Side Jewish community. The
differences between the two Jewish groups and the establishment of a sense of Jewish
identity by the East Side Jews led to conflict. Interviews with members of the Milwaukee
Jewish population revealed that many of them believed that the East Side Jewish
population attempted to “assimilate” new arrivals.36 The more traditional religious
practices and different manner of dress of the West Side immigrants led to efforts by East
Side Jews to transform the new arrivals, but assimilation did not include conversion to
Christianity. East Side Jews themselves did not so much assimilate, as they did they did
acculturate with Gentile Germanic immigrants in many ways, but remained Jewish, albeit
American Reform. After the arrival of the West Side Jewish immigrants, the East Side
34
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Jewish residents, in fact, attempted to acculturate the new arrivals and impart a sense of
Milwaukee Jewish identity upon them.37
The relative poverty of many of the West Side Jewish population led to the creation
of another important historic characteristic of Milwaukee Jewish identity: philanthropy
and relief institutions. The East Side Jewish population established the Hebrew Relief
Association in order to assist the West Side Jews. In addition to charitable assistance, they
also established a Settlement and offered education and lessons that sought to educate the
new arrivals on the Milwaukee Jewish norms. The first wave immigrants acculturated,
and created an American Jewish culture. They then, in turn attempted to teach second
wave immigrants their cultural understandings to the next wave. Historian Jonathan Sarna
uses the term “Cult of Synthesis” to describe the attempts of first wave Jewish
immigrants to impart American Jewish values and norms to the second wave. This term is
defined as an understanding of "the belief that Judaism and Americanism reinforce
one another, the two traditions converging in a common path."38 He notes that the cult of
synthesis "reflects an ongoing effort on the part of American Jews to interweave their
'Judaism' with their 'Americanism' in an attempt to fashion for themselves some unified,
'synthetic' whole. Anyone even remotely connected with American Jewish life is familiar
with this theme, which has elsewhere been described as a central tenet of American
Jewish 'civil religion.”39 Synthesis defines the actions of the East Side Jews more
accurately than the term assimilation and is more akin to acculturation; the new
immigrants were expected to embrace Milwaukee Jewish identity traits, created largely
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by the first wave. Sarna’s use of synthesis defines the process of acculturating Eastern
European Jews in that they should adopt the dominant American Jewish population’s
behaviors and religious observances in the areas that they settled. They did not have stop
being Jewish; they should become American Jews.
The East Side Jewish population had expectations of the new immigrants, and they
had the social resources to enforce those expectations. They possessed considerable social
and economic advantages. Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu used the term “creating cultural
capital” to describe the process by which individuals form preferences for cultural
practices and activities, including religion. He identified primary social groups like
family and schools as agents of socialization, especially for children. Those that practice
the preferred cultural activities are more likely to gain social acceptance.40 Cultural
capital could and often did lead to the creation of social capital. Sociologist Robert D.
Putnam defined the core idea of social capital as the benefits of connections among and
between individual members and the advantageous effects that can occur. Individuals
form connections in their own self-interest and can result in “public good” through the
actions of “well connected” people.”41 The status of East Side Jew could be achieved
through adopting the socially acceptable norms and behaviors, which included the
socially acceptable religions practice. Both Jay Larkey and Pat Kerns were born to
Russian parents. Both were raised in the Reform tradition, and both identify themselves
as East Side Jews. Each used their cultural capital to achieve upward social mobility.42
The second trait, the collective act of philanthropy, also frames the relationship
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between Milwaukee Jewish identity and Mount Sinai Hospital’s Jewish identity. The
hospital was a direct response of the relief efforts in the Milwaukee East Side Jewish
community to increased Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe. The more affluent East
Side Jewish men contributed their money and time to create Mount Sinai. That historic
contribution remains an important part of Jewish identity for members of the Milwaukee
community.43
Tzedakah is often translated as “charity,” but is more accurately defined as an act of
“loving kindness.”44 The concept of loving kindness includes specifics act on the part of
individuals and groups designed to assist the poor. Donating money, volunteering and
visiting those in need are all examples of tzedakah.45 The collective action to create a
hospital defined the Milwaukee Jewish community and Mount Sinai embodied their
commitment to those in need. Rabbi Joseph Telushkin cites Deuteronomy 15:7-8: “If
however, there is a needy person among you. . .do not harden your heart and shut your
hand against your needy kinsman.”46 This commandment led to the earliest philanthropic
efforts on the part first wave Jewish immigrants. Many first wave Jewish immigrants
adopted Reform Jewish practices and many had embraced Reform Jewish practices in
their countries of origin.47. The later immigrants arrived from Eastern Europe and did not
share those practices. This led to the creation of two distinct Jewish groups in Milwaukee.
The East Side Jewish population adopted American Reform Jewish practices and lived on
the east side of the Milwaukee River. The West Side Jewish group retained religious
practices from Eastern Europe and settled on the west side of the river.
43
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The first wave Jewish immigrant population accepted the responsibility to establish
and sustain operations of Mount Sinai Hospital for the poor Jewish immigrants who
arrived starting in 1888.48 That responsibility and the commitment to Mount Sinai
Hospital represented an important trait for Jewish identity for Milwaukee’s East Side
Jews. In contrast to the community’s struggles in establishing multiple synagogues that
met their religious needs, Mount Sinai Hospital thrived because it was the only Jewish
hospital in the area and received the full support of the Jewish community, through their
collective actions on its behalf. Their dedication to Mount Sinai was an expression of
their acceptance of the Jewish commandment of tzedakah, one more salient than specific
religious observance at any one synagogue. Members of the West Side Jewish population
eventually joined the East Side Jewish population in supporting the hospital. Sociologist
Harold Polsky noted that by the 1950s, Jews from both sides of the Milwaukee River
contributed to Mount Sinai. The historically impoverished “Russian” Jews from the West
Side embraced the importance of philanthropy and assumed one of the most important
traits of Milwaukee Jewish identity.49
A third core trait of Milwaukee identity is the historic Jewish commitment to the city
of Milwaukee as a whole. The hospital offered care for Jewish and Gentile patients. The
nonsectarian mission of Mount Sinai represented the sense of gratitude for the perceived
acceptance the first wave Jewish immigrants felt in Milwaukee. They shared cultural and
ethnic traits and spoke the same language as Milwaukee’s non-Jewish Germans.50 The
fact that the Jewish population in Milwaukee was so similar to the non-Jewish
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immigrants arriving with them had a profound effect on the mission of Mount Sinai. At a
time where urban hospitals were usually established as either nonsectarian or religious,
Mount Sinai was created with the distinct dual mission of serving not only the Jewish
community of Milwaukee, but all in need in Milwaukee. Mount Sinai Hospital in New
York and Beth Israel eventually developed nonsectarian missions, but Mount Sinai
Hospital Milwaukee was founded with one.51 This dual identity was one reason that
Mount Sinai was able to serve the City of Milwaukee for over eighty years and why
hospital leaders decided to keep Mount Sinai downtown in the face of Jewish community
outmigration. The founders of the hospital developed a strong commitment to the city of
Milwaukee, not only to the Jewish residents. That commitment strengthened the
relationship between the Jewish community and the city of Milwaukee.52 Pat Kerns, the
owner of a successful flooring company in Milwaukee, was a Board Member at Mount
Sinai. He related his understanding of the history of the hospital in terms of Jewish
philanthropy and gratitude on the part of the Jewish population for Milwaukee. He
believed that the hospital began as a response to the needs of indigent Jewish immigrants
in Milwaukee. The reason Mount Sinai leadership agreed to the 1987 merger that kept the
hospital in downtown was, in part, a formal recognition of the gratitude felt by the Jewish
people for the city of Milwaukee and its acceptance of the first wave Jewish
immigrants.53
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THE FOUNDING OF MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL
Mount Sinai Hospital opened on June 7, 1903. Members of the Milwaukee
community, Jewish and non-Jewish, listened to speeches and accolades from some of
Milwaukee’s most prestigious citizens. Local newspapers reported the event, as the
hospital was declared open to treat those in need of care, no matter what religion, race, or
creed.54 Hospitals in American cities in the early twentieth century were transforming
both their services and their public image, and Mount Sinai reflected these changes.
These hospitals replaced the county almshouses, which housed rather than treated the
indigent sick– often in deplorable conditions. Hospitals of the early twentieth century
were designed as modern institutions of scientific healing.55 Other cities in the United
States opened hospitals that were larger and served more patients than Mount Sinai.
Specifically, these larger urban hospitals served more Jewish patients. New
York,56Newark,57Boston,58 and Chicago59 had large Jewish populations and with the
exception of Michael Reese Hospital in Chicago, were private Jewish hospitals.60 There
were hospitals in Milwaukee established by other religious groups, yet Mount Sinai was
distinctive in that it was founded to be simultaneously nonsectarian and Jewish. Mount
Sinai Hospital served the greater Milwaukee community and was dedicated to the
nonsectarian principle of treating all in need.

54

Newspaper Clipping, “Jews Dedicate Hospital,” Milwaukee Sentinel, June 4, 1903, Box 51, Folder 1, Sinai
Samaritan Medical Center Records, Milwaukee Mss Collection 108, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Libraries,
Archives Department (hereafter cited as Sinai Samaritan Collection).
55 Rosemary Stevens, In Sickness and in Wealth, 17.
56 Arthur H. Aufses, Jr., and Barbara J. Niss, This House of Noble Deeds: The Mount Sinai Hospital, 1852-2002 (New
York: New York Press, 2002), 6.
57
Alan M. Krause and Deborah A. Krause, Covenant of Care: Newark Beth Israel and the Jewish Hospital in America
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2007).
58 Arthur J. Linenthal, First a Dream: The History of Boston’s Jewish Hospitals 1896 to 1928 (Boston: Beth Israel
Hospital, 1999).
59
Sarah Gordon, ed., All Our Lives: A Centennial History of Michael Reese Hospital and Medical Center (Chicago:
Michael Reese Hospital and Medical Center, 1981).
60 Gordon, All Our Lives, 42.

22

The hospital cared for the large Jewish and Gentile immigrant population that arrived
in Milwaukee beginning in the late 1800s and early 1900s. The hospital’s Jewish identity
originates not from any specific practice or formal religious tradition. The hospital was
Jewish because of the support of the Milwaukee Jewish population. It also contributed to
the establishment of the Jewish medical profession in Milwaukee. The hospital also
served the latent function of providing a place for Jewish men to practice medicine.
Jewish doctors in Milwaukee had no place to establish their practices. Despite the relative
acceptance of Jewish businesses, Milwaukee hospitals did not allow Jewish doctors on
staff. Mount Sinai Hospital created opportunities for the Jewish members of the
Milwaukee community. The doctors of Mount Sinai described the history of the hospital
in terms of what the Jewish hospital offered them, namely the opportunity to achieve
upward social and economic success. In 1903, Christian hospitals in Milwaukee were not
open to Jewish doctors. Mount Sinai Hospital served as a means for the establishment of
the Milwaukee Jewish medical profession.61 The doctors established their livelihoods
because of the availability of a Jewish hospital at a time when antisemitism prevented
them from practicing elsewhere in Milwaukee.62 Being a board member conferred a
positive social status on those who contributed time and money for fundraising.63 Jewish
businessmen were able to serve on the hospital board and achieve the status of leaders at
their hospital.64
The decision to be both a Jewish and nonsectarian hospital guided and challenged the
Milwaukee Jewish community through decades of medical and social changes. As early
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as 1904, hospital leaders noted that Mount Sinai was serving more Gentiles than Jews.
The nonsectarian mission of the hospital encouraged non-Jewish patients to seek care at
Mount Sinai, and they did use the hospital. Yet, the number of Jewish patients was
consistently lower than the number of non-Jewish patients.65 Mount Sinai treated more
non-Jewish patients than Jewish throughout its history. However, members of the
collective Jewish community provided leadership at Mount Sinai. It was Jewish because
of that participation. From 1903 through the 1960s, the Jewish Board members of Mount
Sinai, Jewish doctors, and volunteers staffed and funded the hospital to aid Milwaukee’s
growing population.
For the majority of Mount Sinai’s history, fundraising by the Jewish community
covered the costs of caring for the poor in Milwaukee. Support for Mount Sinai Hospital
was an important aspect for two of the three attributes of Milwaukee Jewish identity. The
philanthropic efforts of the Jewish collective community enabled Mount Sinai to treat the
poor in Milwaukee, regardless of their religious affiliation. Despite the long term support
of the Jewish population, the hospital merged in 1987. The relationship between the
Jewish community and Mount Sinai changed beginning in the 1970s.
The literature offers various theories as to why long standing private religious
hospitals closed, relocated, or merged. Many immigrant groups established hospitals in
American cities. Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish hospitals served patients for decades.
Historian Rosemary Stevens glossed over the loss of community funding and focused on
a larger discussion of insurance plans and health care costs.66 I believe that the decrease
in support from their communities starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s was
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significant to private urban community hospitals. Why did so many private religious
hospitals close or merge with other hospitals? Some scholars attribute the closing to
changes within the communities themselves. Many sociologists contributed to the large
body of literature on the concept of community. Some of the earliest works came from
Tonnies, Durkheim, Marx, and Weber. Each offered views on the effects of
industrialization on community groups and its members. Tonnies used the terms
gemeinschaft and gesellschaft to describe communities before and after the industrial age.
Gemeinschaft defined pre-industrial community life as a way of life consisting of close
community ties between individuals living in close proximity and including the
importance of religion and religious unity between community members.67 Gesellschaft,
seen after the establishment of an industrial economy and larger urban environments,
represented a distance between community members in their personal lives. The rise of
industry brought individuals together for the shared purpose of earning a living and
weakened the more personal relationships through social and physical distance within the
community.68
Durkheim’s concepts of mechanical and organic solidarity and the theory of a
community’s “conscious collective” also examined the effects of industrialization on
community members. Mechanical solidarity described the close ties between members of
a community as a “collective consciousness” which facilitated the cooperation of
individuals toward accepted goals. These goals, adopted by the community members,
served as a means of creating a sense of all for one and one for all within small communal
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spaces.69 Organic solidarity represented the less personal, more individual community
model. He argued that as community members industrialized, the struggle to earn and
maintain livelihood led to an increase in social interactions based not on religious
observance or shared kinship, but on economic necessity. Wage earning increased. The
interactions between tradespeople, artists, and other community small businesses and
their customers decreased as more people sold their labor and their time.70
Sociologist Karl Marx studied the impact of capitalism on communities. He noted the
inequality between two broad groups: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie,
those in possession of the means of production in an industrialized economy, affected
community ties through the exploitation of proletariat labor. He argued that capitalism
divided the members of the working class into separate groups, often competing for the
same goals, namely wages. This was what he called divide and conquer. Marx believed
that social distance between community members was not an effect of capitalism, it was a
specific goal of the ruling class.71
Sociologist Max Weber introduced the term socioeconomic status (SES) into the
discussion of community. He described SES as a social position within an agreed upon
hierarchy, beginning with wealth and economic gain. He argued that those with more
wealth achieved higher social statuses based on their assets. They lived in neighborhoods
with high SES. This created distance within communities. Wealth afforded individuals
both material gain and social capital. The lower SES did not live with those in the upper
echelons: economic disparity changed the community relationships.72
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While the theories noted above illustrate the changes between members of a
community with the creation of an industrialized economy, Jewish collective action in
support of Mount Sinai continued even after many of the more affluent members of the
Jewish population moved from the city. The history of the collective actions of the Jewish
community in Milwaukee in the creation of Mount Sinai Hospital revealed the
importance of both high SES and wealth in establishing the hospital. The more affluent
members of the Milwaukee community, Jewish and non-Jewish, listened to speeches and
accolades from some of Milwaukee’s most prestigious citizens at the June 1903
dedication ceremony. The fact that Mount Sinai received support and acknowledgment
from the Gentile population is a testament to the success of the first wave Jewish
immigrants in Milwaukee. The theories above do not fully explain the decrease in the
Jewish collective action at Mount Sinai.
By the 1960s, many Jewish families had moved away from Milwaukee. However,
these families, especially the doctors and their wives, continued to support the hospital.
Jewish doctors admitted their patients to Mount Sinai. I argue that the creation of
government insurance programs, more so than changes brought on by industrialization,
changed the way hospitals provided care for the poor and changed the relationship
between collective communities and their established hospitals. Immigrants founded
community hospitals in urban areas. One crucial event in the history of Mount Sinai was
the War on Poverty, established by the Lyndon Baines Johnson administration in 1965.
Over the course of the War on Poverty, new in health care programs, health care payment
options, and even the attitudes about care for the indigent in the United States
transformed the way urban hospitals did business. Mount Sinai’s actions and reactions in
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the wake of funding changes reveal how hospitals treating a large number of poor patients
began to lose large amounts of money. The support for hospitals through donations and
volunteer hours diminished. In 1965, Medicaid, or Title 19, provided money for the care
of poor patients at many private religious hospitals, including Mount Sinai. At first,
Medicaid provided full reimbursement for patient care. In 1982, the Medicaid program
underwent a series of changes, including the decrease of reimbursements to hospitals for
patient care. The hospitals had to absorb the costs. This created financial difficulties for
many hospitals around the United States, including Mount Sinai. Community fundraising
efforts continued after 1965, but the money was redirected to other Jewish institutions in
new Jewish residential areas. The Ladies Auxiliary continued to raise money for Mount
Sinai, but the funds were used for medical libraries, redecorating projects, and other
improvements instead of costs of patient care.73 In an attempt to compete with other area
hospitals, Mount Sinai expanded their facilities, medical research, and specialties, and
established a teaching program with University of Wisconsin-Madison. These changes
were insufficient to stop the losses, however, leading to the 1987 merger with Good
Samaritan Medical Center. Good Samaritan was created after a 1982 merger between
Deaconess Hospital and Lutheran Hospital (also known as Passavant Hospital).74
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SUBURBAN JEWISH POPULATION AND IDENTITY
Demographic changes in the Jewish population and the development of new
government insurance programs for the care of the poor created distance between the
hospital and Jewish community support. The Jewish community moved out of downtown
Milwaukee starting in the 1950s and began to establish Jewish organizations in the
suburbs. As Krausz noted, the concept of identity evolves, and it did in Milwaukee.75 The
Milwaukee Jewish population established themselves in the city. The more affluent
Jewish population moved out of downtown Milwaukee starting in the 1950s and began to
establish Jewish organizations in suburbs. Social changes, namely the decrease in
discrimination in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1965, created new opportunities at
Milwaukee hospitals. Jewish doctors obtained privileges to practice and their patients
followed them. The symbiotic relationship between Jewish doctors and patients and their
hospital became less vital, but did not end.76
The East Side Jews moved to the suburbs, while Mount Sinai remained downtown.
The relocation of the East Side population altered two of the three core traits of the
original Milwaukee Jewish identity. The collective efforts to the city were replaced by the
need to establish and sustain suburban Jewish institutions in their new neighborhoods.
Philanthropic collective action continued, but in support of institutions outside the city
limits. The historic East Side and West Side Jewish identities should have weakened as
Jews moved out of the city, but they did not. The historical divide between the two groups
remained, still defined by location, between those who remained in Milwaukee, and those
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that moved out.77 Suburban Jewish populations invested a great deal of time and money
in their local Jewish entities. Synagogues, Jewish day schools, and neighborhoods grew
outside of the city. Jewish doctors began practicing at other Milwaukee hospitals, and
their patients followed them. The racial composition of the neighborhood surrounding
Mount Sinai changed as well.78
Some interview subjects reported perceptions that the location of Mount Sinai was
unsafe, which may have kept some patients and even long-time volunteers from outlying
areas away. The downtown location, just north of the area sometimes called the “inner
city,” contributed to the belief that Mount Sinai was a hospital for the indigent.79 Many
Interviewees reported that the decrease in the Jewish involvement and support facilitated
the merger with Good Samaritan. That merger was considered a painful loss by members
of the community.80 However, by this time, the hospital had merged. The result of the
merger was that, as one doctor summed it up, “The only thing Jewish about Mount Sinai
now is its history.”81

POLICY, FUNDING CHANGES, AND DEFICIT
One of the main reasons for the loss of Jewish sponsorship and the decreased
participation stemmed from the changes in the American hospital system: specifically,
how it financed indigent care. Mount Sinai did treat a large number of patients using
Medicaid and Medicare. Decreased reimbursement changes to those programs created an

77
78
79
80
81

Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011.
Marilyn Kahn, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, June 6, 2011.
Dr. Paul Jacobs, Phone Interview by author, November 2, 2011.
Dr. David Amrani, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011.
Dr. Harry Kanin, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011.

30

increasing financial burden at the facility.82 Changes in funding for indigent care resulted
in loss of revenue for many hospitals. The creation and expansion of Medicaid and
Medicare in 1965 began to replace fund raising in funding medical care for the poor. The
Milwaukee Jewish population believed that these new programs would provide for those
in need of care. It was a misguided belief. Funding cuts to both programs beginning in the
1970s led to a fiscal crisis. Both programs fell short in covering the cost of care and led to
financial problems at many hospitals, including Mount Sinai. By the time hospitals felt
the full effects of policy change, the support of their founding communities had all but
ended.
Historian Charles Rosenberg stated that, “Policy is a familiar term. But like many
indispensable words, it is not easily defined.” In one sense Rosenberg believed that policy
is descriptive of practice in the public sector but also notes that “policy” has a variety of
meanings: it may imply a sense of responsibility for the planning and strategic unity
between goals and outcome. Policy should plan for the possibility of conflict, negotiation,
and compromise in policy changes.83
Rosenberg believed that some types of policy had the potential for consequences,
labeled “cumulative” in that each decision and its significance interact over time to define
a new yet historically structured reality, one that is usually unintended and can be missed
by those who did not plot the policy steps completely. He wrote, “The system moves
through visible decision points, elaborated by subsequent administrative practice–with
that specific experience along with other relevant variables shaping the next visible shift
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in public policy.”84 The changes in health care policy and procedure for the indigent at
Mount Sinai illustrated the cumulative effect. The shift in policy, from a community
based and funded support system for private religious hospitals to a governmental
program, vulnerable to changes in political support, left hospitals struggling to provide
care with less money. By placing the responsibility for charity care with the government,
funding became vulnerable to the political positions and attitudes over time. Changes in
the political climate translated into changes in the social program. Historian Jonathan
Engel discussed the political changes since the creation of Medicaid in the context of his
belief that the government’s responsibility to provide charity care is considered
permanent by the majority of citizens. While the debate about how much to spend and
who deserves coverage continues, he argues that no serious attempt to return to collective
community funding for health care.85 His conclusion was that Medicaid, although flawed,
has been successful. At the time of its creation, the data about health care utilization
among the urban poor was dire. Prenatal care, dental care, well child care, and many
other medical services were anomalies for the poor American population prior to the
1960s. The rates of service to the poor in these low income areas were very low, until the
poor were able to pay for the care that wealthier Americans were buying for themselves
using Medicaid. This program, Engel argued, worked as it was designed to, although not
perfectly.86
Others supported Engels in his conclusions about the new programs, but issued a
warning about the future. At a medical conference held in Philadelphia in 1981, David
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Rogers, Robert Blindon, and Thomas W. Moloney presented an article they had written
for the New England Journal of Medicine examining the effectiveness of the Medicaid
program. Their findings showed that while Medicaid was working as intended, and that
the poor were being helped, “A worsening national economic situation has led the public
to place a much lower priority on the provision of health services particularly tax
supported services to our low income citizens.” In short, the popular opinion was
changing and the program was up against the growing economic worries of the public.
The call to safeguard tax dollars from waste was affecting the support for a successful
program.87 They warned that the issue of cost should not be ignored; they feared the
development of a conventional wisdom framing tax dollars spent for the poor to get care
as a “waste.” Medicaid, they argue, was at risk, due to the relative ignorance of the
general public about the assistance program. They were correct. Medicaid costs drew
criticism while being associated with the negative attitudes about social welfare programs.
The public believed that along with cash, food stamps, and housing assistance, Medicaid
was just another example of wasteful government spending.88
Contrary to this emerging conventional wisdom of wasted tax dollars on a broken
program, the authors noted that Medicare benefits were serving exactly the population it
was supposed to: the elderly, the disabled, the mentally ill, and poor children. In fact, the
program was costing so much because it was doing exactly what is was designed to do,
provide health care for those in need. Nursing homes were receiving half of their funding
from the Medicare program. Teaching hospitals, which served a large urban poor
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population, received 10% of their funding from Medicaid.89
Changes in health care also affected hospitals. Medical advances, the creation and
expansion of specific specialties and the creation of health care networks increased the
cost of medical care. Prior to the July 30, 1965 signing of the Title 19 Act, also known as
Medicaid, the Jewish community supported Mount Sinai and assumed responsibility for
the hospital and supported its operations with time and money. The community sustained
operations even during the Great Depression and World War II, when money and
resources were limited.90 The national recession of the early 1980s revealed the
decreased financial contributions to from the Jewish collective to Mount Sinai Hospital.
While volunteer opportunities remained through the 1980s, the fundraising events that
had supported hospital renovations, innovations, and patient care for decades decreased
dramatically. Contributions decreased as private donations were erroneously considered
obsolete in the wake of Medicare and Medicaid by the Jewish community.91 Hospital
administrators understood the fiscal ramifications of changes in Medicaid and Medicare
reimbursement, but the community at large did not donate funds as they once had.92 The
hospital began to struggle when funding for Medicaid and Medicare were cut at the start
of Ronald Reagan’s first term as president in 1981. The majority of the patients treated at
Mount Sinai were using those programs. Mount Sinai served a large number of patients
who could not pay for their care at all, or who had their services reimbursed at rates lower
than the actual costs.93

89

Rogers, Blundon, and Molony, “Who Needs Medicaid?,” 245.
Langill, A Tradition of Caring).
91 Ruth Traxler, The Golden Land, 150 Years of Jewish Life in Milwaukee (Milwaukee Wisconsin: Sesquicentennial
Celebration, 1994), 66.
92
Traxler, The Golden Land, 66.
93 Walter I. Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America (New York: The Free
Press, 1994), 365.
90

34

Before the new government programs, the Jewish people in Milwaukee held events
like a charity ball and an annual Donation Day or some other funding drive to offset fiscal
losses. By the 1980s, the historic fundraising on the part of the Jewish community had
essentially ended. There are two strong explanations for the lack of fundraising for Mount
Sinai. First, the donations stopped because the work was deemed no longer necessary in
light of the government programs. The belief that the government programs paid for the
care the donations used to cover may have undermined the drives.94 In addition, an
overall decrease in female volunteers at the hospital explains why fundraising ended.
Jewish women in the 1980s did not replace the aging volunteers from the 1950s and
1960s. Fundraising efforts abated because there were simply not enough volunteers to
continue.95
The hospital faced closure in the early 1980s until a merger with another hospital,
Good Samaritan, was approved in 1987. Two Milwaukee hospitals, Passavant and
Deaconess, merged to create Good Samaritan Medical Center. They, like Mount Sinai,
relied on community donations for operations. Financial support for the two also declined.
The creation of a regional medical center necessitated a merger under new regulations
established by changes in the Medicaid program. The merger attenuated decades of
financial support and volunteerism. It also severed the community relationship between
members of the Jewish community and the city of Milwaukee, a relationship that had
lasted thirty years after many of the Jewish families started moving beyond Milwaukee’s
borders. The creation of government insurance programs changed the way hospitals
provided care for the poor. Immigrants founded community hospitals in urban areas. The
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communities supported hospitals through donations and volunteer hours. In 1965,
Medicaid, or Title XIX, provided funds for the care of poor patients at many private
religious hospitals, including Mount Sinai. At first, Medicaid provided full
reimbursement for patient care. In 1982, the Medicaid program underwent a series of
changes, including the decrease of reimbursements to hospitals for patient care. This,
combined with the end of patient care fundraising, and almost bankrupted many hospitals,
including Mount Sinai. After the creation of Sinai Samaritan, Jewish leaders announced
plans to preserve a “Jewish identity” at the new facility. However, what was actually
preserved was a symbol of the core traits of Milwaukee Jewish identity; East and West
Side Jewish history, philanthropy, and service to the city.

ORGANIZATION AND CHAPTER OUTLINE
Chapter One of this dissertation discusses the history of the city of Milwaukee and
Jewish immigration. It examines the history of the first wave Jewish population, the
foundation of Milwaukee Jewish identity, and their relationship with other Milwaukee
immigrant groups, including the relatively small West Side Jewish population that settled
outside of the Germanic neighborhoods. The chapter examines upward social mobility
experienced by the founders of Mount Sinai and the planning stages of creating the
hospitals and those organizations and individuals who were instrumental in bringing the
hospital into being. I include a discussion of the early years of operation, including the
dedication of the hospital and the board members and volunteers who served. The
foundation for Jewish commitment to Milwaukee is discussed. In Milwaukee, many first
wave Jewish immigrants obtained civil rights, something denied to them in their countries
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of origin. The 1848 European Revolutions failed to secure basic rights of suffrage and
freedom from punitive taxes for Jewish men.96 This chapter describes the early
interactions between the East Side and West Side populations in Milwaukee and the
contentious attempts to establish Jewish houses of worship. The differences in ethnic and
religious traditions and the actions of the first wave Jewish immigrants toward
compelling second wave immigrants to adopt an American civil religion led to the
creation of several synagogues in Milwaukee. The struggle to establish religious
traditions and congregations cemented the animosity between East and West Side Jewish
populations. The increased SES of West Side Jews did not automatically remove the
stigma of being from the West Side. Increased SES, due in part to the business
opportunities in Milwaukee, made philanthropy possible. This chapter explains the
history behind the three main traits of Milwaukee Jewish identity.
Chapter Two details the arrival of the second wave Jewish population, mainly
Eastern European. This chapter explains how charitable efforts in Milwaukee grew in
response to the large number of Jewish immigrants, most of them very poor. Mount Sinai
Hospital and other Jewish organization began during the late 1890s and early 1920s. This
chapter illustrates the early interactions between East and West Side Jewish populations
through the charitable efforts created. The history of philanthropy, a Milwaukee identity
trait, is an integral part of this chapter. The hospital board members and noteworthy
supporters of the hospital also led relief associations. The important events during these
years, namely the establishment of the annual Donation Days in 1904 show the strength
of Jewish contributions to the new hospital.
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Chapter Three discusses the creation and expansion of Mount Sinai’s Dispensary.
The literature pertaining to the dispensaries at Mount Sinai New York, Beth Israel in
Newark, Beth Israel in Boston, Mount Sinai-Chicago, and Michael Reese-Chicago reveal
the differences and the similarities of urban hospital dispensaries. The contribution of the
Ladies Auxiliary and the establishment of community ties with other hospitals at the
Mount Sinai Dispensary created and sustained community health services and training for
doctors and nurses. Mount Sinai’s leadership attempted to weather the fiscal difficulties
associated with a worldwide economic downturn by creating a membership program for
the hospital. The program ended due to the objection of the doctors in Milwaukee.
Fundraising efforts lagged during this time. The decrease in fundraising activity for
the hospital in the Jewish community concerned leaders at Mount Sinai. Chapter Four
takes up the complex merger negotiations between The Passavant and Deaconess, two
Christian hospitals in Milwaukee. The history of the merger is significant. The two
hospitals considered merger in order to remain open. The financial problems related to
changes in both the American hospital system, namely the increase in costs of care, and in
how care for indigent patients, specifically the creation of Medicaid and Medicare,
stretched hospital resources. The new government funding programs replaced the historic
community fundraising at many urban hospitals, including those in Milwaukee.
The creation of government resources for urban hospitals led to massive renovations
at many Milwaukee hospitals and also spurred the idea of a regional medical center.
Local political leaders and groups, namely the GMC, utilized these resources in order to
build the center. The merger was the result of the political efforts of Milwaukee County
civic groups to that end. Local leaders parlayed their knowledge of federal and state
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regulations to gain funding for the project. They also secured state approval for
construction by facilitating the merger between Passavant and Deaconess. Their plans
hinged on that merger. Good Samaritan Medical Center, the hospital that Mount Sinai
merged with in 1987, opened after a merger between The Passavant and Deaconess. The
protracted process revealed the difficulties associated with the merger process in the early
1980s. The leadership at the merging hospitals were at odds with the new medical center
leaders and a great deal of acrimony delayed the final merger decision.
The creation of the Regional Medical Center in Wauwatosa, Wisconsin occurred
during the merger of The Passavant and Deaconess. The teaching hospital and a medical
college located in Wauwatosa competed with Milwaukee hospitals at a time when the
city’s hospitals needed more patients. The Milwaukee County Hospital moved to the
grounds of the medical center, leaving Mount Sinai to treat more indigent patients. The
limitations associated with new government regulation on hospital construction and
pricing after the creation of the Medicaid program left Mount Sinai with few options after
the creation of Good Samaritan.
Chapter Five details the efforts of leaders at Mount Sinai Medical Center to remain
open after deficits in patient care reimbursements and debt caused by the 1972 expansion.
Between 1974 and 1979, hospital leaders experimented with the idea making Mount Sinai
more religiously Jewish as a marketing strategy. The Executive Vice President behind the
initiative, Raymond Alexander, left Mount Sinai abruptly in 1976, and the initiative was
tabled. The Regional Medical Complex in Wauwatosa ended plans for establishing Mount
Sinai as a teaching hospital, so in 1976 leaders established a teaching partnership with the
University of Wisconsin-Madison. The program was both a blessing and a burden. A
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blessing in that it allowed Mount Sinai Medical Center to remain in downtown
Milwaukee and a burden in that the university doctors resulted in conflict between Jewish
doctors at the hospital and university doctors. This weakened the relationship between the
hospital and the local doctors.
This chapter also describes the circumstances that led to the creation of the
suburban Milwaukee Jewish population. Jewish families moved to the suburbs, and many
of their institutions moved with them. These new suburban organizations benefited from
the time, effort and funds donated by Jewish families. Mount Sinai did not receive the
time, money and attention it had once enjoyed, but the Jewish population continued to
support the hospital, but not to the extent it had in the past. The charity balls continued
into the early 1980s, but the money was redirected from patient care to additions and
departments at Mount Sinai. Hospital board members continued to serve, despite moving
away from the city. The Suburban Jewish population did not completely sever their
relationship with Milwaukee, Mount Sinai remained their responsibility.
Chapter Six describes the severe financial shortfalls at Mount Sinai and the merger
decision. One of the most profound changes came in the aftermath of the PL 93-641,
federal legislation passed in 1974 as part of the Hill-Burton Act. This legislation gave the
U.S. government the power to set reimbursements on the medical care of Medicaid
patients through state agencies. The legislation led to Rate Review Boards and state
control over hospitals in matters of construction and charges for patient care. Hospitals
did not collect the total cost of care from these programs. Secondly, in 1982, federal
regulations on Medicare patients automatically disallowed two percent of the total cost of
care, leaving the care provider responsible for the balance. And finally, the creation of
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Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs) and standardized medical coding in the health care
industry lowered the amount of reimbursement for Medicare patients further. The
combination of reimbursement deficits and the remodeling debt was unsustainable. The
1987 merger of Mount Sinai and Good Samaritan took far less time that the
Passavant/Deaconess agreement. By 1987, Mount Sinai’s leaders sought to keep the
hospital open, even if it meant merging with another religious hospital. Hospital leaders
realized that the location of Mount Sinai made it an integral facility for many of
Milwaukee’s poor patients. The goal was to remain open, not to remain Jewish, and to
that end, Sinai Samaritan replaced Mount Sinai and Good Samaritan in 1988.97
The conclusion examines the Milwaukee Jewish community today, and efforts to
establish a sense of identity. The Milwaukee Jewish Federation held a Jewish Summit in
2011. The two-day event, held at the Milwaukee Public Museum, sought to bring Jewish
groups and individuals from the state of Wisconsin together in order to set goals for the
future of the Jewish population. Accommodations were made to foster the contribution
and participation of all branches of Judaism, Shabbos and kashrut observance in
particular, to maximize community input. I include the idea of revisiting the history of the
Jewish contributions in creating community health care initiatives in Milwaukee. The
history of the 1935 Dispensary provides an example of how cooperation between
organizations and agencies, Jewish and Gentile, provided health care for a growing
number of indigent patients during The Depression. The Affordable Care Act did not
result in universal health care. The issue of coverage and care for those without is a
possible avenue for the efforts of the Milwaukee Jewish Federation to encourage Jewish
collective community action.
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SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY
Archival resources from the Jewish Museum Milwaukee and Golda Meir Library at
the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee are crucial to understanding this history. The
Sinai Samaritan Collection and the Jewish Social Services collection provided details
about the Jewish hospital and Jewish charity efforts in Milwaukee. These two archives
contain newspaper articles, meeting minutes, and reports. Newspapers in Milwaukee
provide a context for the actions of the hospital. The Milwaukee Journal, The Milwaukee
Sentinel, and The Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle published many articles about Mount Sinai
during its eighty-four year history. The Sinai Samaritan Collection at the Golda Meir
Library at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee provided a great deal of data about the
relationship between the Jewish population and the city of Milwaukee. Newspaper
clippings, hospital reports and memos, press releases, and a variety of pamphlets
illustrated the relationship between the decisions made by Mount Sinai’s leaders. They
acted to continue the hospital’s contribution to the people of Milwaukee, the merger was
their last act toward continuing the mission of Mount Sinai. The Mount Sinai Collection
and the archival resources from the Jewish Museum Milwaukee and Golda Meir Library
at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee provided a great deal of information about the
historic relationship between Mount Sinai Hospital and the Jewish community of
Milwaukee. In particular, this collection includes documents about the attempt to
establish Mount Sinai as a Jewish hospital, led by Raymond Alexander, between
1971-1976.
A special note about the Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle belongs here. This publication
provided a means to examine the attitudes and positions held by some members of the
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Jewish community in Milwaukee. During the years of Mount Sinai’s operation, this
paper’s editors were some of Mount Sinai’s most vocal supporters. Established in 1921,
the newspaper’s very first editorial stated that it was not interested in solving anything; it
was created to report on the lives and experiences within the Jewish community in
Wisconsin. The Chronicle remains in publication and continues to provide information to
the Jewish community of Wisconsin.98 It reported many of the high and low points of the
history of Mount Sinai and the efforts to continue on as a Jewish hospital. The Jewish
Museum Milwaukee Archives holds every edition of the newspaper.
In addition to the oral histories, the dissertation of sociologist Howard Polsky, The
Great Defense: A Study of Jewish Orthodoxy in Milwaukee, provided information about
characteristics of the West Side Jewish population in Milwaukee. Polsky provides a voice
for the West Side Jewish population. Swichkow and Gartner provided a great deal of
history about the East Side Jewish experience. Polsky picks up the history of the more
Orthodox West Side Jewish immigrants.99 The addition of the West Side narrative
augments the history of the Jewish immigrant experience in Milwaukee.
The sources listed above were very helpful in providing a great deal of historical data
for this research. However, oral histories provided by the members of the Milwaukee
Jewish community, former employees of the hospital, and volunteers offered a contextual
component to the archive holdings. The voices of the respondents enhance the existing
archival information. The experiences of those who were kind enough to participate in
this study reveal the interactions and reactions that elaborated upon the facts reported in
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newspaper articles. In addition, these histories included information not reported
elsewhere. They relate the history of community interaction and activism from their
perspective. The voices of the community complement the archival holdings and allow
for the community members to elaborate on the printed history.
Mount Sinai was a Milwaukee nonsectarian Jewish hospital, founded and strongly
supported by the Jewish population, for the city of Milwaukee Jewish and Gentile alike. It
served as a symbol of the Jewish value of Tzedakah, operated from a sense of
benevolence, and a source of community pride in its growth as an innovative and
respected hospital. For decades, the men and women of the Jewish community raised
large sums of money through a variety of donation drives, gala events and community
wide fund raising; served on the Hospital board; and advocated for the hospital through
their business ventures and contacts. The history of the Jewish contribution to Milwaukee
begins with the arrival of the first wave East Side Jewish population.
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CHAPTER 1 THE JEWISH POPULATION IN MILWAUKEE
This chapter analyzes the creation and relationship between the two separate Jewish
populations in Milwaukee leading up to the creation of Mount Sinai Hospital in 1903.
The distinction between them contributed to the creation of the East Side vs. West Side
populations. The two groups were split along ethnic, socioeconomic, and religious
differences. However, the differences between the two did not prevent the creation of
Mount Sinai; rather, they inspired it.
Milwaukee was a city poised for growth in the 1850s. Jewish immigrants on the East
Side of the Milwaukee River established businesses and lived among the non-Jewish
Germanic immigrants. Historian Kathleen Neils Conzen noted that Milwaukee attracted
both farmers and artisans, lured by the stories of a great deal of economic opportunity for
those willing to work hard.1 Some of the more prosperous members of this Jewish
community established Mount Sinai Hospital. Initially, a small West Side Jewish
population, those that arrived with the East Side Jews in the 1840s and 1850s, were less
likely to embrace a more American style of Jewish worship and did not settle with the
others. They created their own congregations apart from the other group. After the arrival
of the Eastern European immigrants, starting in the late 1880s, the new West Side
immigrants created one of the largest Jewish neighborhoods in Milwaukee. This chapter
describes the foundation of the first core characteristic of Milwaukee Jewish identity:
namely the significance of which side of the Milwaukee River on which immigrants
settled.
A discussion detailing the foundation for the strong commitment of the Jewish
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population to the city of Milwaukee is also included. The demographic characteristics of
Milwaukee, a large Germanic population chief among them, and civil rights offered to
certain immigrants in Milwaukee at the time of the arrival of the East Side Jewish
population fostered a sense of belonging and gratitude within the East Side Jewish
population. The first wave of Jewish immigrants capitalized on economic opportunities
and civic freedoms in Milwaukee and founded the East Side Jewish population. The
success in business ventures created social and cultural capital for members of the East
Side Jewish population. The increase in SES in the German Jewish immigrant population
was very important for Mount Sinai.
Many of these immigrants gained rights and freedoms not available to them in
Western Europe. The failure of the 1848 revolution did result in a great deal of German
migration to many American cities, Milwaukee included. Historians Louis J. Swichkow
and Louis P. Gartner noted that in Milwaukee, support for those involved in the 1848
revolution in Germany attracted immigrants. They stated, “Another factor [explaining the
large number of German immigrants in Milwaukee] was the publicized sympathy of
Milwaukee’s German community for the revolutionary movement in Germany. This
attracted ‘Forty-eighters’ to Milwaukee in great numbers.”2 John Gurda explained, “The
famed Forty-Eighters, [sic] many of them well-educated and all of them decidedly liberal,
suffered exile for their assault on the established order, and Milwaukee became one of
their American strongholds.”3 The founding members of the East Side Jewish population
arrived with their Gentile counterparts after the revolution. They settled in Milwaukee
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and joined the German community. They established many successful businesses in
Milwaukee because they shared many cultural traits with Gentiles in the city. German
Jewish businesses grew rapidly, and many East Side Jews experienced a great deal of
upward economic and social mobility. Swichkow and Gartner noted that “Jews actively
participated in Milwaukee’s commercial life and contributed heavily to the early
commercial and industrial development of the city. They were represented among the
grain dealers and were pioneer Great Lakes shippers. As elsewhere on the Western
frontier, Jewish peddlers and merchants were prominent, while Jewish manufacturers
clothed most of Milwaukee and its outlying districts.”4 Both Bourdieu and Goldscheider
described this experience as the means to both create social and cultural capital, which
gave a sense of agency to this population to create acceptable cultural standards for
anyone wishing to achieve upward social mobility and higher SES.5 The fact that they
arrived first and many enjoyed economic success also established the East Side
population as the creators of certain norms and acceptable traits within the Jewish
population. Sociologist Hanni M. Holzman wrote that by virtue of being in Milwaukee
first, “They could set up their own society where they made the rules.”6 Holzman posited
that in Milwaukee, East Side Jews found what they had hoped to create in their countries
of origin: freedom to live among Gentiles and equal rights.7 She noted that as many in
the East Side population attained wealth and high social status, these traits were included
to a growing list of certain qualifications that led to acceptance in the German Jewish
4

Swichkow and Gartner, The History of the Jews of Milwaukee, 12.
Pierre Bourdieu, “Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction,” in Power and Ideology in Education (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1977); Calvin Goldscheider, “Demography of Jewish American: Research Findings, Issues,
and Challenges,” in Understanding American Jewry, ed. Marshall Sklare (Brandeis University: Transaction Publishers,
1982), 9.
6
Hanni M. Holzman, “The German Forty-Eighters and the Socialists in Milwaukee: A Social Psychological Study of
Assimilation” (MA thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1948), 13.
7 Holzman, “The German Forty-Eighters and the Socialists in Milwaukee,” 9.
5

47

community as an East Sider.8
However, what Holzman calls “assimilation” is in fact something quite different. The
German Jewish East Side population was not assimilating so much as they were both
acculturating and creating the social norms and mores for their own subculture. The Cult
of Synthesis, as described by Sarna, best illustrates the early history of Milwaukee’s
Jewish population. Affluent East Side Jews synthesized Americanism and Jewish identity
in the context of the city of Milwaukee and created the earliest cultural understandings
about being a Milwaukee Jew.9 They could acculturate, in part because many of the
Gentile Germans living in Milwaukee at the time they arrived supported the 1848
Revolutions taking place in Europe. They were likeminded in the matters of suffrage and
civil rights.10 However, they did not intermarry in Milwaukee in large numbers or feel
the need to change their names.11 They focused a great deal of time and effort creating a
Jewish subculture that allowed them to define and create and later, enforce rules about
being Jewish in Milwaukee, particularly East Side Milwaukee Jewish status.12
Economic opportunities allowed the East Side Jews to create Mount Sinai Hospital,
not just for Jewish patients, but for all those in need.13 The nonsectarian mission of
Mount Sinai Hospital signified, in part, a commitment to the city on the part of the first
Jewish immigrants. This commitment represents the second of the three aspects of
Milwaukee Jewish identity, contributions to the city of Milwaukee. Max Landauer, the
first president of Mount Sinai Hospital and successful East Side Jewish dry goods
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businessman, dedicated the hospital in June, 1903, saying, “The urgent necessity of a free
hospital for the poor and suffering of our city came to us in a practical way as members of
the Hebrew Relief Association.”14 The commitment to treat all in need in Milwaukee at
Mount Sinai emanated from a sense of gratitude on the part of the East Side Jews. It was
an acknowledgment of the rights and opportunities Milwaukee offered to them upon
arrival. The decades of fundraising efforts and donations of money and volunteer hours
on the part of the Jewish community continued after many Jewish residents moved from
Milwaukee. The 1987 merger kept the hospital in the city as a sectarian hospital in order
to continue the mission of caring for the poor in Milwaukee.15
The third facet of Milwaukee Jewish identity, the history of philanthropy, is grounded
in the arrival of the West Side Jews. Milwaukee Jewish philanthropy must include the
discussion of early Jewish religious practices in Milwaukee. The question of how best to
describe the religious differences between the first and second wave Jewish immigrants is
complicated. The sheer number of arrivals challenged relief organizations as well. The
Jewish relief efforts available in Milwaukee at the turn of the twentieth century grew as
more Jews from Eastern Europe arrived. The large number of Eastern European
immigrants in Milwaukee spurred the growth of relief organizations in Milwaukee. The
creation of relief programs and Mount Sinai Hospital in the early twentieth century was as
much about acculturating to the accepted synthesis of Jewish and American practices as
they were about assistance.
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AMERICAN JUDAISM: CONGREGATIONS AND CONFLICTS
In 1654, the first group of Jewish immigrants arrived in America. They established
themselves in New Amsterdam, now New York.16 Two large immigrant waves, the first
starting in the late 1840s and the second, in the 1880s, established the foundation for the
Milwaukee Jewish population. I use the terms first and second wave Jewish immigrants
to describe immigration to Milwaukee during those two periods. The first wave refers to
the 1840 immigrant members of the Jewish population, the second to those who arrived
in the 1880s. Religious practices between these first and second wave Jewish immigrants
were very different in Europe. Those differences created divisions between them after
they arrived in America. The literature revels that these divisions were not primarily
about religious observance: many of the issues that led to discord between the groups
centered on ethnicity and class. These differences often manifested themselves in
religious terms. The early use of the term “Orthodoxy” in some sources used for this
research took on various social meanings, some quite pejorative. At the time of the
meeting of first and second wave Jewish immigrants in American cities, in the late 1800s
and early 1900s, the term Orthodox tended to describe immigrants from the smaller cities
of Central and Eastern Europe and the less secularized. That is, the term often reflected
where that person was from and any secular education they had before arriving in
America. There were social implications stemming from that particular status. In this
sense, historian Jeffrey S. Gutrock found that the term Orthodox became synonymous
with Yiddish speaking immigrants with little formal education outside of the synagogue.
Members of American Reform congregations believed that secular education and
acculturated religious practice increased the likelihood of social and economic upward
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mobility.17 Historian Avaham Barkai believed that the earlier the arrival in America, the
more likely the Jewish immigrant would eventually practice a form of Reform Judaism.18
This form of Jewish practice differed from that of those arriving from Eastern Europe.
When large numbers of Eastern European Jews began arriving between 1880 and 1914,
Barkai noted that American Jewish communities acted to acculturate the new arrivals if
possible, “The now urgent aim was to wean the newcomers, or at least their children from
their alien ways.”19 He stated that there was a fear among those in the first wave Jewish
population that the Eastern European Jewish arrivals threatened their social status and
achievements in their communities.20 The first wave Jewish American feared the loss of
their hard earned social and cultural capital. That fear influenced relief efforts for the new
arrivals.
Barkai noted that these new immigrants did not quickly adopt the trappings of
American Jewish life, “The new immigrants did not share the German’s passion for rapid
Americanization. They gathered in ethnic neighborhoods and tried to benefit from what
America had to offer without relinquishing their traditions.”21 However, Gurock found
that for many of the immigrants in the second wave, the decline in traditional observance
began well before they actually considered leaving Europe. Many Jews living in Eastern
Europe worked on the Sabbath, despite social pressure against such actions.22 He
observed that for some second wave Jewish immigrants, their desire to look and act like
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other Americans led to their decision to change their dress and appearance.23 Men shaved
their beards and payes, married women removed their head coverings, sometimes
throwing them overboard as their ship docked at Ellis Island.24
Historian Eli Faber wrote that the earliest Jewish immigrants realized their freedom to
follow whatever religious traditions they wish, indeed, they were free to create their own.
This applied to both Reform and Orthodox practices. In America, no central Rabbinical
court or leader dictated the religious traditions, as they did in Europe,
Moreover, it was the complete lack of need for a universal Jewish community that
undermined all claims to hegemony. The authority of the autonomous kehillah
(community) of Europe arose from its function as intermediary between the
Jewish population and the government and from its responsibility to provide for
the welfare of a population burdened with civil disabilities. In the tolerant
atmosphere of English North America, in contrast, the Jewish population was
neither required nor ever instructed to provide an official entity to represent it and
to which all Jews must consequently be subordinated. The Jewish colonist was
free to associate voluntarily with the Jewish community or not, whatever its
pretensions to universal authority may have been.25
This situation also limited the amount of power any single congregation could expect
to hold in a given city. This freedom reduced the amount of control any religious leader
could expect over his congregation.26 In New York, there were congregations founded by
Dutch, Bohemian, English, German immigrants by the 1850s. They opened when
immigrants could not or would not join the Sephardic and Ashkenazic congregations
established by America’s earliest Jewish immigrants.27 In Boston, two congregations
developed in the South and North End neighborhoods, the more affluent original
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synagogue in the North, and the more “traditional” congregation in the South.28 In Fort
Worth, Texas, the relocation of the more traditional orthodox shul, Ahavath Sholom to
the center of the city to attract new members inspired the creation of a Reform
congregation, Beth-El.29 In Chicago, an Orthodox shul was established by a former
peddler turned successful businessman, Abraham Kohn, in order to provide kosher meat
for his elderly mother, who refused to eat anything trafe .30
The term Orthodox is used by sociologist Howard W. Polsky, in his dissertation about
Milwaukee, to describe the traditional mostly Eastern European Orthodox religious
observance of Judaism.31 That specific type of Judaism was not a large part of the early
Jewish immigrant experience in Milwaukee. Gurock noted that “Amidst the multitude of
immigrants who made partial peace with Jewish tradition as they strove to adjust and
succeed in America, there was a coterie of deeply devoted Jews who rigorously kept the
commandments.”32 There were more traditional European Jewish immigrants in the
second wave of the late 1800s, but they did not settle in Milwaukee.
Scholars have noted that the Jewish immigrants arriving between 1880 and 1920 were
possibly less likely to remain Orthodox in America. Historian Eli Faber noted that many
European Orthodox Jews heeded the warnings of their rabbis about the dangers to
Orthodox traditions in the Trafe Medina (unclean country) of America. The more Orthodox
Europeans likely remained in Europe.33 Historian Jonathan Sarna remarked that “All Jews,
to be sure, did not join the leftward swing [to Reform Judaism]. Every major Jewish
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community continued to maintain one or more traditional congregations.”34 The Jews that
arrived in Milwaukee and labeled Orthodox by Polsky did not retain many of their religious
customs once settled. The histories of Congregation B’ne Jeshurun on the West Side and
Emanu-El on the East Side of the Milwaukee River, illustrate the relatively brief period of
time some immigrants of the first wave Jewish population practiced a more traditional
form of Judaism. Swichkow and Gartner explained that “Although B’ne Jeshurun had left
Orthodoxy by the later 1860s, its brand of Reform Judaism was very halting. As the sole
congregation, it was an arena for contests between traditionalists and proponents of
completely Reform belief and practice.”35 The Reform minded Milwaukee Jews broke
from the congregation and formed the Reform synagogue Emanu-El.36 Gurock
mentioned B’ne Jeshurun, describing it as a congregation that had “surrendered” to more
American Reform Jewish practices by the late 1850s. The influence of Rabbi Isaac Wise,
proponent of the American Reform Movement, spurred changes at what was once
considered Milwaukee’s Orthodox synagogue. Wise viewed the adoption of mixed
seating [men and women sitting together] and music played on Shabbos as indications
that the dissenters had seen the advantages of adopting “modern” views on the issue of
Jewish rituals.37 Gurock noted that by 1870, almost all Americanized congregations had
turned away from European Orthodoxy.38 The arrival of the second wave Jewish
immigrants challenged these newly established religious traditions of first wave
immigrants in American cities. By the time the second wave arrived, many members of
Milwaukee’s Jewish population achieved upward social and economic mobility. This was
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made possible by the favorable economic climate for Jews in the city and the religious
freedom to define their Judaism.

A CITY OF OPPORTUNITY
In 1839, the two original settlements, Juneautown and Kilbourntown, after a series of
conflicts between founders Solomon Juneau and Byron Kilbourn over political decisions,
together formed the Town of Milwaukee.39 Until 1840, white migrants from New York
State or New England, known as Yankee-Yorkers, represented the majority in
Milwaukee.40 Historian Bayrd Still described a demographic shift Milwaukee at this time:
“In the middle forties, Teutonia began to challenge Yankee-dom and European
migration.”41 A large number of Germanic immigrants arrived in Milwaukee. These
immigrants began to “transform the tone of what had been predominantly a
Yankee-Yorker village; by 1843 a Germanic influence that was to reach its peak by the
end of the century had already begun to make itself felt.”42 The new immigrants from
Germanic regions of Europe arrived in Milwaukee and established a large ethnic enclave
in Milwaukee.43 Historian Bayrd Still noted, “By 1843 it was evident that the
increasingly numerous German-Americans were going to assume a positive role in
developing village culture.”44 The result of this immigrant wave was the creation of one
of the largest Germanic settlements in America. The influence of the immigrants on the
city’s landscape and the association between Milwaukee and German immigrants resulted
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in the nickname Deutsche Athens (German Athens) for the city, signifying a city in
America where German culture met American democracy and freedom.45
The fact that a large number of Germanic immigrants settled in Milwaukee was not
happenstance. An outreach program established by both the town of Milwaukee and the
State of Wisconsin advertised the industrial and agricultural opportunities in Wisconsin in
order to draw immigrants. Bayrd Still recorded that pamphlets and circulars written in
German to attract immigrant workers were distributed in many European countries.46
Still noted that the outreach to Germanic immigrants was so successful that, “As a result,
in many parts of Germany more was known about the Badger State than about an
outlying Prussian province.”47 Milwaukee’s German immigrants wrote to relatives in
Europe about the opportunities in Milwaukee and urged them to emigrate. Still reported
the results of the outreach in term of increased immigrant numbers: “The earliest German
immigrants began to arrive in 1835, and the remainder of the decade saw scattering
arrivals, among them a party of German carpenters, who had come at the solicitation of
Juneau; Matthias Stein, whom Juneau induced to stay; and Louis Trayser, whom the
shipbuilder George Barber persuaded to build an inn for his workers: ‘Zur Deutschen
Little Tavern.’48 However, Still concluded that during this time, a “push/pull” dynamic
brought more immigrants to America. The failed revolutions in Europe and the expanding
economic opportunities in America increased the number of immigrants. Still found that
in the North Central sections of the United States the number of arrivals totaled 280,000
by 1850.49 Immigration numbers rose in Milwaukee. Still that between 200 and 300
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German immigrants were arriving weekly in the 1840s; and soon young Germans from
Chicago were visiting Milwaukee to find themselves brides.50 In the summers of 1843
and 1844, the numbers grew to 1,000 to 1400.51 The city of Milwaukee and the state of
Wisconsin encouraged German immigration after the European Revolutions in 1848.52
Many European Jews immigrated to Milwaukee in order to escape the severe restrictive
laws passed after the revolution ended. Milwaukee offered civic freedoms and the
outreach efforts of the region brought the founding members of what became the East
Side Jewish residents to Milwaukee.

REVOLUTION AND RELOCATION
The European Revolutions of 1848 began when revolutionaries deposed French
King Louis-Philippe in Paris on February 25, 1848. Revolts in Vienna quickly followed
the Paris unrest. Historian Eton Amos notes that “It had started in Paris and Vienna, and
from there it was now leaping with remarkable speed to the main German cities. Across
Europe, the declared aim of the rebels was to put an end to despotism and to the
inequalities under the law.”53 In May of 1848, a revolution nicknamed a “spring of
nations” sought, among other goals, civil rights for Jews in some European regions.
Initially, some governments granted suffrage rights for Jewish men. Some leaders passed
new edicts which lifted restrictions on Jewish students at universities, in order to avoid
losing political power. The Jewish male population held equal rights for a brief time.
However, leaders rescinded the rights granted during 1848 revolution after the revolution
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ended. By December 1848, the revolutions ended and the new Jewish suffrage rights
were revoked. Jewish government participation ended, and new edicts limited their
opportunities even more than before the revolution.54 These losses increased Jewish
emigration.
Wisconsin’s liberal suffrage rights encouraged foreign immigrants by giving them the
right to vote after one year’s residence.55 The right of suffrage was established in 1847 for
immigrants who were “one-year residents, including white males, twenty-one years of
age, who had declared their intention to become citizens.”56 The outreach efforts of civic
and business interests in Milwaukee and the state of Wisconsin to German settlers in the
1850s and 1860s, combined with the failed revolutionary movement in Europe in the late
1840s drew many “Forty-eighters” to Milwaukee. Still explained, “The impact of the
Forty-eighters on the developing urban society was chiefly significant for the cultural and
intellectual ferment which they stirred up in the already cohesive German community.”57
The first wave immigrants created debating societies, lodges, schools, and newspapers in
addition to their businesses. They created an intellectual subculture in Milwaukee, but they
were held in beer gardens than in European style salons, a reflection of the acceptance of
Milwaukee German cultural practice.58
The early East Side Jewish community was part of that immigration population. They
settled in neighborhoods with other like-minded Gentiles, many of whom supported the
1848 revolutions.59 The fact that the city of Milwaukee had a large Germanic influence at
the time the first wave Jewish immigrants arrived is noteworthy. The fact that some first
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wave Jewish immigrants spoke German and considered themselves assimilated Jews in
Europe made their experience in Milwaukee vastly different from that of the second wave.
The first wave Jewish immigrants were able to establish their homes and themselves in
Milwaukee’s Germanic neighborhoods because they shared common cultural traits with
Germanic Gentiles. This allowed them to join the community and facilitated their
entrance into German neighborhoods. Swichkow and Gartner noted that, “These Jews
came during the heyday of German immigration to the United States between 1845 and
1857.”60 They cited the restrictions placed upon Jews in German and a depression in
1850, coupled with reprisals from the failed 1848 revolution as explanation for the
increase in German immigration to America.61
The East Side Jews settled in a neighborhood established by the 1840 immigrants that
Still described as “German town” which was a “self-contained and self-conscious
community centered in the Second, Sixth, and Nineteen wards” founded in cultural and
civic solidarity.62 The East Side Jews lived among the Second Ward’s non-Jewish
population. The neighborhood grew and eventually included areas in the Second, Sixth,
and Ninth wards, where German-style houses, German signs, and the German people made
their homes and businesses and political parties.63 Milwaukee Germans created
associations, lodges, clubs, as well as beer halls and taverns in the city. They established
businesses, places of worship, and schools. Still notes that immigrants born in German
regions made up one third of Milwaukee’s population by 1870 and concluded, “As a
result, the coordinate German society within the developing city was in many ways the
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most distinctive feature of mid-century Milwaukee.”64
The Milwaukee East Side Jewish community arrived at a time when the city wanted
immigrants. The large number of arrivals from Germanic regions after 1848, both Jewish
and Gentile, spoke German in their homes and places of worship and business concerns.65
The East Side Jewish population established themselves in business ventures due in great
part, to the characteristics of Milwaukee described previously and three fortuitous factors
in Milwaukee after 1848. First, they arrived in Milwaukee with a large, culturally-similar
non-Jewish cohort. Second, many Jewish immigrants acculturated themselves in
Milwaukee by learning English. Finally, Milwaukee did not restrict their civil rights and
provided them with the opportunities denied in their countries of origin. Harry Kanin
described the situation as “a perfect storm” for the East Side Jewish immigrants.
Milwaukee was a city open to secular and educated immigrants. Kanin explained, “They
came together with other Germans and were able to succeed.”66 The civic freedoms for
Jewish immigrants in Milwaukee afforded them the opportunities to build successful
businesses and establish professional practices. The economic opportunities in
Milwaukee in the later 1840s facilitated the growth of the Jewish upper class.

BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES
The East Side Jews synthesized their Jewish practices so thoroughly that they were
almost indistinguishable from non-Jewish immigrants in their work, habits, language and
enterprises. They joined the earlier German immigrants in their established neighborhoods.
Indeed, they were often identified most readily with the German community as a whole.
64
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Swichkow and Gartner noted that the Wisconsin State Census of 1855, which listed
residents by wards, showed that most Jews lived alongside Gentiles in the Second Ward.67
Many of the East Side Jewish immigrants started their own businesses. Sociologist
Hanni M. Holzman noted that many of these first wave Jews were from the European
middle class, hoping to secure permanent civil rights and the freedom to establish
businesses without government restrictions.68 Historian John Gurda noted that in
Milwaukee, “Jews showed an unmistakable preference for independent business. In a
sample of eighteen immigrants who came to Milwaukee between 1845 and 1850 and lived
in the city for at least five years, all eighteen were operating their own businesses in 1855,
selling groceries, clothing, dry goods, liquor, tin ware, and even ice, often in association
with relatives.”69 The historic European restrictions on Jewish economic activity explain
the prevalence of Milwaukee Jewish businesses. Gurda noted, “The Jewish predisposition
to business was the product not of genetics but of history. After experiencing the
capriciousness and often the viciousness of their host societies for hundreds of years– the
Spanish Inquisition and the English and French expulsion decrees come to mind– Europe’s
Jews had learned self-reliance the hard way.”70 Jewish families established businesses
which offered jobs to new arrivals. Children grew up in the family enterprises. They staffed
clerking positions in stores and piecework in clothing factories. Their economic success
was a source of community pride. Jewish businesses in the dry goods, grocery, clothing and
textiles flourished in Milwaukee.71 The success of Jewish businesses was such that
Swichkow and Gartner noted, “of the 196 businesses exceeding $200,000 in 1894, eighteen
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of them were Jewish. Four of the 62 in the $200,000 were Jewish. Six of the 50 in the
$300,000 bracket– Landaur, Smith-Mendel Scheftels, G. Patek, H.S Mack and National
Knitting Company– were the property of Jews. The Gimbel Brothers and Henry Stern,
were the only Jewish businesses among the 25 with net worth over $400,000 and the
Pereles Brothers and J.E Friend belonged among the 25 enterprises in the $500,000
group.”72 These businesses included clothing and textile factories, dry goods and groceries,
and retail shops. Sons of immigrant founders continued the family tradition of business
ownership.73 By 1895, most clothing factories in Milwaukee were Jewish-owned. In
addition, Jewish families opened department stores and groceries and dry goods stores
throughout the city. Gimbel’s Department Stores in particular grew rapidly in Milwaukee
and spread into other cities in Wisconsin. Swichkow and Gartner noted, “Local merchants
could hardly keep pace the seven Gimbel brothers who advertised their wares.”74 Henry
Friend and David Adler were among those local merchants, each of them successful.
Adler’s corporation employed 800 by the 1890s and had sales in excess of one hundred
thousand dollars. It employed many Jewish workers for manufacturing and sales
positions.75 Julius Lando was a jeweler as well as a merchant in the optical trade. He was
joined by his brother, Max, an optician, and established an eye-wear business in
Milwaukee.76
Jewish men also held elected public offices in Milwaukee. Baruch Weil was elected as
a Democratic State Senator in 1853. He remained in office until 1857. Jewish Aldermen
held office in Wards 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 9, Lewis Mack, Isaac Neustadtl, Louis Rindskopf,
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Fred Adler, Bernard Leidersdorf and M. Heiman respectively.77 Leopold Hammel, a
founding member of the Mount Sinai Hospital Board, was elected as District Attorney in
1892. The Jewish contribution to Milwaukee politics increased in the twentieth century.78
The Jewish professional class in Milwaukee did not grow as quickly as the business
class. The position of lawyer was one of the few professional careers open to Jews. One of
the first professionals was Nathan Pereles, a lawyer in the investment business.79 Jewish
doctors in particular struggled to establish practices in Milwaukee. There were few Jewish
doctors educated in the United States by 1880, only two Jewish doctors practicing in
Milwaukee, Dr. Louis Adler and Dr. Jacob Mendel, were both educated in Europe. The lack
of opportunities for Jewish doctors in Milwaukee was a problem.80 Jewish doctors were
barred from practicing medicine at existing hospitals in Milwaukee. Milwaukee’s Jewish
doctors needed a hospital to establish medical practices. However, despite the large number
of Jewish businesses, Milwaukee Jewish institutions, namely synagogues, took longer to
establish. The Jewish population in Milwaukee created charitable organizations in the late
1880s that led to the creation of Mount Sinai Hospital. In addition, Milwaukee Jews
established several congregations, each representing the cultural differences within the
Jewish population.
Jewish businesses grew quickly, but the establishment of formal Jewish religious
practices and institutions in Milwaukee proved difficult. This process took more time.
Before any synagogue was built, Milwaukee’s Jewish community purchased a burial
ground, Imanu-Al Cemetery, which indicated an intent to establish a community.81
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Historian Hasia Diner noted,
Nearly all of the congregations that served the nearly American Jews began as informal
groups. It took time for the Jews to decide that they were staying in America and needed
permanent institutions. This decision often took place when the Jews of a community
realized that they needed a cemetery. While all that was required to conduct Jewish
prayer services was a space and a minyan (ten men to pray together), a Jewish cemetery
signified the desire to stay.82

Jewish burials were recorded in Milwaukee as early as 1848. Swichkow and Gartner
explained that, “While land was probably not purchased before 1854, arrangements must
already have existed in 1848 for the ultimate acquisition of that land.”83 The Jewish
residents of Milwaukee had a communal burial ground but did not have a synagogue.
The early Jewish services were informal. The first communal Jewish service recorded
in Milwaukee was on Yom Kippur in 1847. It was held in a room in Isaac Neustadtl’s
home.84 The Imanu-Al Cemetery Association spurred the creation of the first Milwaukee
Congregation, Imanu-Al, in 1849. However, no building was built or purchased; the
congregation initially met in a room over the grocery of Nathan Pereles.85
There were differences between members of the first wave Jewish immigrants in
matters of religious observance. Diner noted that these differences are often obscured by
the overly broad strokes applied to first wave Jewish immigration. There were distinct
differences in cultural understandings and religious traditions within the first wave Jewish
cohort. These differences resulted in conflict when building congregations.86 The
contention over established religious observance in Milwaukee stemming from those
differences was such that Milwaukee’s Jewish community eventually supported several
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congregations to meet the religious needs of the relatively small Jewish community.

BUILDING JEWISH CONGREGATIONS IN MILWAUKEE
The process of creating Jewish congregations in America was often quite contentious.
The social, economic, and religious differences, often along ethnic lines, made any broad
consensus about Jewish practice and prayer almost impossible. Nomenclature was a matter
of great concern. The difference between establishing a “temple” as opposed to a “shul”
signified an ethnic, and often, socioeconomic divide. The term temple denoted a
congregation that was predominantly German Jewish, and usually more affluent. Shuls
were created by more traditionally practicing Jewish immigrants.87 In contrast to Europe,
American cities, including Milwaukee did not have civil restrictions preventing Jews from
creating synagogues. The city of Milwaukee was accepting of religious diversity.
Swichkow and Gartner noted that, “Religious diversity marked Milwaukee from its earliest
years. During its village era, about twelve different church organizations were born.”88
The lack of religious oversight by a central religious figure or governing body in
Milwaukee led to the creation of a number of synagogues before the second wave West
Side Jewish immigrants arrived. Small congregations, split primarily by ethnic differences,
sprang up in Milwaukee, starting in the 1850s. In fact, the sheer number of individual
congregations came as a surprise to Jewish visitors. Rabbi Isaac Mayer Wise, a major
leader in the American Reform movement, noted that in 1856, 200 families supported three
congregations. He hoped to unify the Milwaukee Jewish population by establishing a
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single Reform congregation.89 The first wave Jewish population in Milwaukee established
small congregations before 1880. Some sought to Americanize Jewish practice and others
incorporated rituals based on their ethnic practices. Most did not last long.
By the time the West Side Jewish immigrants arrived in Milwaukee there were two
main synagogues in Milwaukee. Emanu-El was considered more American in its services
and B’ne Jeshurun retained some European practices. Neither practiced Judaism in the
ways of the second wave West Side Jewish immigrants. Sociologist Howard W. Polsky
noted that
Rarely has the dialectic of religious change manifested such clear-cut lines
as in the German Jewish community of Milwaukee in the years stretching
from 1847-1927. At first there were only Orthodox synagogues. The usual
splits and combinations took place until in 1860 there emerged a united
synagogue with modern tendencies. When the next split took place (the
antithesis) in 1869, a complete break was made with the Orthodox ritual
by a small dissident group.90

The “usual splits” refers to the differences within and between synagogues in Milwaukee.
These occurred when members left congregations in protest of any changes they did not
support. In the case of Milwaukee, the “small dissident group” described by Polsky
eventually broke from B’ne Jeshurun and formed the East Side “Reform Congregation
Emanu-El,” which eventually became the largest and wealthiest synagogue in
Milwaukee.91
As the Milwaukee Jewish population increased, the small, informal congregation
meetings in rooms above stores could no longer accommodate worshipers. Some Jewish
individuals began to plan for a facility of their own to conduct services. However, the East
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Side Jewish population as a whole did not quickly build a single central synagogue.
Swichkow and Gartner remarked that, “A few of the ‘most spirited,’ Jewish citizens
believed that the time had arrived to erect a synagogue. They subscribed a sum to buy a site,
hoping that Jews elsewhere in the city would also come to their aid. However, more
cautions members preferred to renovate an existing building for several hundred dollars. A
contemporary criticized the ‘nonchalance’ which retarded the progress of this pioneer
congregation, and the absence of ‘the vital spark’ to enliven and enlarge it.”92
The delay in building a formal synagogue in Milwaukee is noteworthy in that in
Europe, the synagogue was integral to Jewish life. Polsky writes,

The synagogue was the gathering place for all extended family celebrations.
After the religious service marking the bris, (circumcision rite) and engagement,
wedding, a bar mizyah, [sic] a graduation, and so on, the people of the shtetl
would gather in the hall, usually in the back of the synagogue. There they
performed the blessings over food, and consumed the gefillte [sic] fish, chaleh
[sic], sponge cake and wine and whiskey, sang songs, and conversed. The
synagogue was the chief dispenser of honors in the community. Individuals of
high status sat against the Eastern Wall of the synagogue. They would be called
up to the Torah reading at preferred times. Such persons would be called upon to
utter special prayers during the major holidays, and would assume the important
offices in the synagogue and the various associations connected with it.93
Historian Ewa Morawska observed that in the Eastern European shtetls, the shul was
central to the whole community.94 The diversity within the Jewish immigrant population
led to a great deal of contention and many shuls. Sarna noted that in large Jewish urban
population centers, those Jews that did not wish to worship at any of the available
congregations formed one to their liking.95 Gurock noted that the many early American
shuls, established from the 1850s and into the next century, represented a place where some
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European immigrants found spiritual and social sustenance upon arrival to cities with
diverse religious traditions. He called them “Landsmanshaft synagogues” and described
them as “small storefront congregations” that incorporated familiar rituals and practices
along ethnic lines.96 The term Landsmanshaft, as defined by Sarna, refers to the
organizations and associations formed by immigrants from the same area. He noted that the
goal of these Landsmanshaft groups was to unite the Jewish population based on shared
ethnic ties.97 The Landsmanshaft shuls sought to do the same. These congregations served
the needs of Jewish immigrants in American cities, including those in Milwaukee. They
prayed as they had in Europe, and in doing so, recalled the traditions of their country of
origin. In these early congregations, immigrants from all over Central and Eastern Europe
established social ties that extended to life outside the shul.98
Neighborhoods provided the foundation for many of these smaller congregations.99
They also, inadvertently, linked the traditional European prayers and rituals with a lower
SES. By 1920, the descendants of the first Eastern European Jews established religious
practices different from their fathers. Gurock remarked that, by this time, the early
Landsmanshaft congregations had given way to more Americanized institutions. He
identified a specific type of synagogue, the Proto-American Synagogue of the 1890s, using
Kehal Adath Jeshurun on New York’s Lower East Side as an example of the rapid change
in some immigrant congregations. He considered such institutions as “halfway houses” in
the history of American Jewish synagogues. They represented the holding place for
American Jews at a time of increased upheaval cause, in part by differences in religious
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traditions between first and second wave Jewish populations. These halfway houses of
worship sustained their Jewish congregations as they made the transition from Eastern
European traditional worship to a form of Judaism that reflected the acceptance of
American social behaviors.100 Services included sections held in English, conducted by
rabbis that, more often than not, had been trained in America, “There, while sitting still
during services and participating, they could taste the world of their parent’s religious past
through familiar hymns and the unchanged basic prayers without doing violence to their
growing identities as Americans.”101 Members of these types of congregations concerned
themselves with public perceptions of their services as well as the content of the services.
Proper behavior was strictly enforced; worshipers were to remain quiet in order to avoid
giving the wrong impression to any Christians that may have passed by during services.102
This was certainly true in Milwaukee synagogues. Creating any synagogue was a
complicated process. Before any decision was made to create a synagogue, the first step
was to decide what kind of Judaism would be practiced. That decision took a bit of time.
The attempt to create a synagogue in Milwaukee in the late 1840s revealed that while it is
true that many of the immigrants in this wave, Jews and Gentile alike, did share many
aspects of German culture, some Jews in this wave that were more traditionally religious
and less secular that the “Reform” Jews associated with the East Side immigrant wave.103
Historian Hasia Diner writes, “Complications emerge as historians look more closely at
who migrated and why [in the first wave]. Many of the ‘German’ Jews who left for
America before 1880 came from Polish provinces like Silesia and Posen, which had been
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annexed by Prussia and later incorporated into Germany. On paper, these Jews seemed to
be German, and indeed many described themselves that way. But the term does little to
convey their poverty, their religious traditionalism, and the kinds of Jewish communities
they left behind. Even their language [Yiddish] linked them to the later group of
immigrants.”104 That was certainly a factor in the difficulty between Jewish immigrants in
Milwaukee in the 1840s and 1850s. The differences between members in the first wave of
Jewish immigrants became evident when the Jewish community tried to establish a
synagogue.
There was a more religiously traditional segment in the first wave Jewish population in
Milwaukee. They arrived with Jews who identified themselves as Reform and made their
religious observance part of their Jewish identity. In response, the more traditional
members of the Jewish population created a number of small congregations along ethnic
lines. However, they were not as traditional in religious observance as the second wave
Jewish immigrants. The most observant Jewish people in Milwaukee before 1888 were still
not as traditional as the second wave immigrants.105 What is significant about this
difference within the first wave is that the differences in observance within the first wave
disappeared rapidly. Himmelfarb described this process as self-identifying, a means of
accepting and practicing social behaviors.106 The more traditional Jews arriving in the first
wave adopted cultural practices of the more Reform Jews as part of their identity at a faster
pace than the later arrivals.
Establishing a congregation was a complex process, prone to conflict between
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founding members. One of the more important and potentiality contentious decisions to be
made was what kind of Minhag, or regional religious customs, to use for services in the
new congregation in Milwaukee. It was an important decision. Swichkow and Gartner
explained that, “The adoption of a particular Minhag implied the predominance of
immigrants from that European region, and thus was a matter of pride for each group.”107 It
is because of these distinct ethnic differences within the first wave Milwaukee Jewish
population that the Minhag decision was difficult. Some members “insisted on the Polish
Minhag, and organized Ahabath Emuno (Love of the Faith) in January, 1854, for ‘the
promotion of a love and knowledge of our religion.”108 These Jews were part of the
German immigration wave but ethnically Polish, thus considered different from the
Germanic Reform Jews; often the term Orthodox signified those differences. They were
distinct in matters of dress and many of the men wore beards, unlike the members of the
Reform Jewish congregation. Ahabath Emuno lost some congregants after adopting the
Polish Minhag; advocates of the German Minhag seceded and formed a third religious
group, Anshe Emeth (Men of Truth) in 1855.109
According to Swichkow and Gartner, the East Side Jews felt the use of the Polish
Minhag showed these first wave Jews to be “stabile [sic] Orthodox Jews. . .all they wish for
is to repeat the same Piutim (liturgical poems) in the same order exactly, as their fathers did.
The criticism itself hints at the Reform tendencies not far beneath the surface.”110
Members of East Side Jewish community adopted Reform Judaism that was in fact,
brought to America from Europe. Diner noted, “In Berlin, Hamburg, and other German
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cities, beginning in the second decade of the nineteenth century, groups of laypeople and a
growing number of university-educated rabbis launched reforms that would in time
become the Reform Movement. This movement, aided by the relative freedoms from
rabbinical restrictions in America, meant that religious reform from strict Orthodoxy to a
less observant form of Judaism was not only possible, but in some cases, preferable.”111
Reform Judaism was the religious tradition of the East Side Jewish community. They
established Congregation Imanu-Al in 1850. The effect of these religious ethnic
differences was that by 1856, 200 Jewish families were supporting three Milwaukee
synagogues.112 The East Side Jewish community solidified their commitment to Reform
Judaism with the assistance of Rabbi Isaac Mayer Wise, a strong advocate of the Reform
Judaism Movement in America.113 In the 1880s, Milwaukee’s East Side Jewish practices
were more Reform than European traditional, but a few small congregations continued to
serve the more traditional members in the city.

REFORM JUDAISM IN MILWAUKEE
Rabbi Isaac Mayer Wise was a strong proponent of the Reform Movement. He was
raised in a European Jewish environment in his native Bohemia. Once in America, “he
quickly fell in step with the American zeitgeist, one that saw the creation of hundreds of
new denominations and that asserted the right of Americans to create the religious practices
they wanted.”114 The absence of any central rabbinical authority in America facilitated his
movement to create an American Reform Jewish tradition. Rabbis in America acted as
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representatives of Jewish congregations, not authority figures. They did not have authority
to make binding unilateral decisions. They lacked the power conferred upon them in
Europe. Rabbis in Europe were appointed as leaders and acted as emissaries between
Jewish populations and government officials. American rabbis did not have that
authority.115 Wise advocated for the Reform movement in America, but he did not have the
resources to establish Reform as the accepted form of Judaism for any population.
Wise’s actions at his first congregation, Beth El in Albany, New York, revealed his
interpretation of and vision for American Reformed Judaism. He added music to the
service, something forbidden in Orthodox Judaism. The music was performed by a mixed
male-female choir at a time when men and women did not even sit together. When his lay
board fired him in 1850, he and a group of his followers in Albany founded a Reform
congregation, Anshe Emeth, the first in America to do away with sex-segregated seating.116
The East Side Jewish population in Milwaukee adopted Reform Judaism as a means of
Jewish observance that allowed them to define their Jewish practice, without looking or
acting very differently from Gentile Germans.117 Until the immigration wave of the 1880s
began, Reform Judaism represented a form of Jewish religious observance that
acculturated Jews adopted as part of a larger Gentile European immigrant group.118 It
became part of Milwaukee’s East Side Jewish identity through the adoption of American
Reform Jewish rituals.119 Their particular form of Jewish practice allowed them to
maintain their social status and social capital while remaining Jewish, effectively
synthesizing their American and Jewish traits.
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The support of Rabbi Wise profoundly affected the Milwaukee Jewish Reform
movement. According to Sociologist Howard J. Polsky, Wise believed that more Orthodox
Jewish rituals and traditions brought to America from Europe stymied American Jews.120
Wise told one audience, “As severely as I have attacked the impertinence and wickedness
of Atheism, I have also rebuked the benumbed and senseless conservatism which not only
gives birth to atheism, but also tears into fractions the house of Israel.”121 Polsky believed
Wise inspired the Reform movement in Milwaukee: “His appearance [in 1856] was
Milwaukee Jewry’s first contact with the forthright, persuasive exponent of Reform
Judaism, and it left an effect.”122 However, Goldscheider noted that the likelihood of
widespread acceptance of Reform practices by the more traditional members of the first
wave was high, especially in areas where Jewish populations achieved upward social
mobility.123
Swichkow and Gartner believed that Milwaukee Jewish orthodoxy almost disappeared
between the 1860s and 1880s. They note that only Anshe Emes continued to incorporate
European traditional rituals. Polsky believes that the history of orthodoxy in Milwaukee
during that same time period is missing. He noted that
Before 1859, when the German-Jewish population could not
have numbered more than several hundred families, three
separate Orthodox congregations had been started. Each of
them began in a home, and subsequently moved either to a
building convertible to a synagogue or to a new structure. In
1859 the three combined and the. Members conducted services
in a new synagogue on Fifth Street between Wells and Cedar
Avenues, near the heart of the business section. This united
synagogue, now known as B ’ne-Jeshurun, was the only Jewish
congregation in the city and its membership in 1860 numbered
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close to one hundred families. The community, comprising
different national groups -- German, Austrian, Bohemian,
Hungarian -- was united religiously. The basis of religious
organization was Orthodox. Prayers were said in Hebrew, led
by the traditional cantor, the chazan. Meetings of the shul were
conducted in German. A definite bow was made to
Americanization with the stipulation that at least one sermon a
month was to be rendered in English.124

Swichkow and Gartner emphasized the influence of Wise and the Reform Movement as
having “played a central role in the making of Judaism in Milwaukee. His dynamic
presence, personal ties with dominant persons in the community, frequent visits, and his
calls for congregational unity in Milwaukee. . .were largely responsible for the emergence
of a moderate reformed type of Judaism in the city.”125 Polsky’s opinion about Rabbi
Wise’s influence on the Milwaukee Reform Jewish movement is noteworthy in that he
viewed the establishment of Reform Judaism from the perspective of Orthodox Judaism.
He noted that affluent East Side Reform minded Jewish congregants let their social and
economic resources overshadow any sense of European traditionalism:
As the synagogue grew in numbers, the possibility for dissident
opinion regarding the ritual of the synagogue was enhanced. Dr.
Isaac M. Wise, the vitriolic and tireless organizer of the Reform
movement, began to influence many German Jews in
Milwaukee. A dissident group grew to thirty-five members.
Unable to influence the others or to reach a compromise in
ritual and philosophy, the group withdrew to form a separate
congregation. This new congregation was the Reform Temple
Emanu-El. Aided by the sum of $4,250 received from
B ’ne-Jeshurun, a building campaign was begun and a temple
was constructed on Broadway and Martin streets, east of the
river and in the heart of the downtown district.126

However, Gurock noted another possible explanation for the decrease in traditional
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European observance before the arrival of the second wave immigrants: change in social
status. He theorized that the greatest challenge to traditional observance was economic
success.127 Many American Jews gathered a great deal of cultural capital and reaped the
social benefits, not least of which was the higher SES. As members of the Jewish
population rose toward a middle class status, many were determined to fit it as much as
possible. This included where and when they worshiped. In America, many formerly
traditional Jews worked on the Sabbath and prayed in buildings that resembled any local
church. “In the new world, Jews labored on holy days to both survive and advance.”128
By the time the second wave of Jewish immigrants arrived, the more “Orthodox”
synagogue in Milwaukee, B’ne Jeshurun, had installed an organ for services, something the
Eastern European Jews had not had in their congregations in Europe.129 However, it is
considered by many in the Milwaukee Jewish population to represent one of Milwaukee’s
original Orthodox synagogues.

B’NE JESHURUN
Swichkow and Gartner noted that “Although B’ne Jeshurun had left Orthodoxy far
behind by the later 1860s, its brand of Reform Judaism was very halting.”130 The East Side
Jewish population claimed Emanu’El as their Reform synagogue, leaving B’ne Jeshurun as
an option for Jewish worship that was a bit behind the times compared to Emanu’El.131
The Orthodox label in Milwaukee signified, most of all, a reluctance to completely
Americanize worship. Unlike traditional Orthodox synagogues in Chicago, Fort Worth and
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New York, the congregants at B’ne Jeshurun slowly adopted new practices, and eventually
assumed a more Reform Jewish tradition. Emanu-El began holding services in English,
B’ne Jeshurun continued to use German.132 Polsky stated that,
The German Jews rapidly shed customs and traditions which differentiated them
from fellow Americans and quickly absorbed American values and forms into
their lives and institutions. They showed much energy in fraternal, communal and
philanthropic organizations. A well-organized German-Jewish community was
already in existence at the beginning of the mass immigration of East European,
Yiddish speaking Jews.133

Gurock noted that by 1870, almost all American congregations had adopted less
Orthodox practices. The second wave Jewish immigrants became a Jewish religious
majority in cities that had no existing shuls in which they felt comfortable and welcome to
worship.134 In the 1880s, Milwaukee’s Jewish community was a predominantly Reform
community, albeit with two distinct forms. Swichkow and Gartner wrote that, “Emanu-El
promptly made it clear that it stood for Reform Jewish practice and ritual. A few members
who found it difficult to break entirely with traditional practices, and held their own early
Sabbath service before regular worship, or who worshiped with covered heads during the
regular service, were discountanced. Emanu-El decided to permit but one Reform service
on Saturday morning, and prescribed uncovered heads during worship.”135 B’ne Jeshurun
continued to serve the less affluent, less acculturated Jews left behind after the split, but
even those services were much more Reform than Orthodox.136
The second wave Jewish immigrants arrived in Milwaukee and quickly realized their
religious practices were very different from the established Jewish community. The large
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number of Jews arriving in Milwaukee in the second wave found their religious traditions
were not acceptable to many of the Jews already in Milwaukee. In 1880 the number of
Jews in Milwaukee was estimated to be about 2,000; in 1920 it was estimated at 20,000.
The German-Jewish community in Milwaukee established relief agencies to assist the
new immigrants. At the same time, many Milwaukee Jews separated themselves from
their poor unacculturated Orthodox Yiddish-speaking co-religionists.137 The second wave
immigrants arrived from Russia, Romania, Hungary and Poland, but are often labeled the
Russian Jewish immigrant wave. Russian Jews in Milwaukee, as in other cities across
America during this period, initially established neighborhoods with all the elements of
the social organization they were familiar with in Europe.138 They settled together in
some of the poorest areas of the city and established a neighborhood apart from the East
Side Jews.

THE WEST SIDE JEWS ARRIVE IN MILWAUKEE
Residential segregation is an important part of Milwaukee Jewish history. When the
Russian Jewish immigrants arrived in Milwaukee, the established Jewish residents did not
welcome them into their neighborhoods; the original West Side Jewish population moved
from their neighborhoods, as did the East Side Jewish residents. One of the most distinctive
aspects of the Milwaukee Jewish population is the residential migrations of the East Side
and West Side communities. Polsky wrote,
One of the most interesting phenomena of the Jewish
population was that entire Jewish neighborhoods seemed to
move together. Discrimination from without, traditional norms
and social structure brought over from Europe, and economic
137
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factors account for the geographical distribution of Milwaukee
Jewry. One of the thorniest problems confronting Orthodoxy
was that its institutions, amounting to considerable capital
investments, lagged behind the newer neighborhoods into
which Jews moved. The area of original settlement of the
German Jews and the Russian Jews was dictated by economic
considerations. For the penniless arrivals, work-place,
synagogue and meeting hall were all within walking distance of
their places of residence. The German-Jews settled in the
downtown area and built their first synagogues there. When the
Russian Jews arrived during the 80s and 90s, the German Jews
separated themselves from their co-religionists by moving East
and North. Up to the 1940s, the Northeast section of
Milwaukee was identified by both Russian and German Jews as
the more or less exclusive area of residence of the latter.139

Many of the West Side Jews were Eastern European and poor, and were usually
described as “Russian” Jews. The true composition of this immigrant wave has been
obscured by the label, much like the first wave and the German label. Historian Hasia Diner
wrote, “Emigration from the East should not be viewed either merely as a desperate flight
from terror or as a wholesale transfer of Jews and their communities from places of peril to
a place of safety.”140 Jews from Central and Eastern Europe did experience violence,
punitive taxation and exclusion from civic life in their countries of origin. That harsh
treatment shaped political consciousness in this particular Jewish immigrant wave. Many
of the Jews of this group were Marxist socialists, and that political consciousness had an
impact on the places they settled.141 In the history of Milwaukee’s Jewish population, the
poor, more traditional European immigrants comprised the largest group of West Side
Jews.
After decades of acceptance into the German population, the East Side Jews of
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Milwaukee viewed the large number of Jewish immigrants as very different from
themselves and almost unrecognizable.142 Swichkow and Gartner described the opinion of
East Side Jews, “Reform Jews thought of the immigrants’ worship as uncouth and out of
touch with the needs of modern society.”143 Harry Kanin described some of the cultural
differences in terms of class and religion. He noted that the West Side Jews could not afford
to live with the wealthier East Side Jews when they arrived in Milwaukee. The two groups
did not socialize because of the cultural differences between them. East Side Jews
considered the West Side Jews as uncultured and too different from themselves. These
feelings prevented them from socializing with the new immigrants. Kanin described the
situation as, “The East Side Jewish people were more secular and less religious. They had
secular education. The Russians were less secular. They had Talmudic educations, studied
the Torah, they were not secular.”144 Kanin described other differences between the two
Jewish groups, “The East Side Jews were well off, and the Russians were poor. They were
very different. When an East Side household served a meal, the table was set with place
settings and serving dishes and sat at table. The West Side Jewish meal was such that the
diners took plates and served themselves. When one had tea at an East Side home, the
service was more formal; sugar was served in a dish to add to the cup. The West Side tea
service had sugar cubes, which one could place between their teeth to sweeten the tea as
they drank it.”145 The differences in customs were framed as which was proper and which
was not. The East Side Jewish population considered their customs proper etiquette and
avoided social interaction with the West Side Jews. The socialized in their own
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neighborhoods and did not often venture to the West Side.146
The ethnic differences between the two Jewish populations created a social distance
that defined the relationship between them. East Side Jews avoided the new arrivals. Their
disdain derived from sense that new immigrants reflected negatively on them. The West
Side Jews were not the first Jewish immigrants, but they were by far the most distinctive in
that they stood out from the East Side Jewish population. Their socioeconomic status,
language, and cultural practices prevented them from settling on the East Side among the
established Jewish population. Nor did they settle with their fellow immigrants from their
countries of origin. Instead, they carved out an enclave on the West Side.
Gentile immigrants from Poland and Russia arrived in Milwaukee in the late 1800s
and early 1900s, but the Jews within their number did not settle with them. The West Side
Jews spoke Yiddish, not German. They were from Eastern Europe, not the Western regions.
They did not possess the knowledge of the cultural practices of the East Side Jewish
community and could not join the earlier Milwaukee Jewish immigrants. The Gentile
Russians and Poles brought anti-Semitic attitudes over from Europe. Their hostility toward
Jews prevented the West Side Jews from establishing Russian or Polish neighborhoods.147
The West Side Jews established their own Jewish neighborhood in Milwaukee because
there was no other option available to them. They represented a Jewish population in
Milwaukee: distinctive from both the East Side Jews and the non-Jewish immigrants with
whom they arrived. Their arrival created a concentrated Jewish community on the West
Side of the Milwaukee River, to the blocks around the Haymarket at Fifth and Vliet
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Streets.148
The West Side Jewish neighborhood was one of the poorest in Milwaukee. The
increased number of immigrants and growing poverty necessitated the growth of Jewish
relief and philanthropy in Milwaukee as a direct response to the needs of the new
immigrants. Jewish relief organizations in the 1880s were small and unorganized. They
rapidly grew and expanded to meet the increased requests for assistance.

WEST SIDE JEWISH IMMIGRATION AND CHARITABLE ASSISTANCE
The first group of Russian immigrants that arrived in Milwaukee was small and
included skilled laborers and other able-bodied people. The Milwaukee Jewish community
received word that the immigrants were on their way and had time to gather resources to
assist them. In October of 1881, Milwaukee’s Jewish leaders were told to expect small
number of Russian immigrants. The Montreal Committee, located in Canada, worked with
European organizations, including the Alliance Israelite Universelle, that assisted
immigrants in relocating.149 Montreal received immigrants from England and sent them to
American cities, usually by way of New York. The Emigrant Relief Association of New
York worked to help new arrivals settle in American cities.150 The local Jewish community
raised funds and found shelter for the new arrivals. There was no recorded opposition to
providing the aid and the community waited to welcome them. Ten immigrants arrived,
ranging in age from 20-25. The literature described as them “able bodied” skilled
tradesman, and they were quickly given assistance.151 The insistence on able bodied status
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reflected the reluctance on the part of American Jews to encourage the desire for charity.
European leaders did not want Russian Jews settling in their cities in great numbers. Many
of the immigrants sent to American cities were not young, skilled, and able to work, despite
promises from immigration organization in Europe.152
However, as poorer, unskilled immigrants arrived, a distinct decrease in contributions
for relief efforts on the part of the East Side Jewish community led to an appeal from the
Emigrant Relief Association of New York on June 1, 1882. More Jewish immigrants were
on their way to Milwaukee and they needed assistance. The Association needed funds from
Jews and non-Jews alike to meet the needs of the growing number of poor immigrants. The
effort was successful as Christians donated $400 within a few weeks, and Jewish
organizations donated an additional $300. The immediate relief crisis was resolved.
A larger challenge for Jewish relief workers loomed. Like many of the American
Jewish communities of the late nineteenth century, Milwaukee’s Jews did not realize just
how many immigrants would arrive in this second wave. Sociologist Marshall Sklare
noted that, “In fact, the new immigrants swamped the older element. The 400,000 Jews in
the United States in 1888 were joined by 334,338 more by 1896. Thus the ratio of net
migration to initial population after a mere decade was an astonishing 83 percent.”153
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By 1898, two settlements of Russian and Polish Jews lived in downtown Milwaukee.
At least 2,000 lived in these areas which the Milwaukee Sentinel defined as a “jewry [sic],
or ghetto,” in an article linking Jewish religious observance with poverty and
uncleanliness:
These people do not look like desirable acquisitions when they
first arrive, but it is safe to say that the younger generation of
them will turn out some valued citizens. . .The racial desire for
self-betterment is not snuffed out by the filthy environment into
which their poverty forces them. . .As a rule the Russian Jew is
more orthodox than the American Jew. This is attested by the
number of ‘kosher’ butcher shops to be found in the Milwaukee
ghetto. . .Whatever of bad air and lack of soap may pertain to
the average kosher shop, one thing is certain, the meat exposed
for sale did not come from a diseased animal or from one not
slaughtered according to Mosaic law. . .The members of the
Milwaukee’s ghetto are not all robust people, yet they maintain
fair health in spite of their decidedly unsanitary mode of
living. . .It is well worth the trouble to walk along Sixth Street
between Vliet and Cherry on a warm summer evening before
the daylight has entirely vanished. Then may be seen a ghetto
in full bloom for the sidewalks fairly swarm.154

Relief efforts for the poor Jewish newcomers initially lagged because high number of
immigrants and the scant amount of resources available. There was also the matter of the
disdain for them on the part of the East Side Jewish community leaders. The East Side
Jewish population designed relief assistance to compel the new arrivals to adopt
appropriate cultural norms. The new immigrants settled in their neighborhoods and tried to
take advantage of the opportunities available in Milwaukee.155
Many of the West Side Jews quickly realized that their employment opportunities were
limited. Sociologists Sidney Goldstein and Calvin Goldscheider observed that for many of
these immigrants, their efforts to achieve a higher SES was limited because of their overall
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lack of secular education, “In particular, Jews came to recognize that the amount of formal
secular education an individual receives is a major determinant of the occupations open to
him, the income he will eventually receive, and the opportunities he will have to realize
desired values and to enhance life chances.”156 In their hometowns of Eastern Europe,
many Jewish men aspired to gain extensive religious knowledge, the accepted cultural
capital in their old life. The cultural practices in their countries of origin and their pursuit of
religious education did not have as much value as part of Jewish life in Milwaukee.157
Religious observance and hours spent in study were not valued by the East Side Jewish
leaders. New immigrants that insisted on keeping the Sabbath and who suffered from a
lack of employment did not receive much sympathy from those in charge of charity relief
programs. Jews who practiced strict religious observance were identified as “Talmudic
Jews.” Relief organizations viewed religious study and more traditional Jewish practices
as laziness and sloth.158 Relief assistance included attempts to Americanize the new
immigrants. Rabbi Moses from Congregation Emanu-El felt so strongly about the need to
educate the new immigrant that he announced in July 1882,
It will be necessary to establish a free school for the children
where, after returning from public school, they will receive
their Hebrew and religious instruction under the direction of
the two local rabbis. . .also it will be necessary to form a
woman’s society whose duty it will be to visit the families and
activate society. . .and civilize those families so they do not
succumb in isolation, lest left to themselves, they perpetuate
their semi Asiatic existence. We believe we are not mistaken in
maintaining that through such civilizing efforts, we shall be
averting from ourselves a potential danger which threatens us
all.159
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Rabbi Moses viewed the new immigrants as a threat to the East Side population due to
their unfamiliar habits and poverty. Sociologist Erving Goffman wrote that in society,
prestige stems from the favorable judgment and “a status may be ranked on a scale of
prestige according to the amount of social value placed upon it.”160 There was no
prestige associated with religious study.
As Russian Jews settled in American cities, they were increasingly associated with
urban problems and conditions. Historian Eric L. Goldstein noted that “Jews, for reasons
related to their distinct history and social characteristics, served as a convenient symbol
for a host of social problems that were of mounting concern to the American public
during those years.161 Rabbi Moses believed that the new immigrants had to become
more American in order to avoid any repercussions in the Milwaukee Jewish population
as a whole. The response from the immigrants to Rabbi Moses’s statement about religious
observance is unknown. However, resentment toward relief organizations on the part of
the poor is implied. Rabbi Moses also declared in August 1882 that “Our Russians are
singing the old song of the dissatisfied. . .we doubt very much whether the majority ever
had such remunerative jobs in the old country as they have managed to find here.”162
There were attempts, in the late 1880s and early 1890s, to curtail Jewish immigration
to Milwaukee. In a telegram to the Montreal Immigration Office, Louis B. Schram,
secretary of the Milwaukee Russian Relief committee stated, “We demand peremptorily
that you send no more Russians here. All coming from Montreal hereafter will be returned
without taking from depot.” He was true to his word. Milwaukee sent back a refugee with a
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note that read, “Dear Sir, We send a man tonight who is sick and is unable to do anything
for his support. Please return him to Europe and oblige. Yours respectfully, David
Adler. ”163 Despite these efforts, immigrants continued to arrive, in even larger numbers.
Romanian Jews arrived, as did more Russian and Polish Jews. They settled in the West Side
wards. These Jews did not have the same opportunities available to the East Side Jews. The
first West Side Jewish refugees found it difficult to work in many of the factories in
Milwaukee because of their religious practices. Swichkow and Gartner noted that “Early
Jewish immigrants from Central and later Eastern Europe used petty trade as a stepladder
to retail and wholesale trade, while artisans or their sons often ended as manufacturers of
that article. There was considerable anti-Semitism in employment. An observant Jew could
not work on Saturday and Jewish holidays, as was required practically everywhere.”164
West Side Jews established street trades to support their families. Rags, scrap iron, and
produce carts supported many Jewish families.165 Slowly, some of the new immigrants
began making their own way in Milwaukee through their street trade businesses.166 But the
wages earned from street trading and peddler carts were low. The Haymarket neighborhood,
where many lived, was one of the poorest in Milwaukee.167
Poverty did not prevent the creation of numerous shuls in the neighborhood. The West
Side Jewish community created several small congregations. There were differences
among the West Side Jewish immigrants, much like the East Side immigrants before them.
Members of the West Side Jewish community spoke Yiddish and were more traditional but
did not share a common Eastern European culture. Jews from Russia, Poland, Lithuania,
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Hungary, Ukraine, and Romania dressed differently, spoke different dialects of Yiddish,
and also prayed differently.168 These cultural and religious differences complicated the
creation of a unified West Side Jewish Milwaukee community much as they did in the East
Side Jewish experience.

WEST SIDE MILWAUKEE JEWISH
Compared to Russia, during the latter half of the 19th century Germany appeared
liberated. Sarna stated that the arrival of rabbis from Europe “only heightened internal
battles within the American Jewish community. Prior to 1840. . .no ordained rabbi graced
an American synagogue pulpit.”169 Up until the rabbis settled in America, lay members of
immigrant congregations conducted services and managed the affairs. The arrival of
ordained clergy, especially Orthodox, created conflict between traditionalists and
Reformist Jewish groups. Historian Adam S. Ferziger named one rabbi, Rabbi Moses Sofer,
who was very much opposed to Reform Judaism. This rabbi believed Reform ideology to
be the arch-enemy of “authentic Judaism.”170 Rabbi Shmuel Singer observed that
“Orthodoxy was faced with one central problem from the time of its arrival in America.
That issue was how to insure the religious education of its native-born children. It was
because the older generation was unable to pass on their Jewish knowledge and devotion
to their offspring that Orthodoxy in the past was incapable of perpetuating itself in its
new home.”171 The process of obtaining cultural capital had made it difficult, if not
impossible to instill traditional religious lessons and practices in the children of many of
168
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the first wave immigrants.
Polsky described the differences between the two Jewish populations in Milwaukee:
“Upon their arrival in America the German Jews rapidly shed their Orthodoxy but in
America Russian Jews carried on the norms, traditions and institutions they had evolved in
the shtetl.”172 In Milwaukee, Gurda noted that “Although the Haymarket community was
insular, it was not insulated; young people in particular, absorbed the pulse of American
society every time they stepped outside the neighborhood.”173 The more traditional
members of the Jewish population lived in a neighborhood, not a ghetto. They interacted
with the Gentiles in Milwaukee. The result was that the Haymarket neighborhood was not
a shtetl; it was a Jewish neighborhood and open to the city at large. The freedom to come
and go as they chose meant the Haymarket residents could interact with other city
residents, Jews and Gentiles alike. Gurock observed that the lack of isolation facilitated
the break from traditional religious practices, and the second generation of Russian Jews
adopted from birth the cultural norms of the earlier arrivals.174
The West Side Jews also established synagogues. As more Eastern European Jews
arrived in Milwaukee more shuls, most of them Landsmanshaft, opened. Almost a dozen
shuls were established between 1882 and 1914. The issue of religious observance
complicated the creation of a unified West Side Jewish religious community. Polsky noted,
In Russia and Poland, Jews constituted a community within a
community. Talmudic law was the law, the norm by which life
was guided, not only intellectually, but socially. Why? The
manifold restrictions in the land they were living in forced the
Jewish people to turn upon themselves, and the ancient
tradition with its manifold restrictions served as an inside
restraint upon the Jews as they exhausted the ancient
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commentaries in study and the ritualistic patterns in minutest
detailed practice. It was not the Mosaic law alone– but its
embeddedness in the folk practice of the people which gave it
enduring vitality and really maintained and shaped it.175

He contextualized the Milwaukee Eastern European experience in terms of a social
environment that did not exist in the city. There was no large traditional population in
Milwaukee. The one Orthodox congregation available to them practiced Judaism with
different rituals. In addition, Milwaukee offered West Side Jewish immigrants some
degree of economic, civil, and religious freedom in their daily lives not available in
Europe. These freedoms allowed the West Side Jews to create livelihoods and communal
organizations. Polsky noted that,
The constant petty quarreling and personality conflicts in the
early days of the Orthodox community were overlaid with old
country differences. Many of the synagogues had factions
within themselves and there were numerous resignations,
coalitions, combinations and alliances of the various members
as they changed synagogue affiliations. Beth Hamedrosh
Hagodel was started when the chairman of one synagogue
arose at a meeting and referred to a group in the synagogue as
Russian scoundrels. This group walked out and began its own
synagogue along with dissidents from the other Orthodox
congregations.176
In Milwaukee, the West Side Jewish community created congregations and left them as
they saw fit. The freedom to interact with the residents of other neighborhoods and the lack
of restrictions on their religious expressions allowed the West Side Jewish residents to
establish their own form of religious expression.
The increase in poor immigrants strained the existing charitable efforts in Milwaukee.
They did not have the resources to assist all in need. Jewish relief organizations in

175
176

Polsky, “The Great Defense,” 46.
Polsky, “The Great Defense: A Study of Jewish Orthodoxy in Milwaukee,” 46.

90

Milwaukee were small, disorganized, and also limited in resources. They could not meet
the needs of the growing population of poor immigrants. The East Side Jewish community
in Milwaukee believed that charity was a community responsibility, their responsibility.
However, some members of the East Side community donated funds grudging and did not
always respect the dignity of the poor.177
The belief that economic stability came from hard work guided those who dispensed
aid for many relief agencies, including the ones in Milwaukee. Many individuals founded
private charitable agencies in American cities to assist the poor. They helped the people
who were willing to work.178 In Milwaukee, the disjointed group of private charity
organization consolidated efforts and created The Hebrew Relief Association. This
organization expanded services in order to provide for the poorer immigrants.
The prevailing attitude toward poverty relief at the end of the nineteenth century
emphasized the role of individual moral failings. As historian Walter Trattner explained,
“Most Americans continued to believe that, since the nation offered unlimited natural
resources and opportunities for success, poverty resulted from individual moral
failure--idleness, intemperance, immorality, and irreligion. Such shortcomings could be
countered only by bringing contrary forces to bear, ‘by inculcating religion, morality,
sobriety, and industry’ into the poor. If malign influences could be eliminated and
beneficent ones substituted, the better nature of the needy would assert itself and the
problem would be solved.”179 Poverty was a result of moral deficiency and a lack of
responsibility. The poor needed to remedy their own moral flaws. Once that was
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accomplished, poverty would no longer be a problem. The role of relief work included
more than funds. The indigent needed education and training to address their faults.
West Side Jews faced a difficult situation. East Side Jewish relief leaders scorned some
of the tenets of their more traditional Jewish religious practices: especially those that
interfered with their ability to work. At a time when conventional wisdom considered
religion and morality a remedy to the moral causes of poverty, West Side Jewish
immigrants committed to Jewish religious observance and scholarship received harsh
criticism from the members of Hebrew Relief Association. The more traditional Jewish
immigrants did not work on the Sabbath. They kept kosher, which restricted their food
choices. Many of the West Side Jewish men grew up spending a great deal of their time to
studying the Torah and the Talmud. The East Side Jewish population discouraged the
traditional clothing and beards worn by West Side Jews.180 Many East Side Jewish
benefactors made a concentrated effort to change the religious practices of the more
observant Jews, in particular observing the Sabbath and keeping Kosher. They did not
consider the traditional practice of religious study as important as working for a wage.
Some leaders stigmatized such behavior as lazy. Rabbi Moses of Milwaukee’s Emanu-El
stated that, “The Sabbath and the dietary laws form no obstacle for those among them who
are decent and willing to work. And here and there emerges from among them a
self-impressed ‘Talmudic Jew’ who would have the roasted doves that expects to fly
directly into his mouth, not only Kosher-slaughtered, but also Kosher prepared.”181
Religious study, valued in the shtetls, became sloth, and refusing work on the Sabbath was
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laziness.182 Strict religious observance marked one a “Talmudic Jew” and was a barrier and
affront to the relief efforts of the less devout on their behalf. The animosity between the two
Jewish populations grew as more immigrants arrived. The number of applicants for
assistance overwhelmed the existing Jewish charity organizations in Milwaukee by the
mid-1880s. The relationship between the poor and the affluent Jews in Milwaukee became
more strained with the establishment of scientific charity, a topic taken up in the next
chapter. Scientific charity, also known as the charity organization movement sought to
address issues related to poverty in a rational and efficient way.183 Swichkow and Gartner
explained that “Aside from a few dozen conscientiousness ladies, charitable needs so little
preoccupied the Jewish community that the Hebrew Relief Society met great difficulty in
merely perpetuating itself during its first 25 years of existence.”184
As the 20th century began, three facets of Milwaukee Jewish identity, the East and West
Side divide, a foundation of civic commitment to the city, and philanthropic efforts
supporting the network of Jewish charities in Milwaukee took root in the Jewish population.
Jewish relief efforts grew in response to the increased poverty of the new immigrants.
Jewish charity workers began to reorganize their operations and efforts to meet the needs of
the increased indigent immigrant population. Swichkow and Gartner noted that “However,
the 1890s were a decade of radical change. Milwaukee Jewry by then had an immigrant
majority, requiring extensive services over a prolonged period to augment the immigrants’
own widespread self-help. At the same time, charity in America was slowly recognizing
the social problems that were generated by decades of untrammeled urban growth.”185
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This led to the consolidation of the existing Jewish charitable efforts. The Hebrew
Relief Association absorbed some of Milwaukee’s other Jewish relief organizations. The
efforts were part of spirit of tzedakah, which is part of an act of Gemilut chesed (loving
kindness).186 But, more often than not, the charitable hand was extended only after the
relief organization investigated applicants and determined the case was valid and the
applicants worthy. This harsh treatment resulted from the social divide between the groups.
Swichkow and Gartner observed that the East Side Jewish relief workers felt the West Side
Jews lacked a sense of gratitude for their efforts. West Side Jews may have believed that
acts of loving kindness, rather than intrusive investigations, were needed.187 The higher
social status of many on the East Side, and the initial disdain they felt for the immigrants
settled on the West Side of the Milwaukee River continued to affect relations within the
Jewish population into the next century.
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CHAPTER 2 IMMIGRATION AND CHARITY ORGANIZATIONS
Prior to the 1880s, charity work in Milwaukee consisted of a fragmented network of charity
associations in the city. After the number of immigrants from Eastern Europe increased, existing
charity efforts in Milwaukee began to consolidate. This chapter describes the history of Jewish
relief efforts and organizations in Milwaukee. The East Side Milwaukee Jewish population
initially created assistance institutions using two different approaches to poverty relief. One
being a Settlement and one founded on the principles of the scientific charity organization model,
namely the Hebrew Relief Association.
Jewish women in Milwaukee contributed a great deal of support for relief work, starting
with sewing circles and direct donations. The Sisterhood of Personal Service and the Milwaukee
Jewish Mission, two groups that visited the poor to offer advice and educational opportunities,
eventually merged and established the Jewish Settlement in Milwaukee.1 It opened in 1900 in
the West Side Jewish neighborhood to assist the local Jewish population.2 After the creation of
Mount Sinai Hospital, its Ladies Auxiliary supported the hospital for its entire history, ending
only after the 1987 merger.3
The Settlement movement was a national relief movement, part of the larger Progressive
movement. Settlements included a deliberate policy of assimilation in exchange for assistance.
Workers believed that by living among the poor, they could address the core reasons for poverty.
The poor neighborhoods offered practical information about the lives of the poor. The residents
collected demographic information about the residents and used the data to address the needs of
the neighborhoods.4 One of the most well-known settlement houses was located in Chicago,
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Hull House.5
The Charitable Organization Movement provided a framework for the efforts of the Hebrew
Relief Association after the Russian Jewish population arrived in Milwaukee. This movement
advocated the practice of “scientific charity,” a philosophy of organization and rationality in
relief efforts for the poor. Proponents of scientific charity believed that giving aid to “unworthy”
people created dependency and a sense of entitlement for support. Sociologist Theda Skocpol
noted that this was a departure from earlier relief efforts. Political corruption caused a backlash
against poverty relief programs. Some reformers advocated the creation of regulatory boards to
oversee relief efforts. This approach did not dispense a great deal of assistance, but did gather a
great deal of information about applicants.6 The early Jewish charitable efforts in Milwaukee
used this approach. The president Interviewed applicants, conducted investigations, and
dispensed aid. The large number of appeals from Milwaukee’s poor Jewish immigrants
overwhelmed the president and the scientific charity method of poverty relief offered a means of
efficiently distribute aid.
Scientific charity emphasized coordinated relief efforts and investigation of all applicants.
Upper class women, called “friendly visitors” advised the poor about the importance of hard
work and sobriety.7 This philanthropic approach was part of a national trend starting 1877, but
Milwaukee did not adopt it until the late 1890s.8 It was a direct response to the political
corruption that led to widespread fraud in American relief efforts.9 Historian Linda Gordon
noted that a “historical transformation” regarding the meaning of welfare occurred during the
Princeton University Press, 2001), 31.
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Progressive Era between 1890 and 1935. She posited that during this time, concern for all
mothers and children ended. Mothers were separated into categories: those that needed assistance
because of circumstance, and those suffered from weakness in their character.10
The Settlement residents created poverty relief efforts that were different from the scientific
charity workers’ approaches. Walter Trattner explained the difference:
Settlement house residents sought to improve these conditions, to
promote social and economic reform so that those who had dreams
about getting ahead would have the opportunity to do so. Where their
predecessors had emphasized the individual and moral causes of
destitution, drawing distinctions between worthy and unworthy poor,
settlement house workers looked upon all the indigent alike, stressing
the social and economic conditions that made and kept them poor.
While charity workers were interested in dependency, settlement house
residents were concerned with poverty. Whereas the philosophy of the
charity organization movement led to private charity and spiritual
uplift, the philosophy of the settlement house movement led to social
and economic change.11

Volunteers were vital, “especially well-motivated people of the privileged classes who, for one
reason or another, felt impelled to do something about the class divisiveness.”12 However, Trattner
noted that “the settlement and charity organization movements were in many ways the very
antitheses of each other. While not all social settlements were alike, most exemplified the
democratic ideal in principle and in action, while the organized charities were the very opposite -the embodiment of inequality in theory and in practice.”13 Milwaukee’s East Side Jewish women
established many of the early charity programs. Their motivation for doing so resembled the
efforts of many other charity workers in other cities. They worked to alleviate the negative effects
of poverty on families. They focused attention on improving the daily lives of the poor through
10
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home visits and education. The women began to centralize relief efforts through cooperation
between members of an historically divided Jewish population in Milwaukee.
One of the more contentious aspects of the Settlement Movement concerned the role of
“assimilation” in relief work. The services provided to families included lessons in English, as well
as religious classes and vocational training and homemaking. Not all scholars accept Trattner’s
somewhat positive view of the settlement movement in America. Historian Rivka Shpak Lissak
noted that settlement movement members considered the more assimilated immigrants more
worthy of assistance. Those applicants who acquiesced to Americanization efforts were more
likely to receive assistance. She wrote that “Immigrants were not treated as equals and their culture
was not respected. Hull Houses brought the cultural elite to the slums to work toward educating
and assimilating the ‘neighbors. They lead and the poor follow.”14 The settlement movement in
Milwaukee adopted a model for charity relief founded in Reform Jewish practices and German
cultural lessons and created its own network of programs. It first functioned as a community center,
and offered a variety of services and programs. John Gurda noted that Abraham Lincoln House and
the Settlement “were, in fact, the direct ancestors of today’s Jewish Community Center.”15 The
creation of these charitable organizations led to the creation of Mount Sinai Hospital in Milwaukee.
The cost of food, housing, and other basic staples for the poor left very little for medical care.
Relief workers referred poor patients to a small Dispensary, which closed between 1889 and
1892.16 Rabbi Victor Caro of Congregation B’ne Jeshurun formed the Jewish Hospital
Association 1902 to create Wisconsin’s first Jewish hospital.17 Relief agency leaders wanted to
direct more resources toward hiring social workers to assist the poor. Rabbi Caro believed that the
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medical needs of the poor needed urgent attention and that Jewish immigrants needed a Jewish
hospital. Mount Sinai Hospital historically treated more Gentile charity patients than Jewish. They
made up a large bulk of the hospital’s caseload right from its founding. The history of the hospital
reveals that one of the major contributors to the hospital, Abraham Slimmer, insisted that Mount
Sinai adopt a nonsectarian mission. The hospital established itself as a resource for the poor of
Milwaukee, whether Jewish or Gentile. The nonsectarian mission represents the commitment on
the part of the Jewish population to Milwaukee. As early as 1904, hospital leaders questioned the
overall lack of Jewish patients. Other American Jewish hospitals treated a far greater proportion of
Jewish patients than Mount Sinai Milwaukee.

JEWISH IMMIGRATION AND CHARITY RELIEF
The arrival of a large number of indigent immigrants in the late 19th and early 20th century
strained the existing resources in many American cities. Many immigrants settled in the poorer
urban areas and were increasingly associated with the city’s problems and concerns. Historian
Eric L. Goldstein noted, “Jews, for reasons related to their distinct history and social
characteristics, served as a convenient symbol for a host of social problems and that were of
mounting concern to the American public during those years.”18 The fear of being associated
with urban problems led to action on the part of the native Jewish population. Their main priority
was to educate the new arrivals, or at the very least, their children, in the American Jewish way
of life. Native Jews sought to protect the social status, prestige, and the civic achievements of the
whole community by quickly helping the immigrants through a variety of social programs.19
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They established organizations and groups to address the needs of new arrivals. Some programs
included those intended to compel new Jewish immigrants to accept German cultural norms.
Marshall Sklare noted that by the time the Eastern European Jewish immigrants arrived in
America during the 1880s, many German Jews had experienced a great deal of upward social
mobility, which resulted in prestigious social statuses. He commented “Geographical spread,
while necessary to establish the predominance of the German Jews, would not have been
sufficient [to explain the extent of German cultural influence]. It was the spectacular rise of the
German Jews into the upper reaches of the middle class, and particularly into the upper class,
that brought them into positions of authority.”20
This was certainly the case in Milwaukee. There were two formal relief programs in
Milwaukee when the Russian Jews arrived: The Hebrew Benevolent Society and the Hebrew
Relief Society. The Hebrew Benevolent Society was a mutual aid association established in 1873
to provide members with sick and death benefits. Many of the members became self-sufficient
but continued to pay their memberships fees. Surplus funds were used for poverty relief,
including medical services.21 It was a small organization and did not have a great deal of
money.22 The Hebrew Relief Association began as the Hebrew Relief Society on August 1, 1867.
Members contributed five dollars a year for poor relief. A board of three trustees and officers
comprised its leadership. The Society provided financial assistance to the poor for mainly coal
and food. In 1880, the Hebrew Relief Society became the United Hebrew Relief Organization
and in May of 1889 it was renamed the Hebrew Relief Association.23
The Hebrew Relief Association referred only the worthy recipients of aid to the appropriate
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relief institutions after investigating the applicants.24 The worthy received assistance; the
slothful did not. Scientific charity organizations addressed poverty in their communities by
monitoring relief services as well as supervising the recipients. Historian Alice O’Connor
documented how upper class morals and judgments on the poor influenced poverty relief efforts.
She argued that in placing the blame for poverty on the poor, relief workers focused on allocating
help to those who met certain cultural criteria, instead of assisting those in need without regard
for their social position reified the labels of deserving and undeserving poor. These labels have
fallen away, but the ideas behind them endured.25
The acceptance of the validity that the labels deserving and undeserving poor continued with
the political changes in American government structures. Historian Michael B. Katz observed
that this type of assistance model solidified the acceptance of the notion that some poor people
were undeserving. That is, it sanctions the denial of aid for a segment of the poor population that
does not meet the approved criteria, no matter how deep their destitution.26 Sociologist Herbert J.
Gans explained the power relief agencies and programs held over the poor with those labels. He
believed that the labels kept the undeserving poor from aid and also attached blame to them as
the cause of their poverty. In addition, the continued poverty in society became somewhat
acceptable because of the belief that some people did not deserve help.27 This mindset allowed
relief workers to compel the poor to adopt acceptable norms as a condition for receiving aid. A
streamlined method of administering charitable resources and investigating applicants provided
Hebrew Relief Association leaders with the means to provide relief in good conscience by
ensuring worthiness and denying aid when necessary. The elimination of the threats of creating
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dependency and encouraging sloth ensured charity assisted the worthy people and rejected the
undeserving. The Association sought the means to create a comprehensive and universal means
of addressing poverty. Association leaders and “friendly visitors” evaluated and assessed the
homes of the poor in order to make the correct decision.28 Some of poor received assistance, but
as Katz and Gans noted, denying aid to the unworthy was another important part of relief efforts.
The East Side Jewish residents created relief organizations that reflected their desire to
acculturate the West Side Jews, withholding assistance from applicants not willing to comply
with their goals of socialization to American ways. The end result was that the two Milwaukee
Jewish populations remained segregated for much of the early twentieth century. Their efforts to
acculturate the new immigrants did not include plans to welcome them into their neighborhoods.
The relative poverty of the new immigrants affected existing charity groups and spawned
new ones. Relief organizations in the Jewish community in Milwaukee before the 1880s are
described by historians Louis J. Swichkow and Lloyd P. Gartner as an “ad hoc affair, providing
assistance to cases as they arose.”29 After the second wave, Milwaukee’s East Side Jews created
a large relief organization by reorganizing many of these ad hoc groups into a central charity
association in response to the large Eastern European immigrant population.
On June 29, 1882, 218 Eastern European Jews arrived in Milwaukee. Historian John Gurda
writes,
When the German Jews of Milwaukee met their eastern European counterparts at the train
depot in June, the event marked, on one level, a reunification of two peoples who had been
separated for centuries. It did not, however, feel remotely like a family reunion. A gulf had
opened between the two Ashkenazic communities in Europe, and it had grown
significantly wider on the American side of the Atlantic. The eastern European refugees
looked, behaved, and even smelled different from the German Jews who greeted them,
and their economic circumstances could hardly have been more dissimilar.30
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.
This lack of similarity between the new immigrants and the earlier arrivals created a social
distance between the two groups. First wave Jews held a marked animosity toward the new
immigrants. It was so strong that when the Hebrew Relief Association denied a charity recipient,
one possible reason noted was because the applicant was “Russian.”31 The new immigrants did not
settle in the German areas with the East Side Jews. Instead, they lived on the West Side of the
Milwaukee River and established the foundation for the West Side Jewish neighborhood. Existing
Milwaukee Jewish charities organized their efforts and solidified their mission statements to
reflect their cultural understandings about poverty relief and the poor in response to the arrival of
a relatively large immigrant population. Two entities, the Chevra Bikur [sic] Cholim (the Hebrew
Benevolent Society)32 and the Hebrew Relief Association provided charity in the Milwaukee
Jewish community.33 They consolidated their efforts and implemented a new system of
providing relief.

THE HEBREW BENEVOLENT SOCIETY AND HEBREW RELIEF ASSOCIATION
The relief workers were members of the higher social class in Milwaukee. They maintained
a sense of superiority implied through the actions of charity workers. Sociologist Marvin E.
Gettleman believed that the scientific charity movement was, in fact, class privilege used to
impose moral judgment to determine worth and prevent assistant to the unworthy. He described
the process as a means by which “Social programs gathered private information and sought to
protect the upper class from worthless beggars. Wanton benevolence and charity promotes the
31
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survival of the unfit.”34 The belief that the affluent understood the difference between the
deserving and undeserving created a system of charity that did not respect the poor. In fact, the
upper class had a moral duty to impose their moral code onto them in exchange for help.
The upper echelon in Milwaukee were firmly in charge of relief efforts. Initially, the
President of the Milwaukee Hebrew Relief Association personally determined which cases
received aid. He was responsible for “distinguishing between impostors who want to live without
work by cunningly begging and appealing to sympathy and the really deserving who are poor by
no fault of theirs.”35 Relief applicants performed a labor test in a wood yard. President Morris
Miller implemented the test in 1899 as a means of “separating cheaters from the meritorious.”36
Despite these new requirements, the president soon found he could not keep pace with requests.
The Association Board hired a paid agent to investigate cases in order to expedite requests.37 A
memo from a meeting in 1899 reported that, “The innovation of engaging a paid agent to assist
the President in the discharge of his duty has proven a step in the right direction. Certain
dependents were eliminated from our books and aid was denied to a class of dependents whose
need might be supplied from private sources.”38 The Relief Association conducted routine
investigations of the poor to ensure their eligibility for assistance. Leaders kept a ledger with
notations about applicants that included labels such as a schnorrer or goniff.39 These terms
provided the means to describe and track those denied assistance.40 The 1899 Annual Report of
the Association stated that “Poverty is one thing, pauperism is another, a quite a different matter.
The poor, says the Scripture, you shall always have with you. The poor is [sic] the result, the
34
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product of social conditions. The pauper is of our own creation, and charity so far from fulfilling
its purpose, defeats it by creating instead of abolishing pauperism.”41 The poor received help,
the pauper received none. The paid investigator determined the difference.
This form of relief continued until 1902. At that time a new organization, the Federated
Jewish Charities, combined the efforts of the Hebrew Relief Association and other relief
organizations, including the True Sisters, the Ladies’ Relief Sewing Societies, the Widows and
Orphans Society, and the Sisterhood of Personal Service under one name. The new agency
represented a new period in Milwaukee Jewish philanthropy, as emphasis shifted from
emergency aid to systematic social service. The Hebrew Relief Association changed its name to
the Jewish Social Service Association in 1921 to signify the change in charitable perspective.42
Federated Jewish Charities became the Milwaukee Jewish Federation in 1956.43 Both of these
organizations continue to serve Milwaukee in the 21st century. Howard Polsky noted that
The Federated Jewish Charities was organized to unify fund raising in the community.
The Hebrew Relief Association became the largest constituent member, receiving over
one-half of the money allocated to local and national organizations. The director of the
Federation became the superintendent of the Association. Before the Federation, the
maximum amount raised never exceeded $1800. With unification and systematization of
collection the Fund’s totals steadily increased to more than $5,000 in 1908, $15,000 in
1916, and $25,000 in 1921. The Federation was largely controlled by the East Side
Reform and Conservative German Jews.44
This merger gave the East Side Jewish leaders almost total control over a great deal of relief
funds. It also provided relief workers with the resources to create and sustain a Settlement House
in Milwaukee. These houses were part of a national movement designed to provide well
organized and appropriate assistance for those worthy of it.
41
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SETTLEMENT HOUSE MILWAUKEE
Prior to the 1902 merger of several charitable groups noted above, the new Milwaukee
Settlement also established programs designed to assist immigrants in Milwaukee and create
better living conditions in the Haymarket neighborhood, the home of the West Side Jewish
immigrants.
Jewish women in American society in the late nineteenth century participated in a variety of
social causes. Historian Jonathan D. Sarna wrote that “In response to the manifold crises of the day;
particularly assimilation and immigration, responsibility for ‘saving Judaism’ came to increasingly
rest upon the shoulders of women. The home, they synagogue, and philanthropic social work came
increasingly to be seen as part of women's domain.”45 Historian Idana Goldberg believed that the
weakening of traditional religious social structures led the philanthropic efforts of affluent Jewish
Americans, with women assuming positions of social service.46 The Settlement in Milwaukee
began in 1900 with the consolidation of three different Jewish programs established by women:
The Council of Jewish Women, Sisterhood of Personal Service, and Jewish Mission.47 Upper
class Milwaukee Jewish women created these groups and united in order to offer poverty relief
services under the leadership of an East Side Jewish woman named Lizzie Black Kander.48
Gurda described the relationship between members of the Milwaukee Jewish community. “There
was an obvious chasm between the local German-Jewish establishment and the eastern European
Newcomers, he wrote “and no one bridged that gap more enthusiastically–or more
effectively–than Lizzie[Black] Kander.”49 Her visits to the poorer Jewish homes in the
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Haymarket neighborhood convinced her that in order to help the indigent, material relief was not
enough. She was a driving force in the Milwaukee East Side Jewish community.
Lizzie Black Kander was born on May 28, 1858 in Milwaukee. She was middle-class,
German Jewish woman and a member of the Reform Congregation Emanu-El.50 She endeavored
to educate the new immigrants in the East Side way life, including Milwaukee Reform religious
traditions. Trattner noted that most settlements were religious missions. Beyond their
proselytizing activities, they adopted a derogatory view of ethnic traditions and assumed that
their proper role was that of Americanizing the immigrant with all possible speed.51 While the
Milwaukee Settlement did not proselytize among the Gentile population, it did offer religious
education for the more traditional Jewish European immigrants. Around 1907, the Milwaukee
Settlement welcomed a new resident from Hull House in Chicago, “Plans for great activity at the
settlement are being made, and will become effective upon the arrival of the new head resident,
Miss Stella A. Loeb, who comes up from Chicago November 1 to go into residence at the
settlement. Miss Loeb, who is teacher of music at the Avondale school in Chicago, has worked
for eight years with Jane Addams at Hull house, teaching evening classes, and is conversant with
the needs of settlement work. The settlement is now open for the cooking and sewing classes and
the girls' clubs. The boys' clubs will begin next week.”52
The Milwaukee Settlement residents sought to establish the accepted American cultural
practices in the West Side Jewish immigrant population. The new immigrants received a great
variety of lessons toward that goal. Settlement programs included instructions in the ways of
Reform Judaism. Settlement house residents also believed that their middle-class values
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improved the lives of the poor. They encouraged new immigrants to seek out volunteer work and
adopt American values.53 While the settlement house movement may have not been democratic
and progressive in its social reform policies, Trattner believed that:
even their most ardent critics would agree that, despite some similarities, the
settlements were significantly different from the organized charities and that
many were mechanisms for reform that made invaluable contributions to the
movement for social welfare and justice in late nineteenth- and early twentieth
century America. To the extent that settlement house residents advocated or
practiced social control, it was because they realized (as did public health
crusaders and others as well) that social cohesion and justice in modern society
depended upon purposeful planning and the curtailment of some individual
liberty.54
The Settlement movement in Milwaukee succeeded in that, as Trattner points out, “The
settlements, then, embodied the neighborhood ideal– the desire to create an organic community
among the people and institutions of a specific location.”55 The Settlement worked to improve
the Haymarket neighborhood, and the lives of the West Side Jewish population. Lizzie Black
Kander and her fellow volunteers created Sabbath School classes, gave instructions about
keeping a clean house, and offered English language classes.56 There were tangible benefits
from Settlement efforts for the poor.
However, measuring the success of the Settlement efforts are a matter for debate by
historians. Historian Rivka Shpak Lissak points out that if the definition of success included the
realized goal of assimilation, then the settlement movement met that goal. She noted that
Progressive ideology included an emphasis on social reform and cultural issues. Assimilated
Americans were more worthy and less repugnant to residents.57 She points to Jane Addams and
her work at Hull House in Chicago to illustrate the link between immigrant behavior and
53
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assistance. Lissak described Hull House as a “salon” where residents worked to bring the cultural
elite to the slums to work toward educating and assimilating the “neighbors” and create a “better
element” within the slum.58 Settlement House efforts did lead to a measure of improvement in
the lives of the poor. Lissak argued that these efforts were motivated, in part, by a sense of
superiority on the part of the Settlement House residents. Their efforts to improve the lives of the
poor were not purely altruistic. Historians Hasia Diner and Beryl Lieff Benderly remarked that
“For all of the useful education they provided, for all the crucial assistance they rendered, for all
the compassion they felt, many of the well-to-do helpers could not mask their condescension
toward their less-favored brethren.”59 Conditional assistance, not acceptance or respect, was the
legacy of the Settlement in the minds of these scholars.
In the case of Milwaukee relief efforts before the Settlement House opened, there was at
least on program that appeared to instruct Jewish women in on traditional skill: Kosher cooking.
Called the “only ‘kosher’ cooking school this side of New York,” the school attempted to teach
women to cook Kosher meals. The headline reads, “Only Kosher Cooking in the West: An
Interesting Class of Jewish Girls are being taught to Cook by the Milwaukee Jewish Mission-Miss Alida Pattee Is the Teacher, but She Finds it Difficult to observe the Kosher Laws.”60 The
article notes that while Jews of a “higher class” may not keep Kosher, the Jews of the “lower
class, especially the Russians” are “particular” about such matters.61 However, the article goes
on to describe the teacher as one who trained at the Boston Cooking School, but until coming to
Milwaukee “her ideas of ‘kosher’ cooking were rather vague.” It was noted that she made
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mistakes in the kitchen that “horrified the children.” One example cited was the incident where
she accidentally placed red edged napkins, signifying a “fleischdig” [meat] meal on a “milchdig”
[dairy] tea table.62 Another example described how, when Miss. Pattee “forgets” and uses a dairy
mixing spoon in a meat based soup, “there is always a small girl with large dark eyes and a
wealth of coal black hair to point out the mistake.”63
The Milwaukee Settlement initially created programs for children and met on the East Side,
in the basement of Emanu El. In 1895, Kander Black led a group of volunteers in the Keep Clean
Mission at Temple B’ne Jeshurun. The mission focused on hygiene; the children of immigrants
were taught lessons about the importance of keeping clean and children were required to have
“well-scrubbed hands and faces” at the meetings.64 After a year of operation, the group became
the Milwaukee Jewish Mission. It began offering more educational and vocational programs. It
also served as a community center for Jewish residents. They added cooking, sewing and
embroidery classes for girls and woodcarving and painting lessons for boys in 1898.65
In 1900, the Mission moved to a house called the Settlement on Fifth Street, one block away
from the orthodox West Side shul, Beth Hamedrosh Haggodol.66 Gurda notes that “Nearly every
Haymarket resident could find something to do at The Settlement, and it quickly became a
community hub much like Chicago’s famed Hull House, which Jane Addams had established in
1889.”67 In her obituary, it was noted that Lizzie Black Kander was “Called the ‘Jane Addams of
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Milwaukee,’ Mrs. Kander was also affectionately known as the "Mother" of the Jewish Center.
Through her work years ago at the Abraham Lincoln settlement house, old Jewish Center, she
saw the need for other community meeting places for the foreign born, and the growth of the
Milwaukee social center system is due partly to her efforts.”68
The Settlement House offered educational programs, many centered around the kitchen and
home and founded in East Side cultural norms and practices. The cooking lessons provided some
of the recipes published in the Settlement Cookbook. Kander Black published them in 1896 as a
fundraising experiment. She raised the eighteen dollars needed to publish the book through
advertisements.69 This “experiment” sold out year after year, and became nationally recognized.
Proceeds from book sales provided a “substantial portion” of money used to build a new facility,
named Abraham Lincoln House.70 The money from sales supported The Settlement’s programs.
Sociologist Howard W. Polsky posited an alternative perspective about the notion that the
Settlement was a community hub. The opinions of the West Side Jewish community about the
charitable efforts of East Side Jews are largely unknown, but Polsky believed that the West Side
Jewish population saw the settlement movement in general and the Milwaukee Jewish Mission in
particular as
A group of ladies on the East Side, afforded leisure by the prosperity
of their merchant-husbands, turned their efforts from study and the arts
to what was called at that time ‘good and welfare’. For the most part
members of the Reform Temple Emanu-El and the Council of Jewish
Women, these ladies decided to come to the aid of their fellow Jews. It
is a well-known observation among minority groups that recent
converts to an outgroup's way of life can be more enthusiastic about
‘showing the way’ to other minority members, still unacculturated,
than natives themselves. The Reform group as a whole was to serve as
a catalyst and harbinger of change to those Jews who arrived later on
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the American scene. This was not always done tactfully. As a result of
these ladies’ efforts the Milwaukee Jewish Mission was organized. It is
worth recording the reaction of the immigrants. This title (Milwaukee
Jewish Mission) was unfortunate and later was abandoned because of
intense opposition of the immigrants themselves, who while realizing
their need for assistance from their more fortunate American folk,
resented the ‘mission idea’ applied to them.71

Polsky believed that West Side Jews resented the charity efforts of the East Side Jewish
community. He acknowledged that differences in socioeconomic status and the limited
interaction between the East and West Side Jewish communities outside of charity work
explained that resentment:
Social and economic classes sought their own level. One of the most significant
demonstrations of the vitality of social and economic class stratification can be found
right within the Jewish community. Almost from the very beginning the poor man’s rich
cousins sought to isolate themselves from their less fortunate relations. Contacts on a
charity basis were frequent but seldom indeed for many years did relationships mature on
the basis of equality.72

However, historian Jonathan Sarna noted that the possibility of increased social status led to
many second wave Jewish immigrants to Americanize as a means to an end, specifically,
economic prosperity. He noted that as they adopted American Jewish cultural practices, they
found better employment opportunities. Many curtailed their more traditional religious practices
in order to take advantage of opportunities for upward mobility. Sarna allowed for the possibility
that the second wave immigrants had some degree of agency in the decision to embrace more
American Jewish practices.73 Polsky may have underestimated the importance of cultural capital
and the advantages that come with it. It is also possible that the second wave Jewish immigrants
considered themselves “Jewish” by birth and felt a sense of agency in defining their Jewish
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practices. Philosopher Michael Krausz noted the contribution of descent to the construction of an
individual’s Jewish identity. The ascribed status by way of an individual being born or converting
to Jewish either by birth conversion created an established sense of a Jewish self. The West Side
Jewish that did embrace East Side cultural norms and practices may have done so as a matter of
personal choice, that is by assent.74
Despite the criticism, the Settlement and later, Abraham Lincoln House, succeeded in
providing a common meeting place for West Side Jews under the guidance of the East Side
workers. Historians Swichkow and Gartner remarked that, “Like similar institutions in American
Jewish communities during this age, the Milwaukee Jewish Settlement was also a meeting
ground for native and immigrant young people.”75 The Settlement offered a variety of social and
vocational programs and provided the opportunity for some East and West Side Jews to socialize,
albeit in the context of charity. Abraham Lincoln House provided immigrants with public baths, a
library, and classes in American history and civic lessons.76 In 1913, an article in the Milwaukee
Sentinel announced the formation of a “new league” intent on helping “foreigners” in Milwaukee,
“to give legal aid” to those that wanted to become citizens. The new entity was affiliated with the
national organization called the American Foreign Aid league, which had branches in New York,
Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore.77
Despite the efforts of both the Federated Jewish Charities and The Settlement, the majority
of indigent immigrants in Milwaukee, Jewish and Gentile, lacked access to health care. Some of
the most successful men from the East Side Jewish population in Milwaukee established a
Jewish hospital for the medical needs of indigent immigrants. The Federated Jewish Charities
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began operations in 1902. It represented a new period in Milwaukee Jewish philanthropy, as
emphasis shifted from emergency aid to systematic social service. The Jewish Hospital
Association began to plan Mount Sinai in the same year. The hospital opened less than one year
later.

PLANS FOR MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL
Rabbi Victor Caro formed the Jewish Hospital Association in 1902 to create a Milwaukee
Jewish hospital. Rabbi Caro led the B’ne Jeshurun congregation on the West Side and was
dedicated to serving the original West Side Jewish community and the city of Milwaukee.78
Rabbi Caro spoke out against his fellow Jews who criticized the new immigrants for being too
religiously observant. His willingness to criticize other Jews made him controversial, a status of
which he was aware. He stated “I know I have not pleased many of you because I have spoken
often in forcible and bold language. I have done so because I will be held responsible at the bar
of justice.”79
Caro believed that Milwaukee needed a hospital for Jewish patients. The Hebrew Relief
Association provided some medical care assistance at a small clinic before joining Federated
Jewish Charities.80 After the merger, the Hebrew Relief Association created a new mission of
social service. Swichkow and Gartner note that, “The founding of the Federated Jewish Charities
opened a new period in Milwaukee Jewish philanthropy, as emphasis gradually shifted from
emergency aid to systematic social service.”81
At this time, health care assistance was considered emergency aid. Members of the Jewish
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Hospital Association assumed responsibility for the creation of the hospital. Raising money was
the biggest obstacle. Through his role in the Hospital Association, Rabbi Caro solicited financial
support from the Milwaukee community, but he fell short. At about this time, a wealthy Jewish
philanthropist from Iowa provided an initial donation that led to the creation of Mount Sinai
Hospital. He continued to support the hospital even after death. His name was Abraham Slimmer.

ABRAHAM SLIMMER: PHILANTHROPY AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY
The existing archival information about Abraham Slimmer indicates that he believed it was
his religious duty to donate money to worthy causes. He supported Mount Sinai Hospital from
the start. Historians differ in their descriptions of the man; Swichkow and Gartner describe him
as “a Jewish millionaire who lived nearly in seclusion in Dubuque, Iowa.”82 His donations to
Mount Sinai Hospital “indulged his hobby of endowing Jewish hospitals.”83 Gurda describes
Slimmer as “a non-observant Jew and confirmed bachelor [who] developed a second career as a
philanthropist, giving away millions to hospitals and homes for the elderly across the Midwest,
with a particular fondness for institutions run by Catholic nuns and Jewish businessmen.”84
Historian Stanley Bero described him as “Iowa’s humblest and best citizen, and described his
actions in a positive manner.85 These interpretations are not definitive. It is true that Slimmer
was rich, but felt it was his religious duty to give his money away. Philanthropy was not a second
career; it was his self-described expression of Jewish religious beliefs.86
The early life of Abraham Slimmer remains, for the most part, a mystery. Interviews he gave
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to reporters at the time revealed attitudes about his charitable activities, but details about his
upbringing remain unknown. He was born in Prussian Poland “about four miles from Posen” and
in the words of one Interviewer he “prefers to be silent about this period of his life.”87 He
emigrated from Poland and settled in New York when he was fifteen. He moved to Little Rock,
Arkansas until the Civil War. He claimed to be inspired by the passage in Isaiah about making
swords into plowshares and decided to start a farm.88
Slimmer settled in Waverly, Iowa, and founded a cattle farm. Bero described the event in
Slimmer’s life that shaped his philanthropic philosophy. When Slimmer’s first shipment of cattle
arrived before he could pay for delivery, he approached a local banker for a loan. When asked what
collateral he could offer to secure the loan, he replied “my word.” The banker refused the loan and
went home to lunch. The banker’s wife urged her husband to accept Slimmer’s word after he
related the exchange, and the banker did extend the credit and Slimmer repaid the loan.89 This
experience shaped his rationale for contributing money. When asked about how best to help the
poor, Slimmer was quoted as saying, “To put the honest and poor on their own mettle by giving
them credit without interest so they might be able to compete with those whom fortune has favored
more liberally has been his method of promoting good citizenship and of guaranteeing for himself
the comfort of their friendship.”90 He believed that assistance created a sense of community spirit
for the poor. The requirement that the community match his donation fostered a sense of gratitude
on the part of the receiver.
Slimmer gave money to a variety of causes, but all had to meet two conditions. The
community had to match his donation in order to receive the donation, and the cause had to be

87
88
89
90

Stanley Bero, Abraham Slimmer, 25.
Stanley Bero, Abraham Slimmer, 27.
Stanley Bero, Abraham Slimmer, 27.
Stanley Bero, Abraham Slimmer, 15.

116

nonsectarian.91 He was committed to giving funds wisely to causes that were open to all worthy of
need, consistent with the emphasis on worthiness touted by the scientific charity movement. Bero
explained, “He does know what to do with his wealth and accomplishing his purpose in life. This
purpose is a two-fold. One that the giving away of vast sums of money but without working a
hardship in place of a benefit.”92 He wanted the funds he donated to improve the lives of the poor;
he did not want to replace the hardship of poverty to be replaced by the hardship of dependence in
keeping with the tenants of scientific charity. In a response to a question about why he gave away
his money, Slimmer answered, “I regard my wealth as God given. I am merely the temporary
custodian of the money with which I am blessed. It was ordained that I should have this money to
use and Providence will hold me to account for my stewardship.”93 Slimmer believed the indigent
would not and could not improve their lives without assistance from the more affluent in their
communities and the community at large. His requirement for a matching donation from the public
was a means of verifying the commitment of the population toward the goal of addressing the
economic inequalities that led to poverty.94
Rabbi Caro approached Slimmer in 1902, at the start of the Jewish Hospital Committee’s
efforts. Slimmer may have visited the early Dispensary operated by the Hebrew Relief Association,
in disguise in order to determine Mount Sinai’s worthiness. He had done that in the past when
approached for contributions.95 He pledged five thousand dollars to the hospital in early 1903 on
two conditions: the community had to match his gift and the hospital must be nonsectarian. With
the five thousand dollars from Slimmer, and the five thousand from donations by the Milwaukee
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community, the Jewish Hospital Association planned their hospital.96 It took them less than a year
to open Mount Sinai Hospital.
Historian Rosemary Stevens describes the expectations placed on hospitals in the early
twentieth century. Stevens notes that the charitable hospital functioned as a “household,” each one
establishing “portals” of entry and rules for those lucky enough to gain entry. Patients seeking
charity care had to abide by the house rules during treatment. Institutions ensured the patient did
not become too comfortable with charity. The institution instilled the rules in their patients.
Hospital staff monitored patients’ signs of dependency and educated them about the perils of
charity.97 The investigations required before the impoverished received care were often less
stringent than for cash or food. Historian Michael B. Katz illustrated the difference between poor
relief and health care needs using the case of Mrs. B, an elderly woman denied help for food after
the investigation determined she was slothful; once discovered deathly ill she was brought to a
hospital, where she died 2 days later.98 Mrs. B received assistance only after becoming very ill. Up
to that point, the goal of preventing dependency and denying the undeserving remained an
important objective.
Some charitable association leaders in American cities at the time worried that too many
organizations depressed overall relief resources. For example, in Boston, in 1909, Jewish and
non-Jewish citizens opposed plans for a Jewish hospital. They accused hospital organizers of
“highway robbery” and of “fleecing” the Jewish community for more charity; they felt their
community could not sustain existing programs and a new hospital.99 In Newark, New Jersey, it
took years for the Jewish community to establish Beth Israel Hospital, despite a much larger
96
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Jewish population than in Milwaukee.100 In Milwaukee, some of Jewish leaders feared that the
hospital costs threatened the emerging social service network. Morris Miler, the president of
Federated Jewish Charities in 1903, voiced concerns that the hospital would decrease the resources
available for new social services. The decision to consolidate all medical services at the new
hospital assuaged those concerns. The hospital assumed responsibility for all health care services,
leaving Federated Jewish Charities to develop social service assistance programs.101 There were
some on the Board of Federated Jewish Charities that disagreed with the decision, citing the
number of hospitals already serving Milwaukee. The hospital effort got an important boost when
the Federated Jewish Charities decided that the new hospital actually provided the means to move
forward with their plans for expanded social services. The five thousand dollars from Slimmer, and
the matching raised from the Milwaukee community, financed the purchase of a building at 4th and
Walnut for the new hospital.102 The Jewish community was grateful for his gift. Rabbi Caro
remarked, “We can return our gratitude for his assistance in placing in this city a monument which
is and which we hope in the future will be worthy of his and our highest ideas.”103
Mount Sinai Hospital Milwaukee was dedicated on June 12, 1903. Hospital Board Secretary
Leopold Hammel declared, “This occasion demonstrates an era in Judaism, not in the country or
in this commonwealth, but in the city of Milwaukee. On a foundation wide in scope we have
builded [sic] a house wherein shall be nursed the sick and distressed of all races and of all creeds.
Today we dedicate this house, where all alike, rich and poor, Jew or Gentile, will be
welcomed.”104 Board President Max Landauer described Mount Sinai as, “hospital for all creeds,
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where the rich or poor, the high or low, the Jew or the Gentile can receive free care.”105
The hospital treated many indigent patients in 1903. They were usually referred to the
hospital by Federated Jewish Charity workers and had been found eligible for care. However,
acute illnesses and emergency situations were treated immediately.106 Relief workers categorized
health care needs, especially contagious illnesses, as urgent services. They usually bypassed any
investigation until such time as the person had recovered.107 Sixty-two of the one hundred
seventy-five patients cared for in its first year received free care. In 1905, the hospital served 300
patients, over one half free of charge. In 1906, 245 patients were served, in 1907, 408, with the
large majority being free cases. An addition in 1907 allowed Mount Sinai to treat more and more
patients, many of them for free.108 Its focus on serving the poor required a community
fundraising effort. At the June 1903 dedication, Leopold Hammel stated the time would come
when the hospital again asked for their help, “And when that summons comes to you may you be
ready to answer as Abraham of old, ‘Here Lord, am I.’”109 The Mount Sinai Ladies’ Auxiliary
coordinated the 1907 drive to build the addition. The tradition of fundraising and organizational
skills of the female volunteers at Mount Sinai supported the hospital from the beginning.
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MOUNT SINAI LADIES AUXILIARY
In Milwaukee, the Ladies’ Auxiliary assumed much of responsibility for funding the hospital.
The Auxiliary was formed in 1902 as part of the Jewish Hospital Association. Auxiliary members
worked at Mount Sinai year round at a variety of tasks, preparing bandages and linens and making
clothes and toys for the children. They also served as volunteers at the hospital assisting the staff
with patient care.110 One of their major contributions was the annual Donation Drive held on
President’s Day, starting in 1904. The Mount Sinai women organized and hosted the event, with
great success. By 1906, the hospital had outgrown the facility and hospital leaders announced the
need for an expansion. The hospital received a percentage of $10,780 in that year. The exact
amount is unknown as the yearly report listed on the names of the organizations that received
money, not an exact amount.111 Slimmer donated an additional $5000 after the community
contributed $7,000 on Donation Day 1906 to fund a new expansion. The expansion opened in
1907.112
Donation Day contributions provided crucial funding for Mount Sinai Hospital. Colder
winters than usual brought more patients some years. In 1913, a free Dispensary opened. The
Ladies’ Auxiliary staffed the free maternity program at Mount Sinai. Ten years into their mission,
the hospital was treating more patients annually: 224 Jewish and 449 non-Jewish, with 374 being
“charity cases, including 132 free maternity cases.” In 1914, a new hospital building at 945 N. 12th
Street was officially opened, treating a total of 1,489 patients (1,105 non-Jews, 384 Jews). The
hospital publicized the urgent financial needs of the hospital, Dispensary, and the maternity
programs to the community at large. A Milwaukee Sentinel editorial reported on February 19, 1915,
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just before the annual Donation Day, that those needs are the “urgent reason why the institution
should be liberally patronized on the annual Donation Day.” Donation Day brought in $1500.113 In
1917, the Donation Day appeal to the Milwaukee community on Mount Sinai’s behalf was even
more emphatic. The Milwaukee Sentinel noted that, “Demands upon Mount Sinai for free service,
resulting from the extremely cold winter, combined with the abnormally high cost of medical
supplies, food stuffs and other hospital requirements have been so large during the past year that
officers and members of the board of directors of the hospital association believe the citizens of
Milwaukee should extend liberal patronage.”114 The hospital raised $2300.115 Federated Jewish
Charities gave an unknown portion of a total of $31, 320 collected for the year to the hospital.
Much of that money was dedicated to care for indigent patients.116
The large number of indigent patients at Mount Sinai Hospital provided a certain amount of
validation for the Hospital Board of Mount Sinai Hospital; the number of poor patients treated in
the first ten years verified the contention that Milwaukee urgently needed this hospital. Hospital
Board Secretary Leopold Hammel stated, “Many claimed that there was no need for a hospital.
Others even charged us with doing wrong by diverting from other charitable work the money given
to us by our people. To all of these I desire to say that my humble opinion practicing charity in any
form is good in the eyes of the Lord and ours is genuine charity.”117
The hospital treated an increasing number of patients, but not many from the Jewish
community. The number of Jewish patients treated at Mount Sinai was low from the beginning.
Just a year after the hospital’s founding, Mount Sinai Hospital’s Board secretary Leopold Hammel
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stated, “Although we are a Jewish organization, the only Jewish hospital in the state, we have cared
for more non-Jews in this first year than we have Jews.” In 1907, President Landauer declared at
the dedication of the new addition, “Since the erection of the hospital 3 years ago, we find by our
records that less than ¼ of the patients treated were Jews. Another interesting feature is that 94%
of the people taken care of were charity patients. While our organization is strictly a Jewish one,
the hospital is not sectarian, and it is our aim to do all the good we can for all these classes of
people.”118 The support of Jewish community in Milwaukee for Mount Sinai provided indigent
care for mostly non-Jewish patients. The most likely reason for that circumstance is that the
hospital was nonsectarian at its foundation. Swichkow and Gartner wrote that the percentage of
Jews treated at Mount Sinai was lower than any “sizable Jewish hospital in the country and
stirred considerable discussion. One hint came from a [n unnamed] Yiddish source, that Jewish
patients felt no different in a Jewish hospital which celebrated Christmas than in any other
hospital. The unavailability of kosher food was another probable cause.”119

JEWISH CONCERNS AND A NONSECTARIAN HOSPITAL
Throughout the first decade of operation, Mount Sinai treated more Gentiles than it did Jews.
Leopold Hammel was not concerned by the lack of Jewish patients. He explained the hospital’s
general mission, stating “While our organization is strictly a Jewish one, the hospital is not
sectarian, and it is our aim to do all the good we can for all these classes of people.”120 In 1922, an
editorial in the Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle chastised Milwaukee’s Jews for failing to patronize the
hospital: “The disproportionate number of Jewish patients suggests the thought of a lack of interest
in a Jewish hospital on the part of the Jews of Milwaukee. With hearty cooperation, there can come
118
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only substantial settlement and we must strive to the public and especially the Jewish portions
thereof, appreciate the objects and purposes of our uplifting mission and recognize the beneficent
service performed by the hospital.”121 On July 8, 1922, another editorial asked
But are the Jews of this city proud of their hospital, than which there is none better in the
whole land? It doesn’t seem that they are from this sentence in the report of Secretary
Hammel, the disproportionate number of Jewish patients suggests the thought of a lack of
interest in a Jewish hospital on the part of the Jews of Milwaukee. Do some Jews avoid
Mount Sinai because it is a Jewish hospital? Is it less fashionable to be an inmate in a
Jewish hospital than in a non-Jewish institution? To those who hold any such prejudices,
we would suggest a visit and thorough inspection of Mount Sinai Hospital.122
Why were there so few Jewish patients? The surviving archival evidence hints at why
contemporaries believed Milwaukee’s Jews failed to patronize the hospital, but does not offer
a definitive explanation. The religious differences within the Jewish community in Milwaukee
could explain low Jewish patronage at Mount Sinai. The resentment of the West Side Jewish
toward the East Side Jewish charity workers and their attempts to impose their own Jewish
beliefs on the newcomers offers another possible explanation. The East Side Jews created a
hospital intended for a population with whom they had little in common. It is possible that the
West Side Jewish population considered Mount Sinai Hospital not sufficiently Jewish. The lack
of Kosher food and differences in Jewish religious observance may have kept members of the
Jewish community from coming to the hospital.123 On the other side of the Milwaukee River,
the East Side Jewish population may not have planned on using the hospital, believing it was for
West Side Jewish patients.
The hospital continued caring for the sick, and the affluent members of the East Side Jewish
population continued to support the hospital through donations and volunteer hours. However, the
Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 1930s increased the number of
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indigent patients who used Mount Sinai’s services. The number of indigent patients at American
hospitals increased generally, and the donations decreased as the affluent suffered the effects of the
Depression. Mount Sinai Hospital sought solutions to address its financial difficulties. The
hospital’s leaders sought new methods in order to fund operations, including a new larger
Dispensary and a hospital insurance plan. The Dispensary, which opened in 1935 succeeded in
creating a cooperative health care network in Milwaukee. It provided medical care for those in
need, training and education for doctors and nurses, and cooperated with other social service
entities to provide care. The Dispensary remained open until the late 1960s. Also at this time,
leaders at Mount Sinai tried to establish a hospital membership program to pay for medical care. It
was designed as a form of insurance sold to prospective patients. This plan ended after strong
opposition from the medical professionals in Milwaukee. However, it is indicative of the later
struggles between insurance programs and hospitals and a precursor to the eventual Preferred
Provider Organization agreements that began in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
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CHAPTER 3 DISPENSARY CARE AND MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL
This chapter discusses the creation of the Dispensary at Mount Sinai Hospital, in
order to analyze the importance of the Jewish community in supporting the hospital. The
Jewish contributions to the Mount Sinai Dispensary, opened in 1925 and renovated in
1935, were integral to the treatment of the poor in Milwaukee. Funds from the
community and volunteer hours from the members of the Ladies Auxiliary sustained
operations for medical services. Students at the Mount Sinai Nursing School, opened in
1924, also staffed the Dispensary, as did medical interns and residents. Medical care,
child care, follow up care, inpatient and outpatient services were all part of the care
network at Mount Sinai. Thirty-two agencies cooperated with the Dispensary during 1937
alone, including the Catholic Welfare Bureau, the St. Benedict the Moor Mission as well
as Jewish Social Services Association, Family Welfare Association, Milwaukee
Children’s Hospital, and the Milwaukee Health Department.1 This chapter includes a
brief history of two other Milwaukee hospitals, The Passavant and Deaconess. For this
research, Passavant Hospital will be called The Passavant, in order to distinguish it from
William Passavant, its founder. The history of these two hospitals are relevant. The
merger between them in 1982 provided an example of the impact of changes in funding
for health care for the poor on private hospitals. That merger created Good Samaritan
Medical Center, the facility that, after the 1987 merger with Mount Sinai, created Sinai
Samaritan Medical Center.
In the 1920s, changes at American hospitals occurred rapidly. The increase in
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medical training programs and the creation of research programs and a decrease in the
number of dispensaries at urban hospital changed medical services for the poor.
Dispensaries, the precursor to outpatient clinics, suffered in the wake of the modernization
of hospitals. Dispensaries provided medical services for the poor in many American
hospitals. Many of them began to close in the wake of the creation of medical specialties in
the 1920s in order to make room for expanded education programs and medical specialty
departments.2 Mount Sinai Hospital is unique in that it opened and expanded the
Dispensary during that same time.
Nursing schools opened at many urban hospitals during this time. The students staffed
the hospital affiliated with their program as part of their education. Mount Sinai Hospital
opened a nursing school in 1924. Historian Rosemary Stevens remarked that hospitals
treated dispensaries as teaching laboratories for doctors and nurses to study the progression
of disease and gain clinical knowledge, not to aid the poor. When hospitals expanded to
accommodate their educational programs, dispensaries closed.3 Historian Michael Katz
also remarked that the growth of modern hospitals ended Dispensary care for residents in
cities like New York and Boston because doctors preferred clinical experience in
hospitals.4 The new departments created medical specialties, which increased the
occupational prestige of the doctors. The general hospital model and the dispensaries gave
way to a modern approach to medicine based on specialized expertise. Historian Charles
Rosenberg noted that dispensaries became “decreasingly central as hospitals increased in
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number and opportunities for clinical training expanded.”5 It was difficult for modern
hospitals to create specialty departments and continue to treat poor patients in dispensaries.
Medical students and doctors sought appointments in the new hospitals for their medical
experience and education and hospital closed their dispensaries to provide space for their
growing programs.
However, Rosenberg noted that these changes were not universally embraced. Some
hospital officials and doctors resisted the drive toward specialization of hospital care.
Leaders at New York City’s Mount Sinai in particular believed that specialized medical
services dehumanized patients, transforming them until they were “not a person but a
configuration of organs and potential syndromes.”6 However, Mount Sinai New York
decreased Dispensary services and expanded medical education facilities to meet the
increased demand for doctors.7
Mount Sinai Hospital Milwaukee did not create a Dispensary for indigent patients as
part of a teaching laboratory. It established a Dispensary for the explicit purpose of serving
the poor. Milwaukee’s Mount Sinai combined the missions of teaching and caring for the
poor at the Dispensary, something many urban hospitals did not consider for their
institutions.8 The need for staff at the Dispensary meant professional opportunities for the
younger Jewish doctors in Milwaukee that were not available in larger cities. For example,
young doctors encountered long waiting lists at New York’s Mount Sinai Hospital for staff
positions due to the number of doctors in need of internships.9 At Chicago’s Michael Reese
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Hospital, a Dispensary opened in 1893. The staff of seventeen doctors treated fourteen
hundred patients a month during the first year.10 The patients paid what they could, and
those without the means were treated at no cost. In 1899, the Dispensary expanded.
However, in the early twentieth century, Michael Reese leaders decided to expand medical
research and specialty departments at the hospital. They established the Medical Research
Institute in 1929 mainly because leaders believed medical research programs led to
increased funds.11 Hospital leaders believed that “the new hospital building, which opened
in 1907, exemplified a number of new trends in architecture as well as in charity and
medicine.”12
In Milwaukee, doctors, student nurses and Auxiliary members staffed the Dispensary.
The nursing school provided student labor for the wards, and the indigent population
provided the clientele. The financial commitments from the collective Jewish community
funded the new Dispensary and the main hospital.13
The 1923 Report on Free Care articulated Mount Sinai’s mission to the people of
Milwaukee by way of the new Dispensary. The Committee submitted the report to Mount
Sinai’s Board on October 14, 1923 “for the purpose of considering free work to the hospital
and recommending ways and means of increasing the amount thereof.”14 The hospital’s
nonsectarian mission grounded the report. The report stated that “Mount Sinai Hospital,
pursuant to proper authority has sought to extend its service not only to those whose means
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permit them to pay therefore, but also to the indigent, and those of limited means.”15It
recommended expanding and solidifying Mount Sinai’s role in charity care especially to
“those who otherwise might have been deprived of proper medical or hospital attention.”16
It urged the Board to reaffirm the hospital’s original mission: to treat, nurse, and care for
Milwaukee’s sick, disabled, and infirm persons, regardless of nationality or creed. “Mount
Sinai has won the appreciation of the people of this city,” the report stated, “irrespective of
religious belief or racial distinction. While full pay cases for all, irrespective of their
religious faith, should be continued, such services should be subordinated to the greater
service that can be rendered toward the deserving, without expense to them.”17
By 1938, Mount Sinai developed a comprehensive and community-wide health care
system at the Dispensary. The nonsectarian nature of the hospital provided the Dispensary
with funds from places like Catholic charities, the Milwaukee County Fund, and other
private charity concerns, in recognition of the services Mount Sinai provided to non-Jewish
indigents. The Dispensary also had a new Occupational Therapy Department. This
department was funded, organized, and staffed by the Ladies Auxiliary of Mount Sinai.
The Auxiliary volunteers assisted patients in exercises in order to strengthen injured limbs
and to increase fine motor skills after injury or stroke.18
The Dispensary was a success, but the efforts to raise money for operations revealed
a decrease in support for fund raising efforts within the Jewish community in Milwaukee.
During the 1935 fund raising drive, Felix Lowy called upon the younger generation of the
Jewish community to take their place in supporting the Jewish institutions of Milwaukee
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to meet the fundraising goal. The drive fell short. The failure to reach a funding goal
surprised and concerned members of the Mount Sinai Hospital Board. They were
growing older. The younger members of the Jewish community had not joined them in
supporting the hospital. The ramifications of the decreased support from the community
are key points in future chapters.

MOUNT SINAI, FREE WORK, AND THE DISPENSARY OF 1924
Mount Sinai opened the first of two large dispensaries in 1924. A small Dispensary
existed prior to the creation of Mount Sinai Hospital, but closed after 1903.19 The 1924
facility came about in part because of the recommendations found in the 1923 Report on
Free Care. The report noted the need for heath care for the indigent Jewish population. It
elaborated on the specific needs of the large Jewish population in Milwaukee, stating

The rapid growth of the Jewish population of the city in recent years has, however,
given rise to the need of extending the free work among our people, as well as those
of other faiths to the fullest extent of our financial means, and hospital facilities.
This hospital should serve as a center for the promulgation of health measures. It
should be a health center, whither may come, not only those requiring strictly
hospital attention, but also for those whose needs can be served in outpatient or
similar departments.20

Despite the relatively low number of Jewish patients at Mount Sinai, the report
specifically identified the commitment to Jewish patients as an important reason to build
the new Dispensary. The lack of Dispensary services in Milwaukee included in the above
quote served as another reason to build a Dispensary at Mount Sinai.
Another crucial recommendation of the committee was that Mount Sinai should
19
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develop as a health center for the city of Milwaukee at Mount Sinai Dispensary. It stated the
Board should “amplify its present policy toward free and partial pay cases, social service
activities, and the like, by the establishment and maintenance of a free Dispensary, or
outpatient department, and such clinics as may be recommended by the Medical
Administration Committee and the Medical staff.”21 The committee wanted to create a
Dispensary as part of a social service in order to provide comprehensive assistance to
patients. The reported noted that,
From time to time, the question has arisen in the minds of individual members of
the Board whether the hospital has done all that should or can be done in and by an
institution of this kind, not only in strict hospitalization work for the indigent and
those of limited means, but also in extending our social service department so as to
include preventive work, particularly with respect to the Jewish people.22

This was important in light of changes at other Jewish relief organization in
Milwaukee. In 1921, the Hebrew Relief Association became Jewish Social Services
Association(JSSA). This change reflected a reorganization of the Association. The new
organization directed its resources to social work instead of emergency relief services.
JSSA established programs to assist families with a number of social services, including
referring patients to Mount Sinai for medical care. The JSSA served the Dispensary
through the referral of patients and arranging home health services and other assistance
after the patient was discharged.23
The committee suggested the transfer of the small clinic operations from the Jewish
Social Service Association clinic to Mount Sinai and enlarging them meet the needs of the
poor of Milwaukee.
21
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The report stated,
Your committee believes that the high standard and ideals of the medical
profession will impel members of that profession to give of their time and
professional skill toward the successful maintenance of these clinics, and
the out-patient departments. We believe it to be the rule that the important
and effective medical clinics which are maintained in hospitals the world
over are under the guidance and supervision of members of the medical
profession who have by their industry, skill and devotion to higher
professional standards, attained fame and renown in the profession, and in
the communities in which they live; and so it will undoubtedly come to pass
that these clinics in Mount Sinai will not only reflect credit upon the
hospital and its sponsors, but upon those physicians, surgeons, and dentists
who will render service in connection therewith. It must be apparent to all
that the innovations contained in this report will assure more free work in
the hospital. The name Mount Sinai will stand for an institution absolutely
unique among hospitals in this city and state. In short time the poor, the
needy, and the distressed will look upon this institution as an agency for
their relief. The hospital then will not only serve as a curative agency, but
also as a center for the prevention of disease, and thus be a means toward
upholding sanitation and health in the community.24

The centralization of charity health care at Mount Sinai facilitated the transition of the
Hebrew Relief Association into a social service institution. The organization changed its
name to the Jewish Social Service Association, and altered their mission statement to
include social services for families and children.25 The report suggested that working with
JSSA, Mount Sinai could “Develop a heath care center. One that should amplify its present
policy toward free and partial pay cases, social service activities, and the like by the
establishment and maintenance of a free Dispensary.”26 The JSSA became one of
Milwaukee’s most comprehensive social service institutions. The Mount Sinai Dispensary
represented one of the most centrally located medical institutions in Milwaukee. The JSSA
and Mount Sinai worked together to provide medical and social services in Milwaukee.
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The transfer of medical services to Mount Sinai from the Jewish Social Service Association
reflected the change in mission and focus at the JSSA, in that it no longer provided medical
services. The JSSA referred patients to the Dispensary.27 The Free Dispensary opened in
1924. Abraham Slimmer donated fifty thousand dollars, but the Milwaukee community
raised an additional eighty thousand dollars, for a total of one hundred thirty thousand
dollars.28

SERVICES AT MOUNT SINAI DISPENSARY: 1924
In the 1920s, medical advances spurred the creation of more hospital in cities around
the United States as well as expansions at existing facilities. The demand for clinical
experience for medical students in hospitals increased. In 1924, dispensaries at many urban
hospitals competed for resources in the wake of the modernization of hospitals. The
medical professionals, doctors, supported the creation of medical specialties and
dispensaries closed to accommodate expanded medical programs.29 Rosemary Stevens
argued that the medical profession created and maintained an identity based on the
increasing prestige of the doctors in the 1920s.30 Hospitals closed dispensaries and built
operating rooms, laboratories, and nursing schools. Many, including Mount Sinai New
York, established themselves in their communities as elite institutions of medical
learning.31
Mount Sinai differed from most urban hospitals by building and expanding its
Dispensary when most hospitals closed them. Dispensary patients provided medical
27
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education opportunities for doctors and nurses in Milwaukee. The addition of Dispensary
services and outpatient programs established Mount Sinai as a community hospital for
Milwaukee and much “like clinics which are maintained as well as a teaching institution
for staff.”32 The Dispensary treated patients based on financial need. However, in addition
to the eligibility investigation, the staff evaluated the medical needs of patients. That is,
Dispensary staff treated patients after confirming they were worthy of help and the care
they sought was appropriate. Patients with minor illnesses were more likely to be denied
free care, in favor of those with more serious illnesses. Dispensary leaders prioritized the
care of those most seriously ill, and sent less expensive, less serious cases to doctors for
care. The rationale was that those with minor medical problems were less likely to suffer
hardship from the cost of their care. The Dispensary was more likely to treat an expensive
serious medical problem to keep the patient from increased financial hardship. For example,
the Dispensary often sent paying patients in need of non-emergency care to a doctor in
favor of an application from a partial pay patient or free care patient. The chronic or more
serious condition required more care and follow up services. The Dispensary was much
more likely to care for an unstable diabetic or surgically repair a hernia than they were to
care for a less expensive condition. This policy provided the staff with learning
opportunities similar to those found at medical schools in other city hospitals.33
The committee justified this policy in the report, stating,
The committee submits these facts so that the Board may have in mind that these
many men and women are devoting time and effort toward the proper
maintenance of the hospital and your committee believes that it reflects the
thought and feeling of each of these men and women in expressing the statement
32
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that these men and women are contributing this service in a spirit of philanthropy
and benevolence, rather than from a desire to provide hospitalization for patients
who have sufficient means to pay therefor.34
The hospital with a Dispensary model at Mount Sinai served as an example of how
health care institutions utilized health care resources in the years before government
and private insurance plans. Patients with serious conditions and in need of more
expensive medical care received priority for assistance. Those who had minor issues
went elsewhere with the understanding that treating their condition was not likely to
cause undue financial hardship. This sometimes meant the Dispensary treated fewer
patients, but the ones who received care were among the sickest and poorest. After the
hospital took over medical operations from The Hebrew Relief Association, patients
went to the Dispensary, the first point of contact for patients. Dispensary staff evaluated
each case and referred patients appropriately.35
The Dispensary became part of one of Milwaukee’s more comprehensive social and
health care service institutions. The Mount Sinai Dispensary treated the patients
Milwaukee County could not admit to their hospital. It provided services for patients
designed to manage health conditions to the full extent of medical technology of the day.36
Unlike patients at other dispensaries, patients at Mount Sinai benefited from the practices
established by the hospital board in 1923. Hospital staff trained at Mount Sinai’s
Dispensary from 1924 through the 1960s. The Dispensary, later the outpatient clinic, was
closed after the Medicaid Program was started. According to Harry Kanin, “The hospital
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didn’t think it was needed anymore.”37 There were changes coming. A global economic
depression increased the number of indigent patients in need of assistance. Hospitals like
Mount Sinai faced rising costs, more patients, and less money by way of both donations
and payments for care. The Dispensary proved to be very successful at a time when other
hospitals struggled to remain open.

HOSPITALS AND THE DEPRESSION
The Depression of 1929 caused a great deal of financial hardship for many city
hospitals. The efforts to establish hospitals as elite places of healing resulted in a
quandary for many hospitals. The number of indigent patients increased, and so did the
cost of health care. Rosemary Stevens noted that “For patients and their doctors the
lessons of the 1920s had been well learned. Because hospitals were now recognized as
providers of an essential service, it was difficult to cut this service to the bone.”38 The
success of the movement to create modern urban hospitals did cause a problem of
increased demand for services and increased indigent patients. Stevens remarked,
“Hospitals were prisoners of increased demand– both from doctors seeking to hospitalize
patients and from a growing group of patients who could not pay.”39
A number of hospitals, Mount Sinai Milwaukee included, attempted to raise funds by
offering prospective patients the opportunity to purchase hospital days through
memberships which offered the benefit of a fixed number of hospital days per year in
exchange for a fee and a subscription payment. In 1930, according to Mount Sinai
Superintendent L.C. Austin, hospitals in Milwaukee were losing an estimated three to four
37
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dollars a day. Mount Sinai Hospital reported a deficit that year because It treated slightly
fewer paying patients, while the proportion of patients unable to pay rose considerably. An
emergency fund raising drive covered the debt, but Austin explored other options for
raising money.40 Leaders at Mount Sinai reasoned that the Depression led to an increase in
the need for charity care and also made it difficult, if not impossible, for donors to maintain
the level of funding for the hospital received in the 1920s.41
In 1935, Superintendent Austin announced a plan to sell prepaid hospital services.
Austin attempted to fund the hospital by selling what he called “hospital memberships.”
The plan seemed simple enough and Mount Sinai’s leaders hoped this would wipe out
deficit caused by the increased care of indigent patients during the Depression. The idea
was based on a program already in place at Mount Sinai Milwaukee. Starting in 1928,
expectant mothers could pay five dollars a month throughout their pregnancies. By the
time the baby was delivered, the bill was already paid.42 Hospital leaders believed the
same principle could be applied to all prospective patients. Under the new plan, clients
purchased health care services at Mount Sinai including a set number of hospital days,
room and board, operating room services, laboratory and x-ray work, and some
medications.43 For ten dollars, the member purchased 21 days of hospitalization for the
year. Austin believed that the plan would ease the burden of charity care debt on the
hospital.44 The plan could be purchased in advance for use throughout the year.
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The costs of indigent care were very high. In 1931, the hospital had lowered prices
because of the Depression. The hospital lost $21,000 in 1932. Austin explained that
private hospitals like Mount Sinai were in danger of closing. “Sixty percent of all hospital
beds in the United States are in independent and public hospitals. The public hospitals are
today taxed to capacity and would not be able to care for the patients who would be
dumped on them if the private hospitals were forced to close.”45 In 1933, Mount Sinai
leaders needed $35,000 for direct patient care. They hoped membership sales would raise
at least this sum.
However, The Medical Society of Milwaukee County issued a statement saying that a
program like this threatened other hospitals and the livelihood and authority of doctors.
This Society was relatively new. Starting in 1902, members of the Society tried to unify
Milwaukee County doctors.46 There was serious concern on the part of the doctors about
the state of available medical education in Milwaukee. At this time, charges that The
Milwaukee Medical College conferred degrees to improperly trained doctors.47 They
established a committee in 1913 to study the economic conditions for doctors and found
that in relation to other professions, doctors earned significantly less money. The Society
drafted a plan designed to increase income for doctors in order to entice doctors to join
the Society. The plan included investigations of all patients to ensure all who could pay
for care did so. In addition, it suggested that younger doctors assume the majority of the
responsibility for indigent care, leaving older and well established doctors “unburdened”
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by such work.48 There was another reason for opposition. The Society attempted to
create an insurance system in the years before WWI. The war delayed that initiative.49
The Mount Sinai plan threatened plans to renew their own insurance program.
At the time of the Mount Sinai Membership plan, the Society advocated for the
“business, socioeconomic, and political work’ on the doctor’s behalf.50 The Mount Sinai
plan represented a threat to Society members in that the plan required patients to use
Mount Sinai. The Wisconsin State Medical Society remarked that “The plan would
develop a system of medical practise [sic] in which the patient would be dealing with the
hospital, so that the selection of physician might become a matter of choice by the
hospital rather than the patient. It is our belief that a plan as proposed will result in a
much greater demands upon the hospital than the income derived through the plan will
warrant, and the service will be seriously cheapened.”51 Doctors rejected the notion that
patients could form relationships with hospitals directly when their choice of a doctor was
out of their hands. Austin responded that fear of change was not a good enough reason for
Mount Sinai to end its plan. He declared that medical societies and doctors were
frightened by innovation.52 Doctors considered the choice of hospitals part of the medical
care under their authority. Membership plans, like the one at Mount Sinai, threatened that
authority.53 The pressure from the Society ended the membership drive at Mount Sinai.
The two hundred people who bought memberships received their hospital benefits.54
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Austin also tried to address what he called “the common charge that hospital
expenses are too high for the purse of the average citizen” by relating a story about an
appendicitis case. The patient chose a hospital and had hired a nurse and stayed 18 days
for a cost of $334. The man complained that the total was too much, and he blamed it
solely on the hospital’s “terrible prices.”55 Austin explained that the line item bill showed
the of the $334, $150 was paid to the doctor for his visits to the patient at Mount Sinai,
$100 for the operation, $50 for visits, $49 for the special nurse who was paid about 60
cents an hour for her work. The largest hospital cost was $90 for a room for 18 days. The
nurse bought her meals at the hospital, which translated to $6.25 in revenue to the
hospital. After expenses, the hospital lost $3 on the operating room; it broke even on the
anesthetic charge, and lost on the rest of the bill at the rate of $3.60 a day.56
After ending the membership initiative, the Board of Mount Sinai sought funds from
a familiar source, the Milwaukee Jewish community. Mount Sinai still faced a serious
financial situation and the organized opposition had made the membership drive
unsuccessful. Hospital leaders organized a new charity drive. The drive was decisively
more successful than the membership plan. It expanded the existing Dispensary at a time
when many hospitals closed because of the Depression.

55

Newspaper clipping, “Doctors Remonstrate with Mount Sinai on New Pay System,” Milwaukee Journal, May 24,
1933, Box 1, Folder 7, Mount Sinai Collection, JMM Archives.
56 Newspaper clipping, “Doctors Remonstrate with Mount Sinai on New Pay System,” Box 1, Folder 7, Milwaukee
Journal, May 24, 1933, Mount Sinai Collection, JMM Archives. The total of the figures listed is actually $439.00.

141

1938 MOUNT SINAI DISPENSARY EXPANSION
The Great Depression caused much financial hardship for individuals and
organizations. The Jewish community contributed money to support existing operations
and fund the expansion. However, this particular drive required a great deal of support from
the Gentile population in Milwaukee. The combined efforts of Jewish and Gentile
community members raised the necessary funds. The Mount Sinai Dispensary and hospital
survived; despite the country’s economic crisis, the benefactors of Mount Sinai continued
their support. In fact, in 1938, the Dispensary expanded its services to include new services
like Occupational Therapy and expanded surgery facilities, transitioning into an outpatient
department.57 The growth of medical specialization at other hospital led to the creation of
new departments at the Dispensary. The Jewish Social Service Association and Mount
Sinai’s Ladies Auxiliary provided crucial resources to the Dispensary and the means to
expand operations.

SOLICITING COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR COMMUNITY CARE
The fund raising drive of 1935 revealed weakened support from the Milwaukee
Jewish population. Donations and volunteer numbers decreased. By 1935, the leaders of
Mount Sinai realized that the Dispensary was in need of expansion and improvement. The
Depression increased the number of indigent patients who came in search of medical help.
The Hospital Board, in conjunction with the Ladies Auxiliary, started another fund raising
drive to expand the facility. The Board decided the appeal for funds would be made to the
Jewish and non-Jewish communities, in order to raise $75,000. Max Freschl, former
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president of the Federated Jewish Charities, issued a statement to the Milwaukee Jewish
community for their non-Jewish associates:

A Message to Remember. When a patient enters Mount Sinai hospital for
healing of any injury or sickness, there is only one concern of the hospital
and that is to do the best that modern science and skill can do to heal or
cure. . .In this regard Mount Sinai exemplifies the spirit of mercy, charity
and humanity common to all religions. . .it is for this reason that Mount
Sinai appeals to persons of all faiths to help carry it on, for Mount Sinai,
though founded under Jewish auspices, is nonsectarian in service. This is
the message you should carry to your friends who are not of the Jewish
faith.58
They sent a different message to Milwaukee’s Jewish community. Ed Osterman,
Chairman of the Emergency Campaign of Mount Sinai Hospital wrote:
A Message to the Jewish people of Milwaukee. Permit me to emphasis the
fact that the forthcoming campaign is the only source through which may
continue to function. The hospital is no longer a recipient of funds from
the Federation, and is not affiliated with any other fund raising group. It is
merely a matter of facts and figures that if the hospital does not obtain
sufficient financial aid from the community to carry on its work, it cannot
survive. I need not amplify that dire possibility. I am confident to the
utmost degree that the Jewish people of Milwaukee will not permit Mount
Sinai Hospital to even curtail any of its life saving and health preserving
functions.59

In total, 700 workers joined the Drive, with women taking the lead. There were 27
Women’s teams, each with 12-25 workers at the beginning of the Drive. The Men’s
Division was still in the process of organization at the start of the drive. The Drive
included personal appeals for funds and an extensive publicity campaign. Volunteers
mailed an eight-page pamphlet to over five thousand people. They distributed thousands
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of single page leaflets to employees at the larger industrial and commercial institutions of
the city and placed several thousand large posters in stores and shops.60
The pledges came in slowly. The final amount raised, $54,000, was not enough; in
order to raise the final $21,000, the Jewish leadership recruited past members of the
Mount Sinai Board and spoke directly to the younger members of Milwaukee’s Jewish
community. Judge John C. Karel offered his support to the workers who had already
brought in over fifty thousand dollars by telling them they were over half way there and
urging them not to quit. He referenced Rabbi Caro and reminded the volunteers that he
had helped the Rabbi secure the original Mount Sinai Hospital building.61
Felix Lowy, a member of the Fund Raising Committee stated he was happy to do his
part, but made a strong plea for support from the younger members of Milwaukee’s
Jewish Community:
I want to take this opportunity to call on the younger men and women to
assume their rightful share of communal responsibility. It is high time that
the many thousands of Jewish people in this city develop newer leaders to
take the place of the very few veterans who are called upon year after year
to assume the heavy burdens of conducting our institutions and also of
raising the funds for their support. Mount Sinai should not be the concern
of only a few men and women who are willing enough to devote their time
and energy to it. The hospital is a Jewish responsibility for the entire
community of Jews not just a few individuals. The hospital never was
designed as paying business. Its function is to cure the sick, heal the
injured, save human life and preserve the health of the community without
regard to profits or even balancing its budget by selling its service. No
Jewish hospital in the world worthy of the name is operated on a strictly
paying basis.62
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sixty thousand dollars for the hospital and Dispensary.63 The Board drew up plans to
expand the facility despite the fact that the goal of $75,000 was not reached and opened
the expanded Dispensary in 1938.
DISPENSARY SERVICES, STAFF AND PATIENTS
The dedication of the new facility received a great deal of media attention in
Milwaukee. Hospital leaders supplied a great deal of information about the facility and
held a large ceremony to mark the occasion. On May 6, 1938, the Wisconsin Jewish
Chronicle published several articles about the dedication of the Dispensary at Mount
Sinai. These articles reported the services now available at the facility, and the fund
raising efforts. Articles about the kind of care the Dispensary provided its patients
appeared as examples of the success of the new facility. These articles reveal the
cooperation between the Dispensary, Mount Sinai Hospital, and the social service
agencies in Milwaukee in providing comprehensive care for patients.64 The articles
included stories about the patients and their treatment, Jewish and Gentile. However,
those stories do not include direct quotes from the patients themselves and appear to be
written by Dispensary staff, in order to advertise their services.
One story was about “Mrs. Rose Blank” who now needed an operation after years of
chronic illness and putting off care for other bills and necessities. Her husband was laid
off and her acute gall stone “troubles” were at a peak. The article also noted she was “A
lady ‘of the old school,’” and “adhered to the ancient ritual practices” and “observed the
dietary laws.” The idea of going to a public hospital was “revolting, clean enough in
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hygiene” but what of “intangibles like spiritual cleanliness and the proper way of life” for
a Jewish woman, in keeping with God’s laws? The inclusion of God’s laws in the article
is difficult to explain. The nonsectarian tradition of Mount Sinai remained paramount, but
many of the accounts of patient experiences read as testimonials rather than assessments
from the actual patients. They are written in the third person, and do not include many
quotes directly attributed to the patients. The article reported that at Mount Sinai’s
Dispensary, she finds the care she needs; it is the only place to go. There she is among
“friends.” If in her pain she “should suddenly cry out in mamanloschen” [the mother
tongue] she would not be looked at askance, “like a stranger in a strange place.”65 The
article described Mount Sinai thus, “This is her hospital. At Mount Sinai, the people here
know what she meant by ‘spiritual cleanliness.’ Rose felt ownership of the hospital for
hadn’t she, during the ‘good years’ contributed according to her modest means to its
regular campaigns?”66 The staff at Mount Sinai could also understand that “rooted in her
east European ancestry was a fear of officialdom, and despite her confidence in the
hospital and its personnel, she feared the ordeal of questioning.”67 This was why her first
contact with the hospital is through a social worker from the JSSA at the Dispensary. She
told the social worker of her trouble and gave a financial history about ability to pay
along with her medical information; the question was not whether she should receive care
but whether she is in a position to get the same care privately at her own expense.
Because of her more serious illness, Rose was accepted as a patient.68 She was treated
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with “human kindness” and her tests revealed that no surgery needed; instead, primary
care with follow up was prescribed, along with a diet which relieved her symptoms. After
a time, Rose returned for follow up care and was found to be “in comparative good health
and free from pain.”69
Gentile patients were also included in the patient articles. Mrs. Santo
Controfelli–whose name signaled she was Italian–was “troubled with bad eyesight” and
applied for glasses at the Dispensary. After testing she was given a diabetes diagnosis,
which required an eight day stay to start insulin and dietary therapy.70 However, she had
eight children; her husband works and she lacked other childcare. The Dispensary’s
Social Service Director called the family welfare association, which sent a housekeeper to
assist her husband while she stayed in the hospital and received insulin therapy, and she
“takes[it] faithfully and returns to the clinic for assessment.” Her “dark Latin eyes flash
with gratitude whenever the words Mount Sinai are mentioned.”71 The descriptions of
patient treatment at Mount Sinai’s Dispensary reveal a community cooperative health
care system that assisted patients in a variety of ways. However, it is likely that the stories
included in the article represented the assessment of Dispensary staff about the patient
care experiences, not actual testimonials from them themselves.
The Mount Sinai Dispensary opened in Milwaukee despite a national trend that saw
many hospitals closing their dispensaries. The Report on Free Care of 1923 suggested
that the hospital build it and partner with the newly formed JSSA to meet the medical
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needs of the indigent in Milwaukee. The Dispensary expanded in 1938. By all accounts it
was a successful and beneficial facility for the indigent patients and medical staff at
Mount Sinai Hospital.
However, the efforts to raise money for operations revealed a concerning new reality
to Jewish leaders and the Jewish community at large. For the first time in the history of
the hospital, a fundraising drive failed to meet its goal. During the 1935 fund raising drive,
Felix Lowy called upon the younger generation of the community to take their place in
supporting the Jewish institutions of Milwaukee to meet the fund raising goal. The drive
fell short. The Depression may have reduced the amount of money raised, but older
Jewish leaders were concerned that younger members of the Jewish population were not
as active as they had been. The failure to reach a funding goal surprised and concerned
members of the Mount Sinai Hospital Board. They were growing older. The missed goal
cast the future of hospital leadership and future funding in doubt. Members Milwaukee’s
Jewish population eventually moved to the suburbs. They established new institutions, or
took existing ones with them to their new neighborhoods. Time and money for Jewish
institutions in Milwaukee competed with new neighborhood programs. By the 1960s,
Mount Sinai was one of a few Jewish institutions located in Milwaukee’s downtown area.
In 1967, Mount Sinai Hospital’s leaders faced a critical question: relocate the hospital to
the new suburban Jewish communities or remain downtown. Changes in government
programs affected urban hospital like Mount Sinai, the cost of indigent care and the
changes in funding became unstable. Hospital leaders decided to keep the hospital
downtown, but twenty years later, the hospital merged in order to remain open. Changes
in health care policy and the creation of government programs created new challenges for
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urban hospital like Mount Sinai.
Two other Milwaukee hospitals, The Passavant and Deaconess, faced these issues as
well. They too had long histories of community service in Milwaukee. They also relied
on the support of their religious communities for funds throughout their histories.

THE PASSAVANT
The original name of the first Lutheran hospital established in Milwaukee was the
Milwaukee Hospital. It opened on August 3, 1863.72 In 1966, the hospital was renamed
Lutheran Hospital. It is referred to by three monikers in the literature; Milwaukee
Hospital, Lutheran Hospital, and The Passavant.73 I will consistently use the term The
Passavant. It is a colloquial term used by the people who founded it.
The Passavant was one of the first hospitals established in Milwaukee. Reverend
Johannes Muehlhauser, pastor of Grace German Church, was the first to recognize the
need for a Protestant hospital. He was influential in establishing the Wisconsin Synod of
the Lutheran Church and brought Lutheran ministers to Milwaukee to assist in the effort
to create a Lutheran hospital.74 One of the men he brought in was William Passavant, a
minister and hospital administrator from Pennsylvania; as Victor Caro was to the creation
of Mount Sinai Hospital, so William Passavant was to the creation of The Passavant.
Passavant was raised in an affluent and religious German home. During his childhood he
accompanied his mother on errands delivering relief supplies to the poor. As a young
adult, he learned the German language and became interested in the German American
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community. Passavant published The Lutheran Almanac for the German American
population as “a means of diffusing any information among our people” in order to
stimulate interest in educational opportunities and benevolent organizations in the
Lutheran religion.75 He entered the ministry and sought to establish church-based
institutions that aided the poor.76 He had an established a national reputation of success
in Pennsylvania when Reverend Muehlhauser brought him to Milwaukee.
After a few false starts, Passavant found a suitable location for the new hospital in
1863, at 21st Street between Kilbourn Avenue and State Street. During the negotiations,
the seller of the property asked Passavant if he had the necessary one thousand dollars to
seal the bargain. In response, Mr. Passavant stated his belief that the Lord would provide
the money.77 According to legend, an old acquaintance of Mr. Passavant dropped by
during these negotiations and left an envelope containing the exact amount needed for the
new hospital. It was later revealed that Mr. Passavant had signed the contract to purchase
the hospital site without the thousand dollar deposit. Witnesses to the signing were
shocked to realize that he had agreed to the terms of the loan with less than one dollar on
his person.78
Pastor Muehlhauser relied on Passavant to engage support for the hospital from
Milwaukee’s Lutherans. Passavant believed that building the hospital required
community cooperation for relief efforts for those in need. Much like Abraham Slimmer,
he disapproved of sectarian ideology and encouraged community cooperation.79 The
Passavant opened on August 3, 1863. The Board of Visitors (later the Milwaukee Hospital
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Auxiliary) for the new hospital included some of Milwaukee’s most prosperous men:
John Plankinton, the owner of a large packing house, as well as German businessman
August Uihlein, owner of the Joseph Schlitz Brewery, and Gustav Reuss, a banker at
Marshall & Ilsely.80 Although the hospital’s religious foundation was Lutheran,
community support was ecumenical. Historian Ellen Langill noted that “Within the first
five years, the Protestant community of Milwaukee, including Lutherans, Presbyterians,
Methodists, and Congregationalists, rallied around the Milwaukee [Passavant] Hospital,
the only Protestant hospital west of Pittsburgh, and made its welfare its cause.”81
Fund raising was crucial for hospitals. They maintained operations with the money
from donations and volunteers staffing many urban hospitals. The Passavant was no
different. The affluent board members of The Passavant gave generously, but the hospital
was still faced with debt issues from the purchase of the property. The thousand dollar
deposit from the unknown donor was not nearly enough to entirely fund the hospital. The
hospital spent its money on patients and the initial cost of care for the community resulted
in a deficit. Hospital’s leaders did not have enough money to pay on the balance of the
original lease. By November 1863, donors pledged six thousand dollars toward the debt
of twelve thousand dollars owed for the new hospital. The Milwaukee Sentinel published
an editorial in May of 1866 which argued that The Passavant was a worthy cause for
charitable donations.82 On October 31 of that same year, a successful benefit dinner was
held, but the hospital was still struggling.83
The hospital eventually secured additional funds from the Wisconsin legislature for
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its charitable work. In the summer of 1867, The Passavant received an important patient
base: The United States Secretary of the Interior designated The Passavant as the official
marine hospital for Milwaukee’s port. This crucial designation provided a steady stream
of money for patient care. The continued fund raising efforts by the community enabled
the hospital continue to treat Milwaukee residents and federal funds provided for the
costs of care for sailors in port.84 A renovation project was completed in 1894 on
Kilbourn Avenue, the location where The Passavant Hospital remained for the rest of its
years.85

EVANGELICAL DEACONESS
Deaconess was also a Lutheran hospital. However, it was staffed by subset of the
work of the Lutheran Church. The term Deaconesses refers to young women who devoted
themselves to charity work and dissemination of the religious missions of the Lutheran
church. However, Deaconess Motherhouses also included members from other Protestant
religions including Episcopalian, Methodists, and Evangelicals. It was “a special type of
organized Christian service in the Lutheran Church.”86 The goal of the Deaconess
mission was “educating and training Christian women for professional charity work.”87
The community that created it retained a great deal of its German identity long after other
Lutheran churches embraced English language services and prayer books. The continued
use of the German language set them apart from The Passavant community. For the
84
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purpose of this research, the use of the German language is most significant difference
between the two hospitals. There were also differences in religious doctrine.88 The
Deaconess women adopted a way of life that represented “a paring of sorts between
Lutheran and Catholic traditions.” Deaconesses were akin to nuns, at a time where many
members of the Protestant community “shunned all things Romish.”89 The Deaconesses
embraced the “Inner Mission” brought over from Europe. The mission called for the
increased attempts to spread the Christian gospel and expand charity work.90 Deaconess
Milwaukee was a smaller hospital that established a tradition of Diakonia (service) in
Milwaukee distinctive from the larger Passavant Hospital.91
William Passavant brought the first Deaconesses to Milwaukee. He attended a
conference in London on May 11, 1843. He was impressed by the presentation of
representatives of the Deaconess Motherhouse in Kaiserswerth on the Rhine. Passavant
visited the Motherhouse and before he left, recruited four Deaconesses for a Motherhouse
in Pennsylvania.92 Passavant visited Milwaukee in order to open another Motherhouse in
Milwaukee. He brought Deaconesses and with Passavant’s assistance and fundraising
efforts, Deaconess Hospital opened in 1909. The new hospital was designed “to serve all
as nonsectarian and as a refuge for the worthy sick.”93
The Deaconesses included efforts to fulfill their inner mission at the hospital.94 They
continued many of the religious practices brought to America from Europe at a time
where other Milwaukee Lutheran groups were ending such traditions. The Evangelical
88 For a more detailed account of Lutheran history in America, see Abdel R. Wentz, A Basic History of Lutheranism in
America (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1964).
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Lutherans insisted on conducting services in German even as other Lutheran churches in
Milwaukee adopted English. The Deaconess staff was comprised of missionary
volunteers rather than paid workers, with stipends for room and board given in exchange
for their work.95 Evangelical Lutherans formed a Deaconess Service Society with the
purpose of establishing a hospital built on the principles of Diakonia ,benevolence,
education, and poor relief.96 On August 2, 1909, the Deaconess Service Society
formalized a mission statement which included three goals: to establish a hospital for
charitable care, establish a Deaconess Home to provide living quarters for the volunteers
and nursing school students, and to create new charitable programs to meet the needs of
the city.97 The Evangelical Deaconess Hospital, consisting of a small pharmacy and only
fifteen beds, opened on December 10, 1910 at 1807 Grand Avenue. By 1917, a new
50-bed structure was built next door at 1815 West Grand Avenue. The Society hoped to
raise enough funds to build a Deaconess House and the nursing school.98
The Passavant and Deaconess received charitable support in Milwaukee, but there
were differences between the two religious communities in both religious and cultural
practices. Evangelical Lutherans at Deaconess retained much of their cultural norms from
Germany, including the German language. World events highlighted the impact of that
difference; when the United States entered World War I, the anti-German rhetoric
decreased donations at Deaconess. All things German were suspicious after the United
States entered the war; German newspapers closed and German language classes
decreased dramatically.99 The Passavant and Deaconess received charitable support in
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Milwaukee, but there were differences between the two religious communities in both
religious and cultural practices. Evangelical Lutherans at Deaconess retained much of
their cultural norms from Germany, including the German language. World events
highlighted the impact of that difference; when the United States entered World War I, the
anti-German rhetoric decreased donations at Deaconess. The Wisconsin Loyalty Legion
held its first meeting in March 1918 with the self-appointed task of uncovering any
opposition or disloyalty to the American war effort.100All things German were suspicious
after the United States entered the war; German newspapers closed and German language
classes decreased dramatically. Historian Bayrd Still estimated that during this time, at
least 250 persons changed their German names in response to the backlash against
German identity.101 German organizations and businesses also altered their names at this
time. The Deutscher Club became the Wisconsin and the German-English Academy
became the Milwaukee Academy. The Germania Bank renamed itself the Commercial
National Bank. In contrast, The Passavant was fifty-four years old by 1917 and had
established strong ties with other religious groups because of William Passavant’s
commitment to a nonsectarian mission. The hospital administrators did not insist on the
strict use of the German language in its literature and adopted many American cultural
practices. Deaconess continued to insist on the use of German in much of their literature
and supported German language education in public schools.102 After the war ended,
anti-German hostility faded and donations at Deaconess increased.103
In the decades following World War I, The Passavant and Deaconess expanded their
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facilities to meet the needs of the Milwaukee community. Additions were built at both
hospitals to house nursing students. The Great Depression in the 1930s led to decreased
hospital revenues in many hospitals in the United States, and The Passavant and
Deaconess were no exception. A variety of cost cutting measures were implemented in
order to continue treating the large number of non-paying cases; interns and nursing
students volunteered their services and wages for staff were reduced by as much as ten
percent at both hospitals. They remained open through the Depression because of these
actions.104 After World War II, The Passavant and Deaconess grew in order to meet the
needs of the community and to take advantage of the advances in the field of medicine.
The Hill-Burton Act, passed in 1946, allowed both hospitals to receive federal funding to
modernize. Despite this aid, Milwaukee hospitals experienced massive bed shortages.
The Passavant and Deaconess created additional beds to address the problem.105 By the
1950s, many urban hospitals in America had begun to close, or relocate to the growing
suburban areas because of overbuilding. Milwaukee hospitals, including The Passavant
and Deaconess, grew during the 1960s.106 It was not until the late 1970s that The
Passavant and Deaconess began to feel the effects of expansion on their bottom line.
By that time, both The Passavant and Deaconess were on the verge of closing. A
merger between the two hospitals offered a means to preserve the community service
mission of each hospital. However, the merger was complicated by plans to build the
Regional Medical Center in Milwaukee County. Initially, leaders at the Center proposed a
merger with The Passavant. When that failed Deaconess leaders joined negotiations to
create a final plan that included a merger between the new hospital at the medical
104
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complex and the Passavant so they could remain open. Deaconess’ representatives balked
at any proposal that closed their campus. The strong support for the regional complex
from both civic and business leaders in Milwaukee County and the precarious financial
situation at both The Passavant and Deaconess resulted in a merger. It took six years to
develop a merger plan acceptable to both parties. The two hospitals merged to create
Good Samaritan Medical Center in 1982. By 1987, the hospital merged with Mount Sinai
to avoid closing
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CHAPTER 4 POLITICAL CHANGES IN HEALTH CARE: MERGERS AND
EXPANSIONS
This chapter does not speak specifically about Mount Sinai Hospital. Instead, it
examines three specific events in Milwaukee in the 1970s that impacted the merger
decision in 1987: the 1982 merger between The Passavant and Evangelical Deaconess
hospitals, the creation of a medical school at a new Regional Medical Center, and the
construction of Froedtert Lutheran Memorial Hospital as a new teaching hospital. Chapter
5 details how the creation of Froedtert Hospital and the Medical College of Wisconsin at
the Milwaukee County Regional Medical Center in 1980 ended plans at Mount Sinai
Medical Center to establish its own teaching hospital and medical school program.
Froedtert Hospital and its Medical College of Wisconsin also increased competition for
patients.1 Leaders at both Mount Sinai Medical Center and the Regional Medical Center
wanted to establish medical schools to address the physician shortage for the Milwaukee
area. The Regional Medical Center garnered support from civic and political sources
through its board, the Hospital Area Planning Committee (HAPC). The members acted to
capitalize on changes in policy and funding to create their desired medical center. These
resources, in addition to the actions of the local government and private entities expedited
the medical center project.2
These three events also reveal the ramification of specific changes in the delivery of
health care services in America. Mergers increased between 1970 and the mid-1980s.3
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Also during the 1970s and 1980s, local government entities gained significance power in
health care decisions, specifically over hospital construction, and used that influence to
make the changes they wanted, sometimes over the protests of hospital leaders. The
histories of the Medical College of Wisconsin and Froedtert Lutheran Memorial Hospital
illustrates the amount of agency a well informed and influential local government
regulatory board had over the local health care market. I argue that the ability of the local
government regulatory boards to approve construction for a regional medical center
contributed to the decline in available patients for other Milwaukee hospitals. The merger
between Deaconess and the Passavant occurred because influential members of the
Milwaukee population wanted to see the regional center built. To that end, they used their
political power and polity knowledge to secure funding and facilitate the necessary
merger of Deaconess and The Passavant.
Increased costs of health care compelled hospital leaders and administrators to
examine their business practices and make changes in order to offset the rising price of
health care. Scholars identified many possible reasons for the rise in health care. This
chapter focuses on three viable reasons for the rising cost to hospitals for care: the growth
of medical technology and specialized care, overbuilding and a surplus of hospital beds,
and changes in funding for Medicare and Medicaid patients. Of the three, I argue that the
changes in funding for the two federal programs offers the best explanation for rising
hospital costs. This chapter explains the impact of local government action on both the
number of hospital beds in the market and construction decisions. Chapter 5 takes up the
discussion of changes in funding for Medicaid and Medicare.
The creation of Good Samaritan Medical Center is discussed first. The merger
Targets?,” Review of Industrial Organizations 9, no.4 (1994): 394.
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between The Passavant and Deaconess is significant because it created Good Samaritan
Medical Center, the institution with which Mount Sinai ultimately merged. This merger
also illustrated the difficult experience of combining hospitals. Health care providers
realized the need for major changes in their management style during the 1970s. Hospital
leaders understood that some of these changes represented a paradigm shift in the
American health care system, primarily in funding.4 Mergers represented one of the most
profound changes in the business of health care. The construction of the regional medical
center is also discussed. The establishment of the center illustrates the increased power
held by local political and private groups. Political and private groups worked together to
build an ambitious institution. I argue that their power facilitated not only the center, but
the merger of Deaconess and The Passavant. The merger may have eventually occurred,
but the regional medical center would not have happened if not for the actions of local
groups in Milwaukee.

VOLUNTARY HOSPITALS AND FINANCES
Rosemary Stevens noted that the traditional community assistance to hospitals all but
ended by the mid-1970s. Hospital leaders searched for additional ways to fund health care
services. Hospitals no longer received gifts from donation drives, the responsibility for
capital fell on the hospital leaders themselves. Management focused on growing capital
through market forces and collecting fees for patient care. Stevens noted that “No longer
heavily dependent on community gifts and fund drives, voluntary hospitals were no
longer gaining capital from public sources on a voluntary basis, that is from their local
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communities. Instead, in their capital formation, voluntary hospitals were now similar to
major business corporations.”5
Hospital leaders began to adopt a decidedly corporate approach to health care.
Economists Avi Dor and Bernard Friedman explained that hospital mergers were
considered part of a rising trend of corporate mergers and plant closings in the 1980s.
This meant that some opponents of mergers sought to block mergers under antitrust laws
that protected business interests from unfair limitations on competition and trade.
Hospital leaders designed merger agreements meant to maintain services and preserve
positive community reputations in the cities they served. Hospital board members tended
to accept a merger over outright closure.67 Economists Erwin A. Blackstone and Joseph P.
Fuhr, Jr. stated that since many hospital board members were business leaders in their
communities, they supported the notion that the hospitals should hold down costs and
limit competition as much as possible. Mergers offered a means to that end.8
Merger attempts revealed sources of conflict in the process of combining different
organizations. Conflict between merging organizations can occur even between
businesses that appear to be closely similar. One possible source of conflict stemmed
from conflict between corporate cultures. Economists Roberto A. Weber and Colin F.
Camerer observed that a sense of culture is developed in an organization through
common experiences over time. The longer the company history, the more likely conflict
will arise during the merger process.9
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Kevin J. Dooley and Brenda J. Zimmerman described the merger process using a
marriage metaphor. Merging health care organizations seek collaboration through mergers,
acquisitions, alliances, and resources in order to gain profit or reduce costs. Much like a
marriage, each organization hopes to gain value from the new relationship.10 Similarities
and differences between the merging interests present unique challenges to the
relationship.
The opposites, while appreciating at one level the differences, are often
challenged by the stress of having to work at understanding the other’s
assumptions and make one’s own position heard. The relationships between more
similar partners may find subtle but significant differences in their ways of doing
things that challenge their relationship. For a merger where the focus is on
creating new opportunities, having too much similarity may limit the potential to
see new options.11

There was a great deal of similarity between Deaconess and Passavant. They were in
the same health care service market. Both hospitals enjoyed decades of community
support, and formed their own traditions and culture. But leaders at each hospital felt
forced into a “marriage of convenience” which led to distrust and a protracted merger
process.
Mergers were relatively rare before the 1980s. Hospital administrators considered
mergers a means for their struggling hospitals to remain open. Merger supporters
considered them a favorable alternative to relocation or closing a hospital. Hospital
mergers increased in American cities part because of the provisions of the federal
Medicaid and Medicare legislation of 1965, which created fiscal advantages for hospital
consolidation. Sociologists Jack Reardon and Laurie Reardon described the situation
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facing hospitals in terms of profit and debt. Mergers provided an easy way for hospitals to
increase revenue without building additional facilities. The easiest way to grow was to
take over an existing institution.12 Lower patient cost of care was the manifest function
of the legislation.13 Dor and Friedman found that many merger agreements tended to
include hospitals that were in relatively good financial shape, these mergers succeeded
more than those which included failing hospitals.14 Economist Tony Ugur Sinay argued
that merger activity in the late 1980s was meant to reduce production costs by the
elimination of waste and duplicate units at hospitals in close proximity. Mergers occurred
to ensure long-run survival for the merging hospitals.15 The American Hospital
Association (AHA) data indicated that most hospitals involved in a merger or
consolidation between 1987 and 1990 were located in or around the same metropolitan
areas.
There was a latent function associated with the financial incentives in Medicare and
Medicaid legislation. Investor owned hospital systems grew out of the unintended fiscal
advantages associated with buying a single hospital. Hospital systems were created from
these provisions.16 Hospital mergers permitted the reduction of operating costs for
hospital systems. For example, after a hospital merged, the newly formed hospital
received discounts from suppliers based on volume. Investor-operated hospital systems in
Milwaukee include Humana, Hospital Corporation of America (HCA), and American
Medical International. These systems of investor-owned hospitals over time became
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powerful interest groups at both the federal and state level.17 As the hospital systems
grew, doctors saw changes in their private practices; they became part of the hospital
systems. Hospital systems began to acquire physician networks that brought the entire
medical practices of doctors into the corporation; health care networks were able to
establish complete health care systems with these purchases. The purchase of both
hospitals and physician networks provided the facilities and medical staff for the growing
hospital systems.18
Mergers, along with the purchase of physician’s practices and other services as part
of the deal, led to the advent of antitrust lawsuits against hospitals under the Sherman Act
and the Clayton Act. Prior to the 1970s, antitrust legislation was considered inapplicable
to the business of health care work, based on a traditional sense that heath care work was
noncompetitive and performed by specialized professionals.19 The first two sections of
The Sherman Act prohibit restraints on trade through contracts and forbids the creation of
a monopoly in the market.20 The first section of Clayton Act outlaws any merger that
would substantially decrease competition in any geographical market.21 Two antitrust
cases set precedence for possible antitrust allegations against hospital merger plans: the
1975 Goldfarb v Virginia State Bar decision22 and the 1976 Hospital Building Company
v Trustees of Rex Hospital decision23 in 1976. Goldfarb struck down the idea that
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hospitals were automatically absolved from antitrust regulation, and Rex ruled that
hospital mergers could be blocked under the Sherman Act on the basis of concerns over
limiting competition in the overall hospital market.24 Blackstone and Fuhr observed that
the vast majority of nonprofit mergers were not challenged.25 In the years between 1981
and 1993, less than 4% of the 394 merger applications were challenged under antitrust
legislation.26
There are two distinct types of mergers: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal mergers
seek to increase the market share for the merging facility. Vertical mergers seek to gain
control over resources like medical supplies and physicians, and secure their place in that
diversified market. The Deaconess/Passavant merger was horizontal. Opponents to the
Deaconess/Passavant merger did not cite antitrust issues as a deciding factor in trying to
stop it. That did not mean that the merger was without controversy. By 1978, three
hospitals remained in downtown Milwaukee: Mount Sinai, The Passavant, and Deaconess.
They continued to treat patients, but administrators and Board members at each hospital
faced the same challenge: how could the hospital stay in Milwaukee and remain fiscally
viable? The practical answer to that question was complicated. All three hospitals
eventually decided to merge with another hospital in order to continue treating patients.
They maintained their traditions of community service but lost their individual identities
in the process.27 The collective fiscal problems of these three hospitals led to a series of
mergers in the early 1980s. First, The Passavant and Evangelical Deaconess merged to
create Good Samaritan Medical Center in 1982. Then, in 1987, Mount Sinai Medical
24
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Center merged with Good Samaritan to create Sinai Samaritan Medical Center.

THE COST OF HEALTH CARE AND BUILDINGS
Rosemary Stevens noted that one of the most salient explanations for the increase
was the rise of medical specialties and new technology. Health care cost more because it
included unprecedented technological advances.28 In the case of Milwaukee hospitals,
the creation of cardiac centers, emergency departments, neonatal wards, and other
medical specialties competed for patients at an increased cost. Mergers made sense
because consolidating services at a single hospital saved money for both the patient and
the provider. Philosopher Daniel Callahan believed that medical technology was a
blessing and a burden for patients and the hospitals that treat them. The costs of providing
care increase with advances in care. Uninsured and underinsured patients are essentially
priced out of assistance for their health care needs, leaving the hospitals to collect the cost
of care from those who cannot afford it. Hospitals compete with each other to draw
patients, but charge more for the treatment offered. He cites the nature of the “private
sector” as a salient reason cost controls on health care fail. The private sector has
autonomy in its business decisions and exercises that ability to set costs.29
These high cost led to more financial problems. Advancements in the national health
care industry contributed to the financial problems at urban hospitals in that they led to
shortened hospital stays for patients.30 In addition, some health services kept patients at
home instead of in a hospital bed. This cut hospital revenue even further at renovated
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medical facilities.31 Many Milwaukee hospitals and experienced low patient census
numbers and financial shortfalls in the 1970s.
Overbuilding and duplication of services made possible by government programs are
another possible explanation for higher costs. Dor commented on the situation saying that
by the 1980s, hospitals that had expanded their facilities faced the task of “restructuring”
and mergers offered a means to that end.32 Stevens observed that many American
hospitals expanded their facilities in order to draw in patients.33 Simultaneous
renovations at many Milwaukee hospitals time created an excess of hospital beds.
Historian Ellen Langill noted that hospitals that were overcrowded in the 1960s built
expansions in the 1970s and were virtually empty at times by the 1980s.34 Hospitals
raised room rates in order to address the loss of patients to their competitors.35
Three Milwaukee hospitals with over a century of history among them–The
Passavant, Evangelical Deaconess, and Mount Sinai Medical Center–eventually
disappeared into a single hospital through a series of mergers caused in part by these
changes.36 Administrators at the three hospitals, as in other American urban areas at the
time, approved expansion plans during a building boom in the early 1970s. Hospital
administrators and board members believed that the larger facilities and specialized
medical services would bring in more money. However, the overall number of beds in
Milwaukee decreased the number of patients at each of the three hospitals. Expanded
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choices and the decreased length of hospital stays decreased hospital revenue.37 The new
departments needed more patients to offset operation costs associated with creating new
treatments and to fund new technological procedures and tools.38
The 1982 merger was deemed necessary in order to reduce the number of beds in
Milwaukee. It was offered as an alternative to closing either hospitals. In addition, local
government officials wanted to build a regional medical center. The number of hospital
beds in Milwaukee had to be reduced. Mergers between hospitals were difficult because
none wanted to close. The merger between The Passavant and Evangelical Deaconess
illustrates the challenges of the merger process. The historic commitment to community
service at both hospitals complicated the merger negotiations.39 The Passavant and
Evangelical Deaconess hospitals were established by members of Milwaukee’s German
Lutheran community and had served the people of Milwaukee for decades. The merger
created Good Samaritan Medical Center after years of negotiation and conflict caused by
the desire on the part of the representatives from both The Passavant and Deaconess to
stay open.
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MERGING INTERESTS: THE PASSAVANT AND EVANGELICAL DEACONESS
The Passavant and Deaconess were two of Milwaukee’s oldest hospitals, established
and sustained by two religious communities in Milwaukee. Both were committed to
serving the city of Milwaukee. The merger between these two hospitals was contentious
and conflicted, and it took six years to complete. Tensions remained after the creation of
Good Samaritan Medical Center; the merger did not alleviate the discord between the
administration and staff from both hospitals. It exacerbated it.40
Mergers between hospitals often turned into conflicted and time consuming
endeavors. The boards of each hospital had to agree on matters of both administrative and
day-to-day operations. New leadership boards had to make decisions on personnel and
location. The employees who worked in the new hospital had the responsibility of making
those changes work. At first glance, it may not seem that the merging of two Christian
hospitals would be overly difficult; but representatives of both hospitals wanted to
preserve the individual history of their respective institutions described in the previous
chapter.41
At the time of the merger, the main point of contention between The Passavant and
Deaconess was preservation of each hospital’s mission. Their traditions, their daily
operations, and the location of the new hospital mattered most.42 As noted above, each
hospital wanted a relationship, a “marriage” that yielded valuable benefits.43 The merger
between these two hospitals took years to complete due in part to the stipulations offered
by Deaconess’ administrators, the smaller and younger hospital. They insisted the final
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merger agreement had to include their campus. This conflicted with The Passavant
leadership’s efforts to do the same for their own facility.44

MERGERS AND COMPLICATIONS: THE MAKING OF GOOD SAMARITAN
This section details the merger between Deaconess and The Passavant. The merger
between two of Milwaukee’s oldest hospitals was complicated and conflicted. Both
hospitals had decades of history and a strong sense of community pride. The actions of
the HAPC, the committee planning Froedtert Hospital, during the 1970s alienated leaders
at both the Passavant and Deaconess Hospitals and delayed any merger. Leaders at
Deaconess and The Passavant resented the idea of merger and remained suspicious of the
motives and machinations of the Greater Milwaukee Committee and HAPC involved in
creating the new regional complex. Initially plans for Froedtert Lutheran Memorial
Hospital included a merger with The Passavant to create a single Lutheran hospital in
Wauwatosa. However, The Passavant was not willing to relocate to the complex.
Throughout the merger discussions with The Passavant, HAPC leaders tried to convince
Passavant leaders to join the new complex, especially when merger negotiations between
Deaconess and The Passavant lagged. These actions irritated Deaconess leaders, due to
ongoing the merger discussions between Deaconess and The Passavant. The distrust grew
to the point that Deaconess’ leaders halted merger negotiations a few times before 1980
merger.45 The HAPC was determined to build Froedtert Hospital and sought to secure
any merger agreement as quickly as possible. In the negotiations with The Passavant and
Deaconess, the reference to Froedtert Memorial Hospital as a possible merger partner was
44
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remarkable in that the hospital did not yet exist. It may have been that leaders at both
hospitals accepted the inevitable creation of Froedtert Hospital and fought to preserve as
much of their missions as possible.
The publicized financial troubles at both the Passavant and Deaconess drew the
attention of the members of HAPC. They entered into negotiations with The Passavant
and Deaconess to negotiate a merger agreement and build the regional hospital.46
Deaconess’ leadership suspected that their hospital, as the smallest, was targeted for
outright closure.47 The GMC had hoped to partner with The Passavant to create a single
Lutheran hospital at the new Center. Deaconess leaders believed their exclusion from the
merger negotiations meant both the Passavant and the HAPC sought to close their
hospitals.48
Deaconess’ leaders remained skeptical and eventually refused any affiliation with
Froedtert Hospital.49 The leaders of The Passavant and Deaconess fought against any
plan that closed either hospital. But the construction of the regional medical Center
hinged on closing beds in Milwaukee. The Passavant and Deaconess were losing money,
and when The Passavant leaders left merger negotiations with Deaconess over a dispute
about the final location of the new hospital, the regional medical Center representatives
tried to convince The Passavant to merge with their facility instead. This caused anger
and distrust between Deaconess and the leadership at new medical Center. The local
newspapers contextualized negotiations between these three hospitals as a “rocky
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marriage” that resulted in the merger of The Passavant and Deaconess and the creation of
the Regional Medical Center.50 Good Samaritan Medical Center and Froedtert Memorial
Hospital were the end result of years of conflict, discord, and hostile negotiations.
On November 2, 1976, representatives of The Passavant and the HAPC, representing
the not-yet-extant Froedtert Hospital, released a statement saying they had agreed to
merge. The announcement was apparently made without prior notice to Deaconess
Hospital representatives, who still believed they were exploring a merger with The
Passavant.51 If the November 2, 1976 announcement was intended to intimidate
Deaconess leaders into a quick and final merger, it did not succeed. If anything, the
announcement prolonged negotiations. Eight months later, in 1977, Deaconess leaders
offered a merger plan that would allow the planners of Froedtert Hospital to join the
merger between The Passavant and Deaconess Hospital, but on Deaconess’ terms.52
Deaconess leaders hoped to exploit the efforts of the HAPC, and use it to their advantage
in the final merger plan. The beds at Deaconess acted as a barrier to those who wanted the
new center. Deaconess sought to protect what they could by opening themselves up to
any inducements HAPC might offer, in order to stay open.53 It stated that the proposed
merger plan excluded Deaconess. Deaconess’s leaders believed that the information cited
by the Southeastern Wisconsin Health System Agency, (SEWHSA), responsible for
collecting the data supporting hospital bed reductions for the new center, forced HAPC to
act. Representatives for Deaconess believed the announcement was a ploy to get any
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merger agreement: “this agreement, which was negotiated without the involvement of
Deaconess obviously cast Deaconess’ role in a joint venture with Lutheran [The
Passavant] in some doubt.”54 This was, to say the very least, an understatement.
Deaconess’ leaders refused to discuss any merger plans unless their own stipulations were
included for serious consideration and were now convinced that the only reason they
were invited into the merger discussion was to close Deaconess:
It is now obvious that Deaconess was sought as a party to the
Froedtert/Lutheran situation in order to: satisfy health planning officials
that a significant number of beds could be eliminated and provide a way to
keep the lagging Lutheran [Passavant] facilities operating while Froedtert
was under construction, by closing Deaconess and taking over its many
programs. These objectives could only be accomplished by elimination of
Deaconess Hospital’s facility. The entire planning process to date has been
slanted in this direction.55
Deaconess leaders became wary of any future merger plans with The Passavant. One of
the most obvious signs of animosity between Deaconess and Froedtert occurred after the
November 1976 announcement: Deaconess refused to merge with The Passavant if
Froedtert was involved in any way.
Without the Passavant, Deaconess would have had to find a new merger partner,
relocate, or close.56 It is entirely possible that the merger announcement was a
negotiation tactic designed to force an agreement. The announcement may have been
designed as a means to intimidate the Deaconess leadership and force them to reengage
with The Passavant on the stalled merger negotiations. The leaders of The Passavant were
highly committed to the legacy of their hospital; it is unlikely that they would have
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agreed to a final merger with the regional medical complex that closed their own
downtown campus.57
By November 2, 1976 Deaconess resumed discussions with The Passavant. However,
if the announcement of a merger between Froedtert and The Passavant was designed to
intimidate Deaconess into accepting a predetermined plan, it was not successful.
Deaconess leaders continued to issue statements designed to ensure their official
positions on all matters relating to the merger were known. Deaconess wanted more than
equal representation on the new administrative Board. Deaconess insisted that a full fifty
percent of the Board be Deaconess representatives and the other fifty percent to be split
between The Passavant and Froedtert leaders.58 In addition, Deaconess stipulated that the
final terms of consolidation were to be defined as a multi-facility system rather than a
single site.59
By July 18, 1977, Deaconess announced that “with information to date,
Deaconess, Froedtert and Lutheran [Passavant] Hospitals are not ready to commit to the
principle of merger.”60 The final agreement to resume merger discussions did not include
Deaconess’ stipulation about Board composition; each hospital had a one-third interest in
leadership decisions, but Deaconess was willing to talk. Each hospital formed legal teams
to protect their interests. The official position of the merger team was, “The proposed
structure protects the interests of each hospital in such key areas as medical staff by-laws,
employee assets, corporate policy and budgetary and operational control. It guards the
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religious affiliations of each hospital since the original corporate parent bodies and their
religiosities are maintained.”61 The hospitals appeared ready to discuss creating a
cooperative health care agreement between both locations. The merger team planned to
conduct feasibility studies.62
It was not to be that simple. A surprise announcement in February 20, 1978 halted
the merger process yet again. Deaconess called off the merger, citing a loss of twenty
million dollars a year if a new facility was created without closing The Passavant.
Passavant leaders now balked at implication that their facility was the most logical choice
to close because of its age.63 The Passavant representatives were opposed to their own
closure and refused any merger that included HAPC, the Froedtert representatives. It is
quite likely that the HAPC leadership capitalized on Deaconess’ hostility in order to force
their hand on a merger, whether with The Passavant or with them. On August 26, 1977,
Deaconess announced that The Passavant leadership rejected the July 18th merger
proposal over the inclusion of Froedtert. This decision ended any chance of the three
hospitals merging and Froedtert hospital was no longer a part of the merger discussion.64
This turn of events meant that a merger between The Passavant and Deaconess was
an alternative to closing both hospitals. The Passavant leadership refused to close and
Deaconess representatives had a very strong commitment to the preservation of their
hospital as well.65 Merger negotiations had reached an impasse. The distrust between
Deaconess and The Passavant over the role of Froedtert hindered the renewed merger
process and the final agreement for the new facility even after Froedtert left the
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negotiations. The official statement from Deaconess in 1977 about any future proposed
merger was unambiguous:
Representatives of Froedtert and Lutheran knew or should have known the
qualifications with which Deaconess had agreed to enter into further
discussions. Instead of acknowledging these qualifications, approval for
Froedtert Hospital was sought from the state health planning agency based
upon, among other things, the impression that Deaconess had agreed to a
merger between the three hospitals. This was never true. It is obvious now
that Deaconess was sought as a party to the Froedtert Lutheran situation in
order to satisfy health planning officials that a significant number of beds
could be eliminated, provide a convenient way to keep the lagging
Lutheran facilities operating while Froedtert was under construction by
closing Deaconess and taking over its many programs.66
Even without Froedtert, Deaconess leaders were suspicious of their counterparts at
The Passavant. Another two years passed before the hospitals reached an agreement. The
fact that neither hospital closed during the prolonged negotiations leads to the question:
were either one of the hospitals facing imminent closure? The merger discussions and
statements indicate concern over keeping the hospitals open. Deaconess representatives
reiterated stipulations to The Passavant officials that neither hospital close. They
supported the creation of a cooperative system between their hospital and The Passavant.
Deaconess wanted to form operating relationships with other hospitals in Milwaukee,
keeping them all open but treating distinct groups of patients. Cooperation between the
hospitals left each hospital’s identity intact, which was the main goal for Deaconess
Board members from the beginning.67 Deaconess leaders wanted to keep both hospitals
open and invite other hospitals to join them.68
Deaconess’ leaders began approaching other hospitals to explore possible
66 Report, “The Deaconess Position on Merger of Froedtert, Lutheran, and Deaconess Hospitals,” June, 1977, Box 4,
Folder 13, Sinai Samaritan Collection.
67 Report, “The Deaconess Position on Merger of Froedtert, Lutheran, and Deaconess Hospitals,” June, 1977, Box 4,
Folder 13, Sinai Samaritan Collection.
68 Report, “The Deaconess Position on Merger of Froedtert, Lutheran, and Deaconess Hospitals,” June, 1977, Box 4,
Folder 13, Sinai Samaritan Collection.

176

partnerships. They wanted to create a system of shared services and active ties with
Children’s Hospital until the construction of the new facility at the regional complex.69
Deaconess also sought a relationship with St. Luke’s Hospital in order to “Begin a
feasibility study for the purpose of exploring areas where shared services and programs
between the hospitals might lead to improving the quality, economy, and efficiency of
health care.”70 The partnership with St. Luke included referrals from Deaconess to St.
Luke’s Cardiac Care center, and orthopedics services. St. Luke’s in turn, referred patients
to Deaconess for ambulatory care and emergency services.71 Deaconess leaders knew
their hospital was in dire straits and tried to establish a relationship with St. Luke’s on its
own, to perhaps claim a sense of autonomy in the decisions for its future or to secure an
alternative agreement with St. Luke’s in case the relationship with The Passavant ended.
After more negotiations, a new merger plan between Deaconess and The Passavant
was finally announced in June, 1980. The official statement from SEWHSA applauded
the agreement, saying, “The long term saving and efficiencies will be tremendous. This
consolidation is just what the doctor ordered in light of today’s rising cost of health
care.”72 An editorial in the Milwaukee Sentinel on June 27, 1980 also approved of the
plan, “Two major causes of today’s obscenely high health–care costs–which everyone
more or less shares at least indirectly-are excess hospital bed capacity and duplicated
medical services. Merger is the key to curing both problems.”73 An article published the
same day reported the merger plan in terms of marriage, stating that after a “rocky four
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year courtship,” the two hospitals had finally “consummated their marriage” and agreed
to “tie the knot,” ostensibly leaving Froedtert at the altar.74 The final plans to create Good
Samaritan Medical Center were in place. The merger was approved on September 11,
1980 and on September 29, 1980, an announcement made it official; Good Samaritan
Medical Center had arrived.75 Froedtert Lutheran Memorial Hospital opened in the same
year. It partnered with the Medical College of Wisconsin as a teaching hospital.

GOOD SAMARITAN MEDICAL CENTER
Initially, Good Samaritan Medical Center implemented the vision of Deaconess’
leadership. The two hospitals remained open even as they shared leadership. Deaconess
remained on Wisconsin Avenue and The Passavant on Twenty-First Street and Kilbourn
Avenue. Services were redistributed between the two sites. By 1984, St. Luke’s Hospital
joined Good Samaritan as a “health care associate.” The hospitals shared some services
but did not merge with the new facility. St. Luke’s continued as a stand-alone hospital and
maintained its previous relationship with Deaconess.76 The combined hospital sites of
Good Samaritan and St. Luke’s shared patients based on services offered at each site. St.
Luke’s received cardiac patients from Good Samaritan. The Deaconess site received
pediatric and maternity patients and The Passavant site treated emergency cases from the
other two hospitals. They shared services such as CAT scan technology and surgery cases.
Shuttles transported patients between sites.77 The merger appeared to have met its goal of
cost savings by July 7, 1986 when John Schwartz, President of Good Samaritan
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announced that “the ink at Good Samaritan was finally black again.”78
Exactly how that ink changed back to red was a matter of controversy. Staff
reductions were one of the ways that the new hospital cut costs. Workers at both hospitals
were concerned about their employment status months before the merger. In the July 3,
1980 edition of Vital Signs, the newsletter of Deaconess Hospital, Kenneth S. Jamron,
president of Deaconess Hospital addressed this concern:
One thing that you should keep in mind as you hear rumors about cutting
the workforce: we have all been the target of a bureaucratic attack on that
they call ‘excess beds.’ The pressures applied to downtown hospitals to
merge or close have been based on that questionable statistic. Even giving
them the benefit of a doubt however, look again at what they’re talking
about–EXCESS beds. They don’t claim we’re caring for too many patients,
just beds. Let them preach all they want–how much of your work is
involved with tending to the needs of a nonexistent patient? 79

Projections for the future for Good Samaritan Hospital and the fiscal bottom line were
hopeful due to lessons learned in the merger process; Jim Schwartz, President of Good
Samaritan Medical Center, explained, “We were losing a bundle of money. We were
worried about how deep we could cut, and if we cut too deep, would the whole thing
collapse?”80 The article warned readers that “instead, he found that, much to his surprise
[,] that you could not cut too deep. There may be a few more layoffs at the hospital.”81
Layoffs were a source of tension at the new facility, but the most controversial
change after the merger was final was the closing of the Deaconess Campus of Good
Samaritan. On March 30, 1985, Good Samaritan leaders announced closing of the
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Deaconess campus. Staffing cuts had not provided enough cost savings. It was just too
expensive to keep both hospitals open. After all the struggle and the insistence on the part
of the merger team that the histories of each hospital would be preserved, the original
Deaconess building was sold to Marquette University and razed, leaving only a plaque,
including its motto Diakonia, at the site of its campus on Wisconsin Avenue, the sole
reminder that the hospital had ever existed.82 The news on the decision to close included
the sentiments of the Deaconess representatives, albeit only after justifying the decision:
The rich history of Deaconess Hospital accounts for the very mixed
feelings about its closure. On the one hand this represents a sound and
logical business decision, but on the other, we cannot help but see it as an
event fraught with emotion. However, the final chapter of Deaconess
Hospital’s history is read. It is a prime example of the tremendous change
occurring in health care today and the absolute necessity for flexible
management.83

The closure of the Deaconess site did alleviate some of financial burden at Good
Samaritan Medical Center, but it did not result in increased revenue for the hospital; the
overall savings in overhead costs were still not enough to finance both operations. Good
Samaritan leaders continued to pursue cost cutting measures to strengthen the fiscal
situation and continue operations in Milwaukee. A stipulation in the merger agreement
was that Good Samaritan Medical Center would continue to provide medical services in
the city; the mission included a formal commitment to the Milwaukee neighborhood
around Twenty-First Street and Kilbourn Avenue. The administrators of Good Samaritan
assisted in the establishment of the Avenues West Association, which brought Near West
Side businesses and charitable concerns together to address social and economic
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challenges in the neighborhood, but did not result in increased patient revenue or census
numbers.84
The protracted merger process between Deaconess and The Passavant Hospitals
illustrated the lack of agency private hospitals had in the context of new government
regulations. The leadership at Deaconess aggressively fought off attempts by the
proponents of the Regional Medical Center to force a merger, but their efforts could not
overcome the advantages held by those supporting the new Center. The political support
for the new Center, combined with the threat of closure, brought about the merger and
cleared the way for construction.
The actions of Deaconess leaders illustrated an awareness of the power shift between
private hospitals and government regulatory institutions. The suspicious and antagonist
press releases, culminating in the Merger Memo, indicated an understanding that their
hospital was at risk of closing. Their agreement to the merger came in response to the
perceived risk of closure. The closing of the Deaconess campus soon after the merger is
ironic in that the merger was supposed to keep the hospital open. Rather than close
Deaconess under their own terms, the decision came after the creation of Good Samaritan,
when Deaconess leaders no longer had the final say in such matters.
During the six years spent finalizing the merger creating Good Samaritan Medical
Center, and the establishment of Froedtert Memorial Hospital, Mount Sinai Hospital
continued to struggle financially. In 1987, Mount Sinai and Good Samaritan announced
their own merger. The merger process was just as complicated as its predecessors and the
final plan also had to satisfy two distinctly different religious traditions. In addition, the
health care networks in Milwaukee were growing and absorbing other hospitals in
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Milwaukee. In light of consolidated health care services and dwindling resources for
health care services for the poor, Mount Sinai Hospital administrators felt that merger was
the only option available to them that allowed some sense of the historic commitment to
Milwaukee by the Jewish community to continue.

THE REGIONAL CENTER AND MEDICAL SCHOOL: POLICY AND POLITICS
The context of the state, for the purpose of this research, is one that sees the political
aspect of social discourse and policy as a theoretical meeting place, or arena, in which the
public and the government of elected officials accept and reject social policy. Elected
members of the formal political structure and the members of the public at large can use
this concept of the state in order to air their differences and their views about the direction
of policy and possible changes in social programs.85According to sociologist Ellen
Immergut, public policy is not assumed to be a linear orderly process incorporating the
needs and wants of individuals or the economic sphere, nor is it the end result of any one
actor or interest. Political decisions “emerge from highly complex combinations of
factors that include . . . systematic features of political regimes. . .Institutions do not
determine behavior, they simply provide a context for action that helps us to understand
why actors make the choices they do.”86Sociologist Robert H. Cox elaborates on the role
of the state in creating social policy outlined by Immergut and posits that, in the realm of
public policy, the state acts as a framer when successful in its quest for new social
spending programs to the voting public. In matters of social policy, the state is both an
identifier (or an enumerator) of problems faced by the citizens and the market, and also
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defines the proposed legislation as addressing a “social problem” or as a “needed
reform.” The state defines the need for help on the part of its people and works within the
market system to bring about a solution. In the case of welfare programs like health care,
policy institutions, like the government, show whether the state has a part to play in the
formation of new or innovative programs.87
The local government boards in Milwaukee sought to shape policy in the matter of
hospital construction as they saw fit. The merger process created an adversarial
relationship between The Passavant, Deaconess, and the Hospital Area Planning
Committee (HAPC). The HAPC represented the future Froedtert Lutheran Memorial
Hospital. Deaconess representatives ended negotiations at times because of their distrust
of Froedtert leaders.88 The foundation for that distrust came from the actions of two
Milwaukee County committees: The Greater Milwaukee Committee (GMC), which in
turn created the HAPC. These two committees strongly supported the new regional
Center hospital, and Deaconess’ leaders distrusted their motives. The GMC and HAPC
concurrently raised funds for the new facility while negotiating with Deaconess and The
Passavant. They planned to build a medical school and bring other health care institutions
together on a large campus.89
The Greater Milwaukee Committee (GMC) was a major influence in Milwaukee
business and civic affairs. Avella argued that from the 1930s, the group was instrumental
in monitoring and capitalizing on federal funding opportunities for Milwaukee’s
development.90 The GMC established itself in the local political arena in order to get
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approval for the center.91 The surplus of hospital beds in Milwaukee was an issue, but it
is not the only reason for the drive to create the Center. The GMC wanted to create a
centralized medical center and wanted a medical school in order to receive research
grants. Public support for a regional medical center grew, and the findings of two
commissioned studies, the McLean Report of 1953 and the Willard Report of 1959
supported the construction of a regional medical center in Milwaukee.92 After County
Executive John L. Doyne took office in 1959, the GMC worked to establish a large scale
regional medical facility.93 Avella analyzed the change saying, “The Doyne-GMC
combination was to mastermind the delicate and difficult process that culminated in the
establishment of the Regional Medical Center in 1969.”94 This Center ultimately ended
the separate entities of The Passavant and Deaconess.
Federal government funding through Titles 18 (Medicare) and 19 (Medicaid), and the
federal Regional Health Care Act of 1965 financed the plans to establish a regional
medical center. This act set aside federal funding for areas that had no such facility. A
subcommittee of the GMC, dubbed the Heil Committee after committee member Joseph
Heil, Sr., issued a report in 1967 that became a road map for the creation of the center.
The report supported the creation of the center and drew its attention on the benefits to
those institutions that planned to join the project, not the hospitals in merger discussion.95
The report stated that Milwaukee was one of three major metropolitan regions of the
country without such a facility. The committee recommended a location for the Center in
Wauwatosa. The final draft of the Articles of Incorporation and by-laws established by
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members of the business and health care communities completed the proposal. On
November 20, 1969 the committee announced the regional medical Center “officially
called into existence,” as a goal for the future. Essentially speaking, this announcement
represented the position of the GMC that the center was a foregone conclusion. The GMC
established the Hospital Planning Board (HPB) with the ultimate goal of using federal
funds from the Regional Health Care Act of 1965 to establish a regional medical Center
outside the city of Milwaukee.96
Beginning in the 1960s, hospitals were required to submit plans for expansion to a
new organization: The Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Committee (SEWRPC)
established in 1960.97 Its twenty-one members were appointed by the governor, the
Secretary of the Department of Development, and the seven southeastern Wisconsin
county boards. Three members from each of the counties participating (Milwaukee,
Ozaukee, Washington, Racine, Kenosha, Waukesha, and Walworth) served six-year terms.
SEWRPC had no acting authority; its role was to conduct research to plan for
development in the region to avoid overbuilding in the represented counties. Any
recommendations made by SEWRPC were carefully considered before approval for
county projects.98
Their recommendation was that the Regional Center could not add to the number of
beds in the Milwaukee Count area. It was not binding. However, given the new authority,
neither The Passavant nor Deaconess could act independently and risk losing revenue
under the Development Act of 1974. This act included penalties for violations of any of
the recommendations of the local board. In order to build the regional medical center, a
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decrease in the current number of hospital beds in Milwaukee had to occur. Construction
could not begin until some sort of agreement to reduce the number of beds overall was
finalized. SWRPC’s report provided the organizations with a vested interest in creating
the Regional Medical Center, the GMC and the HAPC, an important recommendation
supporting their plan. Avella stated that “With the cooperation of Doyne [,] a vision
developed of a coordinated health care Center located on the County Institution grounds,
with the medical school and a host of other independent health care facilities in close
proximity or attached by bonds of affiliation.”99
As much support as the regional medical center plan had from local political leaders,
the plan for a medical school at the center led to a fortunate situation on the issue of
funding. The Medical College of Wisconsin brought prestige to the project. As a teaching
hospital, the new hospital gained support from the public.

MEDICAL COLLEGE OF WISCONSIN
The planning board of the new regional Medical Center wanted a medical school to
create a teaching hospital at the new center. HAPC members approached representatives
at the private, Jesuit School of Marquette University. Marquette University School of
Medicine was formally chartered in 1918. By the 1950s the school faced a severe
financial crisis. An accreditation team of the Association of the American Medical
Colleges flagged the college with a status of “confidential probation” in 1952 because of
financial problems.100 Marquette officials approached trustees of the Kurtis R. Froedtert
estate for financial help. Froedtert was a prosperous brewer who had died in 1951. He had
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been a devout Lutheran and left a trust for the construction of a teaching hospital to be
named after him.101 The Marquette Medical School failed to secure any of the funds; the
trust money was held up in local business projects, and a lawsuit filed on behalf of the
Lutheran Men of America denied the Marquette University School of Medicine’s funding
requests in part because it was a private Catholic university. They felt the money should
go to a Lutheran institution.
Years of declining enrollment and the flagging of its credentials led to a financial
crisis that could not be solved by many public funding options because of its private
school status. Hill-Burton Act of 1946 provided funds for private hospitals treating
patients on Medicare and Medicaid. Hospitals used Hill-Burton funding to build additions
and establish specialty departments. State agencies applied for funds to build facilities.
Private medical schools could not apply. However, a medical school, as part of a public
hospital, did qualify.102 Marquette was ineligible for government grants through the
National Institute of Health and the Hill-Burton Act of 1946 because of its private school
status. Each of these federal sources provided millions of dollars to various public
institutions for construction and research.103 Proponents of the Medical Center secured
funds for its medical school program because it was eligible for various public financial
sources through the Hill-Burton legislation.104
The Center leadership’s commitment to establish a medical school stemmed from the
projected physician shortages in Milwaukee identified in the Heil Report of 1967. GMC
leader Edmund Fitzgerald believed the medical school was an integral aspect of the
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whole Center. The existing program at Marquette University School of Medicine
provided an opportunity to include a medical school at the Center. Fitzgerald facilitated
the transition of Marquette’s medical program from a private religious school to a
nonsectarian entity. The Heil Report recommended that the new facility needed a medical
school to provide crucial training for future doctors who, in turn, would staff the proposed
hospital. After the transition, the medical school became eligible for expanded public
funding opportunities.105 The combined efforts of the GMC and The HAPC succeeded in
quickly establishing the medical school at the regional center campus. On September 30,
1967, the medical school program left Marquette University, and in February of 1969
received over one million dollars in state funding for relocation to the Center. Avella
noted that because of the actions of the members of the planning board, the school was
approved: “After having fended off a court challenge to the aid, the school moved to a
new status, changing its name in 1970 to the Medical College of Wisconsin.106
This plan for a medical school and an affiliated teaching hospital and the strong
support for the Center outpaced Mount Sinai Medical Center’s efforts to establish its own
medical school.107 For the leadership of Mount Sinai Hospital, the establishment of a
teaching hospital affiliated with a medical school so close to their facility was profoundly
disappointing, in part because Mount Sinai Hospital had attempted to establish a
relationship with the Medical College. Mount Sinai Board members wanted to establish
the hospital as a teaching hospital, something they felt would add to the prestige of an
already “great” hospital.108 Mount Sinai needed more patients and hoped to attract them
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with a medical education program. The renovations in 1972 and 1976 coincided with
simultaneous expansions at The Passavant and Deaconess, two hospitals in close
proximity. Mount Sinai established a partnership with University of Wisconsin-Madison
to create a residency program for new doctors, but only after ending its plans for a
medical college of its own. Mount Sinai Board member Ben Marcus remarked that
despite several overtures during the 1970s on the part of Mount Sinai, the Medical
College “never” responded.109 The new construction at the hospital included expanded
obstetrics and emergency departments, but the leaders at Mount Sinai abandoned plans
for a medical school and teaching hospital. This decision increased the financial
difficulties at the hospital. The renovations had not brought in more patients and the loss
of the teaching hospital and medical school option influenced the merger decision.110
Mount Sinai leaders searched for another way to establish a teaching program and bring
in new patients. This led to two new initiatives at the hospital: a relationship with the
University of Wisconsin-Madison and the attempt to establish a Jewish brand for the
hospital. The relationship with UW-Madison was a modest success and the attempt at
establishing a Jewish brand was for all intents and purposes, unsuccessful.
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CHAPTER 5 IDENTITY, CHANGE, AND INNOVATION AT MOUNT SINAI
Many of the descendants of original East Side Jewish population no longer lived
within Milwaukee city limits by the mid 1960s. Jewish doctors had established practices
in Milwaukee because of Mount Sinai Hospital. The acceptance of Jewish doctors at
other Milwaukee hospitals allowed the doctors to expand their medical practices,
facilitated upward economic mobility, and allowed many to follow their patients to the
suburbs.1 As the Jewish community dispersed beyond the city of Milwaukee, in the
mid-1960s, Mount Sinai’s leaders debated whether the Jewish hospital should go with
them. After a great deal of time and effort on the part of the Jewish leadership and the
Milwaukee Jewish community at large, they decided not to move. The Milwaukee Jewish
Chronicle reported that the decision to stay downtown was because, “They [the hospital
leaders] believed there was a continued need for a hospital that would serve both the
city’s Jewish population which had long since moved out of the area, and the residents
near the hospital which had become dependent on its services.”2
The line in this editorial about the hospital “serving the Jewish population that
had long since moved of the area” was quite puzzling; the Jewish population needed the
hospital along with the patients downtown, but why? The small number of board
members made the decision to remain downtown. There is no indication that any vote
was taken about the future of Mount Sinai. It is possible that the success of the
fundraising drive that financed expansion implied support for the downtown location.3
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The iconic Star of David edifice added with the 1972-74 expansion and the hiring of a
full time Rabbi who was also a mohel signified a Jewish presence, but the changes were
more cosmetic than substantive as religious expressions.4 These additions sought to set
Mount Sinai apart as a Jewish brand, rather than change the nonsectarian mission and
adopt a religious identity. Pat Kerns stated that “we wanted to give something back.” The
decision was announced by board president Ben D. Marcus who “lauded the hospital for
making the decision to remain downtown.”5
That decision, combined with the approved construction of the Regional Medical
Center, rendered their plans to brand Mount Sinai as a teaching hospital moot. There was
considerable conflict between hospital administrators and board members over the issue
of increasing revenue at Mount Sinai. Mount Sinai leaders realized a collaboration with
the Marquette Medical School to become a teaching hospital was no longer possible. The
Regional Medical Center had a medical school already, there was no need for another full
medical school in Milwaukee. Two different approaches to address the growing financial
shortfall; surfaced, one championed by Ray Alexander, Vice President of Mount Sinai,
the other from board members and doctors at the hospital. Alexander believed that
establishing a religious identity at Mount Sinai would increase hospital census numbers.
The board members wanted to look at other Jewish hospitals and identify any changes or
new ideas that could be brought to Mount Sinai. The literature presented thus far sheds
light on the reason for the conflict: the different approaches to measure and establish
Jewish identity. Ray Alexander’s action suggest that he believed that instituting religious
practices at the hospital created a Jewish identity for the hospital. The members of the
4
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board and the doctors acted to emphasize their presence at the hospital as a way of
bringing attention to the Jewish leadership and medical practitioners present since the
hospital opened.
Ultimately, the answer to the question about what actually constituted Jewish identity
became less important in light of the effects of government programs created in 1965.
The Medicaid (Title XIX) program initially covered the full cost of care for patient
treatment. As medical costs increased, reimbursements for costs of care for those using
Medicaid and Medicare fell behind the costs to the hospital. These programs ended the
community funding for private hospitals. In a sense, these government programs severed
the relationship between communities and hospitals.
For a time, Board members and physicians believed that by branding Mount Sinai as
a Jewish hospital, it was possible that new patients, assuming they believed in the
conventional wisdom about how Jewish hospitals were among the best, would use the
facility in greater numbers. They hoped to capitalize on that stereotype in an effort to
bring more private paying patients to Mount Sinai.6 Their attempts to do so foundered
due to the conflicts between Alexander and the board and doctors about what exactly
constituted a Jewish identity. Ray Alexander, Vice President of Mount Sinai from
1969-1976, committed a great deal of time and support toward the goal of establishing a
Jewish identity centered on establishing religious practices and iconography at Mount
Sinai.7 Dr. Paul Jacobs, on the other hand, reported that hospital board leaders and many
of the doctors wanted to emphasize the fact that the hospital was Jewish without radical
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changes to its administration, design, or practices.8 The two positions are best described
as a choice between establishing a Jewish identity and establishing a Jewish brand. A
Jewish identity required a departure from the nonsectarian history of the hospital.
Establishing a Jewish brand meant capitalizing on the history of Mount Sinai and the
contribution of the Jewish population in Milwaukee.
Establishing a Jewish identity through the recognition of specific Jewish religious
practices as proposed by Alexander at Mount Sinai Milwaukee represented an attempt at
major change while continuing the mission of the hospital. He advocated the idea that
making Mount Sinai more “Jewish” would complement the historic nonsectarian mission
of the hospital. Alexander hoped that by doing so, Mount Sinai- Milwaukee could attain
the success of other Jewish hospitals. Mount Sinai New York opened in an area with a
higher number of Jewish residents. It began as a Jewish hospital and eventually adopted a
nonsectarian mission.9 Beth Israel in Newark also treated a large Jewish population and
began as a Jewish hospital, with a nonsectarian mission adopted later.10 Beth Israel in
Boston did the same.11 These hospitals were considered Jewish from the very start.
Michael Reese in Chicago adopted a nonsectarian mission, but treated a large Jewish
population. It was also recognized as a Jewish hospital.12
By comparison, Mount Sinai Milwaukee began as a nonsectarian hospital and
historically had more Gentile patients. Observing the Sabbath, an increased emphasis on
celebrating Jewish holidays, and offering Kosher meals were not part of the hospital’s
8
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practices.13 At the time hospital leaders considered these changes, the hospital treated
more Gentile patients than Jewish. The former Jewish neighborhoods near Milwaukee
were now almost completely Gentile and black. Historian Joe Trotter found that African
Americans settled in West Side neighborhoods near Jewish residents. In the 1920, African
Americans and Jews lived in close proximity, in the sixth and tenth wards. After 1930, the
African American population concentrated in areas vacated by the Jewish population.14
By the 1970s, the neighborhoods adjacent to Mount Sinai Hospital were predominantly
black.15 The decision to remain downtown and treat Gentile patients signified the fact
that Mount Sinai’s leaders acknowledged the success of the nonsectarian mission. The
number of Jewish patients at Mount Sinai was lower from the beginning. In addition, in
the postwar years, Jewish patients in the suburbs of Milwaukee started using hospitals
closer to their homes, instead of patronizing Mount Sinai exclusively. In addition, more
Jewish doctors established themselves at other hospitals and more Gentile doctors began
to practice at Mount Sinai.16 Concurrently, the creation of a medical education program
sought to elevate the status of Mount Sinai as teaching hospital, like many of the Jewish
hospitals cited above. Like other Jewish hospitals in large cities, Mount Sinai Milwaukee
hoped to create a reputation as an institution of innovation and learning.17
In light of changes in public policy, health care costs, and health care services
emerging in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Milwaukee Jewish community’s support
for Mount Sinai proved crucial. Their fundraising efforts paid for a massive expansion of
Mount Sinai Hospital in the 1970s. Mount Sinai’s leaders implemented two significant
13
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initiatives during the 1970s to meet the needs of patients and stay financially viable: the
attempt to establish a more distinct Jewish identity at the newly renovated Mount Sinai
Medical Center and a partnership with the University of Wisconsin-Madison for medical
interns and residents. The first floundered; the second was a mixed blessing.

STAYING IN MILWAUKEE: DECISIONS
The Jewish population in Milwaukee in the early twentieth century lived in
neighborhoods on the east and west sides of the Milwaukee River. Between 1925 and
1950 the Jewish community established a concentrated presence in neighborhoods north
and east of the downtown area. By 1963, the West Side Jewish population was
concentrated in Milwaukee, in Sherman Park, while the East Side population had moved
to the North Shore suburbs.18 All the while, Mount Sinai Hospital remained in its
location at Kilbourn Avenue and Twelfth Street.19 Until the 1960s, Jewish doctors who
established practices in Milwaukee could practice only at Mount Sinai Hospital. Other
Milwaukee hospitals’ withholding of privileges for Jewish doctors revealed one of Mount
Sinai’s crucial functions: it enabled the growth of a successful Jewish medical
professional class that paralleled the established Jewish business class in Milwaukee.20
Many Jewish businessmen and doctors were able to achieve the upward social mobility
necessary to move their families out of the urban core.21 Historian John Gurda referred to
the years between 1945 and 1967 as “the golden age” for the Jewish community. Jewish
institutions in Milwaukee were thriving in the post war years. Many Jewish families
18
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relocated as a result of economic success, moving to more affluent areas outside of the
city. They left behind the old neighborhoods that began to decline.22 By 1967, Jewish
doctors had gained privileges at other Milwaukee hospitals and were not practicing
exclusively at Mount Sinai. Harry Kanin and Jay Larkey reported that by this time
discriminatory practices at other Milwaukee hospitals ended and Jewish doctors were no
longer barred from them.23
Their Jewish patients began to patronize other hospitals as well; many were now
living outside the city limits in suburban Fox Point, Glendale, and Mequon and used the
hospitals closer to their homes.24 In this respect, the Jewish community of Milwaukee
was not unlike the Jewish populations of other urban areas; after World War II, Jewish
families were able to move to the suburbs in part because of their economic achievements.
Historian Hasia Diner notes,
If any era in the history of American Jewry could be considered a “golden age” it
would be the twenty years following World War II. They crafted a series of new
communal practices that reflected the dominant themes of the postwar age:
prosperity and affluence, suburbanization and acceptance. Jews in their
associations and organizations emphasized that they supported America’s
increasing commitment to end privilege based on race, religion, and national
origin. In this era dominated by a new kind of Jewish mobility—the move from
the cities to the suburbs—American Jews found ways to combine middle class
comforts, social activism, and Jewish commitments.25

The descendants of the original Milwaukee East Side and West Side Jewish
immigrants were part of that “golden age” of upward mobility and suburbanization. Even
after relocating, their ongoing commitment to Mount Sinai Medical Center was the means
by which Milwaukee’s Jewish community gave back to their original neighborhoods.
22

Gurda, One People, Many Paths, 189.
Dr. Harry Kanin, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011 and Dr. Jay Larkey, Interview by author,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, August 17, 2011.
24 Dr. Harry Kanin, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011.
25 Hasia Diner, The Jews of the United States: 1654 to 2000 (University of California Press, 2004), 259.
23

196

Many Jewish civic organizations, including synagogues and community programs,
followed Milwaukee’s Jews out of the city; Mount Sinai Medical Center was the
exception. This migration was not unusual; in many urban areas, the Jewish community
and the organizations they established moved together.26
Jewish leaders were aware that keeping Mount Sinai in downtown Milwaukee would
mean fewer Jewish patients, but that knowledge did not prompt them to relocate the
hospital. A study commissioned by three major Milwaukee Jewish institutions, Mount
Sinai Hospital, the Jewish Home for the Aged, and the Jewish Convalescent Center,
influenced the decision to stay downtown. The Jewish Welfare Fund funded the study. It
was the central charitable organization in Milwaukee.27 The Rosenfeld study, which was
referred to by the name of its main author, Eugene Rosenfeld, supplied data about the
city’s population distribution and suggestions and plan for the Boards of the four
institutions to consider in order to improve their operations. The study also provided data
to assist the institutions in determining what changes should be made to best serve the
Milwaukee community through their cooperative efforts.28 The study provided
information about social and economic environment in Milwaukee in the geographic
areas serviced by the Jewish organizations. It outlined and provided the information
foundation for establishing a medical training and research program at Mount Sinai,
including policy objectives, staffing, finances, and administrative structures required to
coordinate their efforts.29 In short, the Rosenfeld Study provided Jewish leaders at these
four Jewish institutions with a great deal of data to assist them in decisions for the future
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of Jewish Community efforts in Milwaukee. The decision solidified the commitment of
the Jewish community to the city, even as the Jewish population moved outward. Mount
Sinai continued as a nonsectarian hospital under Jewish sponsorship until the 1987
merger, in part due to this decision.

THE ROSENFELD STUDY
The Boards of the four facilities, Mount Sinai, the Jewish Convalescent Home, the
Jewish Home for the Aged, and the Jewish Welfare Fund, commissioned the Rosenfeld
Study to assist in the creation of a cooperative future between these institutions, which all
served the health care needs of Jewish Milwaukee. The employees of Eugene D.
Rosenfeld MD, of E. D. Rosenfeld Associates Incorporated, Hospital and Health Services,
conducted the study and submitted the findings to leaders at each institution and the
Milwaukee Jewish Federation.30 These consultants from New York City conducted the
study in order to “suggest short and long term guidelines for the development of health
services for the Jewish community.”31 The study “suggested appropriate methods for the
Jewish community to meet its obligations in health care to itself and the general
community.”32 It measured the current and projected health and medical needs of the
Jewish and non-Jewish communities in Milwaukee and made recommendations to the
Jewish-sponsored agencies in respect to their specific and joint responsibilities to meet
those needs. The study included suggestions and methods for meeting the costs involved.
It also recommended that the Milwaukee Jewish Federation serve as a central
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communication link between the health services of the three facilities.33 Finally, it
highlighted the need for the three health care facilities to develop new programs and
define their functions and offerings to the Jewish community of Milwaukee and guided
the leadership at the Jewish Welfare Fund in decisions about funding those efforts.34
The Rosenfeld researchers concluded that the residents of downtown Milwaukee,
the majority of them non-Jewish, relied on Mount Sinai for their health care. The report
then made suggestions for how Mount Sinai, the Home for the Aged, and the
Convalescent Home could strengthen their cooperation and communication to serve
Milwaukee residents. The study suggested partnerships between the facilities.35 They
discovered a relative lack of efficiency in each of the health care settings. All three
facilities, Mount Sinai, Jewish Home for the Aged, and the Jewish Convalescent Center
provided almost identical services. In addition, the study determined that some parts of
the facilities at Mount Sinai were “obsolete, inefficient or inadequate” and suggested
upgrades of some sort, either through relocation or remodeling.36
Pat Kerns recalls the Board meeting in 1967 that resulted in the decision to keep
Mount Sinai Hospital downtown. In that meeting he stated only a few voted differently;
the majority of the Board committed to keeping the hospital in Milwaukee to continue to
mission of caring for the needy in Milwaukee. Leaders had already committed to staying
downtown. The study included suggestions for the renovation.37
The demographic information in the Rosenfeld Study confirmed that the number of
Jewish patients at Mount Sinai was very low, as was the number of Jewish families living
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near the hospital. The majority of Milwaukee’s non-white population was found to be
most highly concentrated within the near north side area of the city, just north of Mount
Sinai.38 The patients living in Mount Sinai’s neighborhood were less affluent than
elsewhere in the city, and the report revealed that a full three-quarters of charity care
patients at Mount Sinai lived in areas “immediately adjacent to the hospital.”39 Historian
Joe Trotter noted that African Americans settled in Jewish immigrant neighborhoods in
the central business district (CBD) as early as 1910. Mount Sinai was built on the western
boarder of the CBD. The decrease in Jewish immigration in the 1920s and residential
mobility decreased the number of Jewish families. The African American population
grew as the Jewish population decreased.40 Gurda notes that, “The Near North Side
became the heart of Milwaukee’s African American community. Between 1940 and 1960,
black residents grew from 46 of the old Jewish quarter’s population to 85 percent. Nearly
all the old synagogues that survived the wrecking ball were purchased by African
American congregations.”41
The creation of the federal Medicaid program meant that poor patients did not have
to travel farther away from their homes to the County Hospital. This hospital, which had
served the downtown patient base, had relocated in 1968 from the city to the new
Regional Medical Center outside of Milwaukee city limits, in Wauwatosa. City residents
sought services closer to home. Mount Sinai Hospital was their hospital, even if they
were not Jewish, because it was in their neighborhood.42
The Rosenfeld Study also suggested that the leadership of Jewish efforts in health
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care needed a strong board to take responsibility for policy decisions by “interpreting
the hospital’s needs through its relationship with staff and administration.” The
decisions about the future operations of the three institutions had to be collaborative.
The reason for the inefficiency stemmed from the lack of communication and
collaboration between leaders in health care service institutions in Milwaukee.43 The
study recommended cooperation between the three facilities in order to serve
Milwaukee and highlighted the need for open and cooperative Jewish leadership,
stating,
Historically, the Mount Sinai Hospital Board of Trustees has been a closed
self-perpetuating body, not well representative of the Jewish community
and concentrating too often on operational problems, without clear-cut
long-range development goals on education, research, and facilities. In the
past, it has not worked closely with the Welfare Fund and the Jewish
community to obtain sufficient understanding and support of its program.
The present policy and administration bodies should be strengthened and
reorganized and eliminate confusion by creating a framework for each area
to work from and with.44
The decision to remain downtown preserved the original mission to care for the poor in
Milwaukee. That decision could signify a tacit acceptance of the Rosenfeld Study’s
findings. Archival documents do not contain any Board meeting minutes that illuminate
any debate. They committed themselves to strengthening the hospital’s medical
reputation in order to draw more patients to the hospital by way of a large-scale
renovation of the existing facility. They explored options that would strengthen their
relationships with Milwaukee’s other Jewish institutions and work together.
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FUNDING THE JEWISH BRAND
The issue of money remained problematic. Leaders at Mount Sinai believed the key
to alleviating deficits from decreased reimbursements for care was to increase revenue.
They resolved to enlarge the hospital and solicit support from more members of the
Jewish community. If Jews would no longer be patients at Mount Sinai, they could
remain volunteers and donors. Mount Sinai had a strong Ladies Auxiliary with experience
raising funds and volunteering.45 However, the Milwaukee Jewish community’s historic
financial support of the hospital was decreasing over the course of the 1970s.46 Auxiliary
members contributed many volunteer hours and sponsored an annual fund raising ball,
but the formal charitable structure funding Jewish efforts fragmented upon their departure
from Milwaukee. As the number of Jewish organizations to serve the suburban Jewish
population outside of Milwaukee increased, the amount of money available to Mount
Sinai decreased.47 Also, the public perception that indigent care at Mount Sinai Hospital
was covered through Medicare and Medicaid decreased the perceived urgency of raising
funds for the hospital from the community. Mount Sinai’s donors believed that the
Medicaid and Medicare programs were paying for indigent care. In fact, in many cases,
these programs covered only a portion of the total cost of patient care. In addition,
patients with no insurance added to the hospital’s overall deficit.48 The relocation of the
more affluent Jewish community meant that while Mount Sinai remained in Milwaukee,
the Jewish community leaders were not as accessible as they had been before the move.
The change in geography distanced them from the hospital. They established community
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centers and shuls near their new homes and devoted their time and resources to nurturing
the new institutions. The Rosenfeld Study noted that over time and distance a problem
arose; disagreement between members of the Jewish population existed over the degree
of its responsibility for the maintenance of service for a large number of persons from
Milwaukee as well as for the Jewish community now living outside the city.49
This situation was of particular significance for Mount Sinai Hospital. Some of the
confusion stemmed from urban problems common to all cities and involved all types of
voluntary entities. The Milwaukee Jewish population, like other immigrant groups, left
the buildings of their community behind and built new structures in new areas. Many of
the synagogues left behind were razed or purchased by others.50 The hospital was
different. It was not razed. It was not reestablished in a new Jewish suburban location,
and it was not purchased by another entity. It was still the Jewish-sponsored nonsectarian
hospital in Milwaukee.51
The Rosenfeld Study found that the Milwaukee institutions helped define and
identify the Jewish population and served as an opportunity for Jewish civic involvement
in Milwaukee, even after many Jewish families moved north of the city.52 Its operations
were a credit to the community. Gurda remarks that, “Landmarks like Mount Sinai and
the JCC had raised the community’s local profile.”53 The study highlighted the fact that
the majority of the Jewish population had not been sufficiently involved in decisions of
the role and direction for its remaining health care agencies. The study suggested
engaging more members of the population. The study suggested Mount Sinai and the
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other institutions needed that strong support.54 The study recommended increasing the
involvement of the Jewish population beyond fund raising drives. Ray Alexander hoped
the decision to consider a more religious Jewish identity at the newly renovated Mount
Sinai Medical Center would increase the involvement of the Jewish people. The
Rosenfeld Study suggested that the leadership recruit new representatives beyond the
“closed self-perpetuating body” of leaders identified in the study.55 The Board sought
ways to elevate the prestige of the hospital by appealing to the affluent members living
outside Milwaukee. There is no mention in the Rosenfeld Study of creating religious
programs or practices at these institutions.
The Rosenfeld Study also noted that medical training opportunities in Milwaukee
lagged behind other large cities. Other Milwaukee hospitals were offering training in the
emerging specialties for residents and interns, but the study noted that at Mount Sinai,
The hospital itself is not providing the opportunities and the climate in
which the capacities of the staff can flourish. This along with the
negativism on the part of many staff members about teaching and lack of
interest by others has been one of the great problems of Mount Sinai
Hospital. . .On the whole; the older men are less committed and less
willing to devote time and leadership to education and research. The
younger men would like more facilities and services allocated to these
activities and are discouraged about the hospital’s failure to move in these
directions. . .The absence of a comprehensive health center is perhaps the
most obvious reflection of this weakness. Milwaukee is one of only three
cities among the 25 SMAs in the United States that does not provide at
least one major medical center for its citizens. One of three without one
single outstanding general hospital of national note.56
The Rosenfeld Study, like the Heil Report commissioned by a subcommittee of the
Regional Medical Complex planning board in 1967, noted Milwaukee’s lack of a
large-scale medical facility. This was one the reasons that leaders at Mount Sinai wanted
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to establish a medical school program; doing so would address the need for learning
opportunities for doctors and create a regional medical Center. In Milwaukee, however,
approval for the Medical College of Wisconsin at the County Regional Medical Complex
in Wauwatosa usurped those plans. In 1974, Mount Sinai established a teaching program
affiliated with a major Wisconsin university as an alternative way to accomplish both
goals.57 It was not quite what the Board members envisioned, but at the very least the
partnership addressed the need for medical education at Mount Sinai. The Rosenfeld
Study led to two significant initiatives at Mount Sinai during the 1970s: exploring a more
Jewish identity and establishing a teaching partnership with the University of
Wisconsin-Madison. Each initiative presented hospital leaders with additional challenges.
The Jewish community in Milwaukee had never been religiously homogeneous, not even
close, but a strong commitment to the city that had provided generations of Jewish
residents with opportunities and acceptance transcended differences between the East
Side and West Side Jews. Mount Sinai Medical Center remained a source of pride and
civic service for the entire Jewish population, whether they lived in Milwaukee or not.
There was a great deal of disappointment on the part of Mount Sinai leaders over the
unsuccessful attempt to partner with the new medical center in Wauwatosa. Many had
personally approached leaders at the center in an attempt to strike a deal. Several attempts
to establish any affiliation between the facilities failed.58 Leaders at the medical college
at the Regional Medical Center expressed no interest in partnering with Mount Sinai,
citing a 1954 accreditation survey which recommended that the College “should not let
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service to the community impinge on the academic mission.”59 By 1959, college leaders
were urged to consolidate the facilities in Wauwatosa rather than disperse services to
other hospitals in Milwaukee.60
They funded the ambitious renovation through a fund raising campaign named “Once
in a Generation.”61 Board president Ben Marcus remarked that, “The Jewish community
in Milwaukee is not only involved in Jewish causes, but it deeply involved in welfare, the
arts, industry, and civic enterprises throughout the state of Wisconsin. We are willing to
assume positions of leadership and we are proud that we care.”62 This drive raised
enough money to create a facility fit for a medical college and the title teaching hospital.
The new Star of David erected over the main entrance of Mount Sinai signified a Jewish
hospital. But what kind of Jewish hospital? Differences in religious observance among
members of the Jewish community complicated the exploration toward being a Jewish
hospital. As a nonsectarian hospital, adopting a Jewish brand through the support of the
Jewish population, the religious differences did not matter; but as a religious hospital,
those differences became important and more contentious.
Alexander strongly supported the plan to establish religious observant practices at
Mount Sinai; the board wanted to brand Mount Sinai Hospital Jewish. Alexander wanted
to change the nonsectarian mission of Mount Sinai, and the Board wanted to capitalize on
stereotype that Jewish doctors and Jewish hospitals were the among the best and establish
a Jewish brand that celebrated the Jewish support for the hospital. But when he left his
position, the Board pursued other options for the future of the hospital.
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A PRACTICING JEWISH HOSPITAL
Raymond Alexander was the Executive Vice President of Mount Sinai at the time of
Rosenfeld Study. He came to Mount Sinai from Mount Zion Hospital in New York City.
He dedicated a great deal of time and effort to the task of creating a Jewish religious
identity at Mount Sinai and used his experience and contacts from New York and Mount
Zion to further the cause of creating a Jewish religious presence at Mount Sinai
Milwaukee.63 In May of 1971, Alexander issued a report claiming that 1971 was “the
most decisive year in Mount Sinai’s history.” He stated that the “boldness and foresight
with which the Board and Medical Staff of Mount Sinai have moved” by creating new
medical programs was commendable. He wanted to pursue a religious Jewish identity
with the same level of determination.64 He also stated that there was to be a new
philosophy that Mount Sinai and other Jewish hospitals could embrace, one that
advocated that “Health care should be a right and not a privilege, and that the heritage of
Judaism with its emphasis on social justice. . .all concede to emphasize the health care
role.”65
Mount Sinai had already committed their hospital to serving health care services to
those in need, as a nonsectarian hospital, in 1903. The decision to brand the hospital as
Jewish really had less to do with a “new” commitment to social justice and more to do
with making Mount Sinai a Jewish hospital as a marketing strategy.66 Alexander pursued
the establishment of a religious Jewish identity with what could only be described as
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“boldness.” The Board sought to emphasize the fact that the Jewish doctors at their
nonsectarian hospital treated all.
On January 24, 1971, Alexander invited Dr. Lowell Eliezer Bellin, the First Deputy
Health Commissioner of the New York City Health Department, to speak at a celebration
for newly appointed Chiefs of Staff at Mount Sinai. In his comments, Bellin addressed
the importance of the relationship between Jewish hospitals and Jewish identity. He
believed that Jewish hospitals were vital not just for the cities they operated in but for the
Jewish community.
But if Jewish hospitals were to vanish tomorrow from the United States, it would
spell tragedy both for the general community and for the Jewish community. It is
not chauvinistic to mention here that Jewish voluntary hospitals are among the
best in the United States. They have set local and national standards for therapy,
teaching, education, and general innovation. Substitutes for them in sufficient
numbers are not imminent, and the mediocre institutions actually available to take
their place would add morbidity and mortality of all ethnic groups. Moreover, the
continued existence of the hospital under Jewish auspices accords with a
sophisticated Jewish Realpolitik.67 In some communities the mere threat of
founding a Jewish hospital has been enough to encourage other local hospitals to
liberalize their staff privileges to Jewish physicians. I anticipate no immediate
reversion to the pervasive anti-semitism [sic] of the medical schools and the
hospitals, which besmirched our nation until recently. Nevertheless, I agree with
those who suggest caution before giving ourselves over totally to generalized
de-ethnicized auspices. “The poor of your own city take precedence over the poor
of another city,” counseled the Talmud, opposing thereby an escapism into holism
in which the poor of neither city receive succor.68

Bellin believed that Jewish religious hospitals had an important role in health care
and in the Jewish community as a whole for the survival of a Jewish identity. He argued
that Jewish communities had to reinvest in their religious institutions as part of a plan to
“re-Judaize” their identities. He noted the potential for some Jewish communities to,
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Be indifferent and possibly hostile. To these. . . I would respectfully submit that
during the next ten years any agency that is viewed as of dubious Jewish
authenticity, of spurious Jewish particularism, and of ambiguous Jewish
accomplishment will find it increasingly difficult to obtain support from the
Jewish community that becomes increasingly assertive about its identity, and has
many calls upon it from competing Jewish causes.69
The support for a distinct Jewish religious character for hospitals like Mount Sinai
linked to the Jewish community as a whole. Bellin elaborated on his statements about
Jewish identity and emphasized the merits of a strong Jewish identity for the community
and highlighted the absence of such at Mount Sinai. He was particularly concerned about
the lack of Jewish presence in the hospital and in the community, stating,
The following areas are worthy of discussion: (1) It is grotesque that some Jewish
hospitals in this country as a matter of policy do not hire pious Sabbath observers.
There is no incompatibility between running a hospital 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week, and having observant Jews on the staff. Similarly, there is no
incompatibility between fiscal solvency and the maintenance of a kosher kitchen.
(2) The Jewish hospital as a “Jewish” institution should be able, without
defensiveness, to assert its religious identity. The Christmas tree on the lawn of
the Jewish hospital has been cited so often that it has become a cliché. It is
intolerable that there are Jewish physicians within Jewish hospitals who routinely
urge their new Jewish mothers, for the sake of convenience, to circumcise their
sons before the 8th day and thereby eschew the religious ceremony of the Briss
[sic] altogether.70
After decades of service to Milwaukee as a nonsectarian hospital, Alexander urged the
Board at Mount Sinai to seriously consider strengthening the Jewish presence at Mount
Sinai by incorporating religious observance at the hospital. Mount Sinai did not provide
Kosher food, had a nondenominational chapel for patients and families, and apart from
the name, did not display a Jewish religious identity in the hospital. Sabbath observance
was not part of hospital policy, but patients could elect to observe the Sabbath if they
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wished. Norma Achter, a nurse at Mount Sinai for over forty years, reported that there
were volunteers who lit Sabbath candles for patients, and staff avoided any unnecessary
procedures if they violated the prohibition against working on the Sabbath.71 The
hospital was decidedly nonsectarian; Abraham Slimmer, the original benefactor of Mount
Sinai predicated his continued support on the nonsectarian mission for Mount Sinai. Even
the orthodox West Side immigrants used the hospital when it opened in 1903 had been
expected to embrace the less ritualized Judaism of the East Side Jewish community that
operated Mount Sinai while they were patients. By 1971, Slimmer had long since passed
away, and the Board was now seriously considering embracing a Jewish identity for
marketing the hospital.72 The Board wanted to brand the hospital as Jewish, but did not
support incorporating specific religious practices, their use of the term identity was,
unsurprisingly, secular; they wanted to highlight the presence of Jewish doctors at Mount
Sinai and the support that came from Milwaukee’s Jews. Their understanding of Mount
Sinai’s Jewish “identity” resulted from the belief that the hospital was Jewish because
they made it so, through their support.
By 1974, the Mount Sinai Jewish Hospital Study Mission was formed to investigate
other Jewish urban hospitals in order to learn more about successful urban Jewish
hospital. The Study Mission included Board members, doctors, Ladies’ Auxiliary
representatives, and Jewish community members at large.73 Volunteers traveled to Jewish
hospitals in Chicago, Detroit, Toronto, and St. Louis to meet with staff and reported their
findings to the board at large. In a letter to Mrs. Ruth M. Rothstein of Mount Sinai
Hospital Chicago, Alexander explained that the “Mount Sinai Study Mission” wanted to
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study medical departments, the Ladies’ Auxiliary, and fundraising efforts. Alexander
believed in the Study Mission and wrote in his letter, “If all works well, which I’m sure it
will, we would be glad to reciprocate. Maybe we can start a national movement.”74 These
study missions did not focus much, if any attention on the religious aspects of the
institutions. The main focus was on matters of service and policies, medical departments,
and census numbers.75
Mount Sinai board members visited Chicago on December 19, 1974. They met with
administrators to learn about the emergency department, outpatient programs, hospital
goals and objectives and relationships between Sinai Chicago and other hospitals.
Milwaukee Sinai leadership learned that Chicago Sinai had a program to ensure patients
were satisfied with their care and other customer service issues. The Milwaukee Sinai
leaders took that policy under consideration.76 There is no indication that the committee
specifically targeted any Jewish religious practices at Sinai Chicago for consideration.
The focus of the mission was on hospital operations and specific medical departments,
not on Jewish religious identity. Alexander tried to use religious practices to impart
Jewish identity on the hospitals. The Board wanted to implement proven operational
strategies found at other Jewish hospitals.
Milwaukee Sinai representatives then traveled to Detroit Sinai and the Jewish
Hospital of St. Louis in 1975. At the annual meeting of the Board of Milwaukee Sinai in
May 1975, the mission report was presented to the full Board. The study mission
members concluded that Mount Sinai Milwaukee was operating much like the hospitals
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visited. The challenge for leaders was to determine why the other hospitals were more
financially successful.77 The mission study did not yield much new information for the
leaders of Mount Sinai Milwaukee. The focus of the research was on matters of clinical
policy and medical departments. The attempts to create a religious identity at Mount Sinai
Milwaukee ended abruptly a year later. In May 1976, the hospital announced that Ray
Alexander had left his position. The Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle reported that he left
Mount Sinai for a job at Albert Einstein Medical Center in Philadelphia.78 The board did
not continue what Alexander had started.
There was no specific reason given why Alexander left Mount Sinai at such a crucial
time, but his departure essentially ended efforts to create a Jewish religious identity at
Mount Sinai. His efforts did not receive a great deal of support. Alexander wanted to
institute practices at Mount Sinai to emphasize the Jewish religion and the mission
wanted to establish a successful hospital using the business practices at other Jewish
hospitals. The board wanted to create a successful hospital with the support of the Jewish
community. It seems likely that Alexander left because he realized few, if any, of the
changes he worked toward would ever become reality at Mount Sinai. As recently as
April of 1976, he touted the changes made in Milwaukee to attendees at a conference of
Jewish Hospital Directors, saying, “There has been an ongoing debate over many years as
to whether or not a Jewish hospital will lose that identity if it serves a cross section of the
community. Mount Sinai maintains its Jewish identity by giving free services to Russian
immigrants, serving Kosher meals and cooperating with leaders in the Jewish
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community.”79 Mount Sinai had historically served more non-Jewish than Jewish patients;
commitment to “the cross section” was the reason the hospital remained downtown. The
Jewish community in Milwaukee had always supported Mount Sinai as a matter of
tzedakah and as an expression of their Milwaukee Jewish identity.
In truth, the hospital did not need a Jewish religious identity to survive; it needed
continued support from the Jewish community. Hospital leaders wanted a Jewish brand.
There was a profound difference between Alexander and the members of the hospital
research mission. Again a crucial difference between Alexander and the Board stemmed
from different interpretations of what made the hospital Jewish. Ray Alexander wanted to
add religious practices as an expression of Jewish identity, complete with traditional
observance rituals at Mount Sinai. The Board wanted to accentuate a Jewish brand for the
hospital using the historic contributions of the Jewish people of Milwaukee. Paul Jacobs
noted that there was interest in creating a Jewish essence for the hospital, but in the
context of staffing Jewish doctors and a medical education program. Alexander wanted to
add significant religious elements to the hospital. Milwaukee had a deliberately
nonsectarian Jewish hospital. A religiously observant Jewish hospital in Milwaukee had
not ever existed. The effort toward making the hospital more religiously observant Jewish
floundered after Alexander left, but the plans for a Jewish brand materialized. There were
some changes to the hospital.
The Board focused on possible changes the hospital could make to improve their
health services; after Alexander left the issue of instituting religious practices at the
hospital was tabled and the leaders at Mount Sinai concentrated their efforts on creating a
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teaching program at Mount Sinai. In fact, had Mount Sinai pursued plans to become a
more religious hospital, the teaching program might not have been established.

UNIVERSITY MEDICINE: MEDICAL EDUCATION AT MOUNT SINAI
While the Mount Sinai Study Mission was visiting other hospitals, other Board
members worked to create a teaching program for doctors. The decision to form a
teaching relationship with a university was not without precedent for a Jewish hospital.
Jewish hospitals in large urban areas like New York,80 Boston,81 and Newark82 had
strong relationships with university medical programs. The Rosenfeld Study
recommended similar efforts to do so at Mount Sinai.83 Creating a formal relationship
with the University of Wisconsin-Madison represented the chance for a symbiotic
relationship between the organizations. The city of Milwaukee offered the medical
students the opportunity to observe and learn about a variety of medical procedures in an
urban environment distinctly different from Madison.84
Mount Sinai wanted to partner with the struggling Marquette University program as
part of their vision for a regional medical Center in the city. The Medical College of
Wisconsin, formerly the Marquette School of Medicine, was a logical choice because of
its location near Mount Sinai Hospital. However, Ben D. Marcus, President of the Board
of Trustees at Mount Sinai, told the Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle that “We just could not
get a hearing from them. They just didn’t seem interested in using Mount Sinai.”85 The
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pending merger between the Medical College of Wisconsin and Froedtert Lutheran,
which moved their operations to Wauwatosa, may explain why the Medical College did
not respond to Mount Sinai’s overtures.86 Marquette Medical College had severe
financial problems in the early 1970s and could not secure funding because it was
affiliated with a private religious college. The available funds came from government
programs that did not fund private institutions. The decision to end the medical school
program at Marquette University and move it to the Medical College of Wisconsin at the
new regional medical center allowed the college to receive funds denied to a private
university program.87
Marquette Medical College’s lack of interest might also have stemmed from concerns
that any affiliation with a religious hospital, however nonsectarian, would disqualify the
program from government funding under the Hill-Burton Act. The religious differences
between the medical school and the hospital presented another challenge. If funds had
been secured, the institutions had to address these differences before establishing any
program. The merger between Deaconess and The Passavant illustrated the possible
difficulties facing both institutions in creating a partnership. Economist Teresa D.
Harrison found that most hospital mergers occur between two nonprofit hospitals within
the same health care service market.88 The merger between these two hospitals represents
one of the most common merger scenarios. Whereas Harrison concluded that more
attention needed to be focused on the actual effects of mergers on competition after the
merger, this research documents the battle between representatives of the merging
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hospitals and government entities.
The teaching program established at Mount Sinai was designed to create a “clinical
arm” for University of Wisconsin-Madison’s third year interns and medical residents in
order to provide them with more experience in the “urban clinical environment.”89
Mount Sinai representatives approached faculty members at the Medical College of
Wisconsin in order to recruit them for the purpose of creating a teaching program. Their
attempts to establish any affiliations between the Medical College and Mount Sinai
failed.90 However, there was another available option in Madison. “In contrast with the
situation at the Medical College of Wisconsin, UW-Madison lacked an adequate supply
of patients and looked longingly toward Milwaukee. Mount Sinai, rebuffed by the
Medical College, looked to Madison for an affiliation and was warmly received.”
Hospital officials hoped the relationship would be the first step toward the goal of
creating a full-scale teaching institution at Mount Sinai.91 Student doctors, especially
those interested in emergency medicine, needed a comprehensive education in the field.
Milwaukee’s cultural make-up was much more diverse ethnically, and the larger
population offered more clinical experiences in urban-based hospital medicine. David
Amrani described the clinical opportunities in Madison as limited. Milwaukee had a
variety of cultures and provided a diverse patient pool. UW-Madison students at Mount
Sinai gained experience in a variety of emergency cases. Madison offered a more
homogeneous clinical experience.92
The Rosenfeld Study had concluded that it was “axiomatic that major Jewish
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training and teaching hospitals that were affiliated with universities were a drawing card,
a magnetic attraction for interns and residents.”93 Madison students treated a variety of
patients with diverse ethnic backgrounds, while Mount Sinai enjoyed the status of
teaching hospital. It appeared to be a mutually beneficial relationship. However, conflict
between university administration and faculty and hospital doctors arose; namely, the
Milwaukee doctors gave and the University took.

MEDICAL EDUCATION AT MOUNT SINAI MEDICAL CENTER
The description of the relationship between the staff of UW-Madison and Mount
Sinai’s doctors comes from a member of the University staff, Dr. David Amrani, and Dr.
Paul Jacobs, a Jewish Milwaukee doctor. Amrani was recruited from New York in 1980
as part of the UW- Madison clinical program research staff.94 He had been to Milwaukee
ten years earlier for personal reasons and had visited Mount Sinai. When the opportunity
to work at the only Jewish hospital in Wisconsin arose, he accepted the position and
moved with his wife to Milwaukee. Despite plans to stay in Milwaukee only for a short
time, Dr. Amrani remained in Milwaukee for over thirty years.95 He explained the
relationship from his perspective; the program at Mount Sinai was a “clinical arm” of the
University of Wisconsin-Madison Medical School. The hospitals in Madison were
considered “narrow” in terms of patient demographics and clinical experience. The
school sought opportunities to provide students with medical training in an urban hospital
with a more diverse patient demographic. Mount Sinai Medical Center of Milwaukee
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provided that diversity.96
The agreement had advantages for the medical students from Madison and the
doctors at Mount Sinai. It provided student doctors with medical experience. Those
students, in turn, were valuable in providing much needed staffing help at the hospital.
However, the new program resulted in conflict over hospital policy and procedures
between the new UW-Madison leadership and the Milwaukee doctors. Amrani named Dr.
Richard Rieselbach, from the University of Wisconsin-Madison as the “driving force” for
the new program and stated the university essentially “overtook” the hospital under
Rieselbach.97
At a 1976 symposium held at the Mount Sinai Medical Center, the program received
praise for its initial success. In two years the program had already “improved patient care
with better medical education.”98 Dr. John A.D. Cooper, president of the Association of
Medical Colleges in Washington D.C., stated that medical schools gained from
partnerships with urban hospitals because students get better clinical experiences working
in a metropolitan hospital.99
Amrani believed that it was Rieselbach’s support for the partnership that kept Mount
Sinai in downtown Milwaukee. In 1979, an opportunity to buy land in Mequon arose;
Mount Sinai again had the opportunity to relocate. Reiselbach used his influence to keep
Mount Sinai in Milwaukee and touted its status as an urban medical campus to persuade
Board members at Mount Sinai to stay in Milwaukee. He highlighted the fact that Mount
Sinai provided downtown neighborhoods with access to university medicine. Hospital
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leaders decided to pass on the possibility of relocating.100
The Medical program at Mount Sinai was a mixed blessing for the hospital; it was a
source of pride for the hospital but it also ultimately altered the partnership between
Mount Sinai and Jewish doctors in Milwaukee. The University academic staff from
Madison “overtook” the main hospital and displaced the Milwaukee doctors in hospital
administrative operations.101 The Milwaukee doctors started practices at other
Milwaukee hospitals. The historic relationship between the Jewish doctors and Mount
Sinai diminished. One of the fundamental aspects of the hospital’s Jewish identity
weakened as the doctors practiced elsewhere.102 Ironically, the establishment of a
teaching program in the tradition of other Jewish hospitals in America affected the
traditionally close relationship between Jewish doctors and hospital in Milwaukee.
Amrani explained that Milwaukee’s Jewish doctors were not included in the
decisions about the teaching program. Instead, they were literally displaced by the
UW-Madison doctors; the non-university doctors had their offices relocated to the
remodeled “professional building” away from the main hospital.103 The displaced doctors
resented being pushed aside and expressed the feeling that as non-UW doctors they were
“second class” staff, subordinate to the new doctors from Madison.104 The experts from
the university, not the neighborhood experts, settled into positions of power at the main
campus.
Paul Jacobs was a Jewish doctor practicing at Mount Sinai at the time of the
university partnership. He reported that general practitioners at the hospital felt
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resentment toward the university staff and left due to their dissatisfaction with the
changes at the hospital after the teaching program began.105 He stated that Milwaukee’s
Jewish doctors did not have to stay at Mount Sinai; they had chosen to remain there.
Jacobs remarked that, “After the university program was established, the close feeling
that this was our hospital and our attachment lessened a great deal. After moving to the
professional building, some began to establish their practices at other hospitals.”106
This rift led to a decrease in the amount of influence Milwaukee doctors had over
policy and procedure decisions at a time when Mount Sinai needed the support of
Milwaukee’s Jewish community, including its doctors. The Board retained control of
funding decisions and still held a great deal of power, but the doctors did not have the
influence they once had in the hospital hierarchy. Amrani believes that in the late 1970s,
Mount Sinai died as a Jewish community hospital and transitioned into an urban medical
education institution. He explained, “Mount Sinai became the University of
Wisconsin-Madison hospital for a period of time. By 1981, the doctors from the
university were entrenched at the main hospital, with the Jewish Milwaukee doctors
practicing off site.”107 The influence of the hospital Board in leadership and decision
making matters weakened. The members of the hospital Board made major decisions
among themselves for decades. Now, there was another entity in the hospital that wanted
to have a say in matters.108 This was not what the Rosenfeld Study suggested. It urged
Milwaukee Jewish institutions to cooperate with one another. The conflict between the
Milwaukee Jewish doctors and board members and the university administration resulted
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in a strained relationship between Mount Sinai Medical Center and important members of
the Jewish community, the doctors, at a time when a strong relationship was crucial. By
1984-85, the financial difficulties at Mount Sinai stalled any growth of the medical school
program. Medical students continued to staff Mount Sinai, but there were no increased
financial benefits to the hospital. Mount Sinai was broke and unable to dedicate resources
to any expansion of the UW-Madison program.109
In 1967, the Rosenfeld Study provided suggestions for strengthening Jewish health
care institutions in Milwaukee. The end result of the changes made by Mount Sinai’s
leaders was a weakening of the relationship between Jewish doctors and the hospital. It
recommended creating a medical teaching program at the hospital. Despite the teaching
program and remodeling project, the finances at the hospital did not improve. In addition,
the program created a distance between the hospital and Milwaukee Jewish doctors. The
Rosenfeld Study did not account for the importance of Jewish doctors to the Jewish
identity at Mount Sinai. This was a crucial error. Hospital leaders erred as well; they did
not solidify Jewish community support for Mount Sinai as the study recommended. The
hospital needed the doctors even if they no longer needed the hospital. It also needed the
continued community support, donations and volunteer hours, at this time.
The study also noted that there was no need for an exclusively Jewish hospital in
Milwaukee, in part because Jewish doctors and patients were no longer barred from other
Milwaukee hospitals. Ray Alexander was not able to create a more religious Jewish
identity at the hospital, but leaders wanted a Jewish brand. The hospital had started as a
nonsectarian hospital supported by the Jewish population. The Jewish support made the
hospital Jewish. The other hospitals in Milwaukee accepted Jewish doctors. Leaders
109
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implemented cosmetic elements to the new addition to brand the hospital as Jewish but
did not realize the importance of the Jewish doctors. The doctors expanded their practices
to other hospitals after feeling usurped by the new university program. The effects of
these actions were that by 1980, Mount Sinai Medical Center had a small university
education program for doctors, an expanded facility, and a strained relationship with
Milwaukee’s Jewish doctors and the Jewish community at large.
The financial difficulties brought on by changes in government programs led to a
merger with Good Samaritan Medical Center in 1987. The hospital lost the foundation of
its Jewish brand, community support, and Jewish doctors, when the doctors began to
practice elsewhere. The volunteer hours from the doctors’ wives decreased as well.
Jewish patients went to other hospitals. The hospital could have moved with other Jewish
institutions north of downtown. Mount Sinai could have joined the other relocated Jewish
institutions in the suburbs. The decision against relocation sealed the fate of Mount Sinai.
When the time came to consider a merger, the Jewish population did not see the need for
a Jewish hospital for themselves any longer. Government programs replaced fundraising
for indigent care. The community support of the original nonsectarian mission of the
hospital to serve those in need and the desire to give back to the city led to the decision to
surrender the hospital. The hospital remained downtown and after the merger became the
main campus for Sinai Samaritan Medical Center.
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CHAPTER 6: MERGER WITH GOOD SAMARITAN MEDICAL CENTER
The 1982 merger of Deaconess and Passavant Hospitals did not prevent the 1987
Mount Sinai merger with Good Samaritan. Why did Mount Sinai have to merge when the
number of beds was reduced downtown? The merger of Deaconess and The Passavant
significantly reduced the number of beds. Hospital leaders and local government officials
believed that the reduction of total hospital beds in Milwaukee would help other hospitals
in Milwaukee so what led to the 1987 merger? The answer to the question stems from a
variety of changes in government programs, hospital administration practices, and changes
in the fund raising practices within the population. Many urban hospitals struggled to meet
the costs of patient care in light of decreased reimbursement rates in the Medicaid
program. However, the location of Mount Sinai, in a downtown and poor neighborhood
and the high number of poor patients led to a decrease in private insurance patients. This
led to higher rates of shortfall between actual cost of care and the amount hospitals
received. The hospitals then tried to address the shortfall by adopting a different
organizational model, more “business like” in practice. The decrease in fund raising from
the Jewish population and volunteer hours, combined with the declining funding for a
growing number of Medicaid and uninsured patients led to the need to merge.
Changes in Medicaid funding did not fully illustrate the situation at many urban
hospitals treating large numbers of indigent patients. In addition to the shortfall between
full cost of care and government benefit payments, there were other latent functions to
consider. The assessment that Medicaid was working as it was intended had been presented
by David Rodgers et al. in 1982. The data they collected indicated that health care access

223

for poor people had indeed risen, with good outcomes.1 More people were being helped,
more care was being delivered, and the program was indeed working and expensive
because hospitals recovered the total cost of care. The authors of that article assumed that
cuts would be made to the program. The effects of those cuts remained to be seen.2 The
American taxpayers were now invested in the public health care system and subsidized
health care expenditures for the poor.3 Charles Rosenberg noted that from the foundation
of the first hospital, the cultural belief was that patients in public hospitals should be
expected to pay for their care, but not be denied if they could not afford it, while Starr
remarked that toward the end of the 20th century, the poor should be cared for, with a caveat
about wasteful spending on that care. Public medicine should be freely given but not at the
expense of the fiscal health of the institution.4
The use of tax dollars affected the private hospitals that accepted patients on Medicaid,
like Mount Sinai. Public perception pitted their own life situations against the needs of the
poor and not wanting them to receive handouts they themselves could not get in hard times.
The notion that no one be denied care because of poverty carried the stipulation that as long
as the cost did not conflict with the needs of those not on aid, care could be given.5 Soon,
Medicaid patients found themselves increasingly vulnerable to the health of the economy.
The commitment to helping the poor combined with unreliable funding sources resulted in
many fiscal challenges for hospitals like Mount Sinai. For decades, private hospitals like
Mount Sinai had distinguished themselves from the public hospitals by way of funding and
1 David E. Rodgers, Robert J. Blundon, and Thomas W. Molony, “Who Needs Medicaid?,” New England Journal of
Medicine, 307, no.1 (1982): 456.
2 Rodgers, Blundon, and Molony, “Who Needs Medicaid?,” 456.
3 Jonathan Engel, Poor People’s Medicine: Medicaid and American Charity Care Since 1965 (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 2006).
4
Charles Rosenberg, In the Care of Strangers, 67; Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (New
York: Basic Books, 1982).
5 Engel, Poor People’s Medicine, 182.
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community support. They also benefited from their private hospital status. In the early
history of American hospitals, public hospitals, like many other public institutions and
poverty programs, were hampered by erratic funding sources and public perception about
the way they treated patients.6 Whereas at the start of the 20th century public hospitals were
seen as a place for those with the lowest socioeconomic status, private hospitals treated
those determined to be worthy of help through the efforts of various affluent community
members.7
Historian Sandra Opdycke explained that the fundamental difference between a
public and a private institution is that a public institution is bound by many social and
cultural understandings about their mission.8 Private hospitals rejected patients based on
their inability to pay for care and could also discharge those who could no longer afford to
pay for their care. They were much more likely to uphold the standard of guarding against
the perils of charity, even in the event of severe illness. They were free to consider their
economic health over the needs of the indigent.9 The public hospital did not have that
option, but there were rules for them as well. Public hospitals provided assistance for the
poor freely when a life was at stake. They aimed to avoid creating dependency, and at the
same time gave to those in need proper and respectful treatment.10
The creation of government health insurance programs relieved hospitals of the task of
measuring worthiness. The programs also subjected private hospitals to the problems faced
6
Rosemary Stevens, Charles E. Rosenberg, and Lawton R. Burns, History and Health Policy in the United States:
Putting the Past Back In (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2006); Paul Starr, The Social Transformation
of American Medicine (New York: Basic Books, 1982).
7 Sandra Opdycke, No One Was Turned Away: The Role of the Public Hospitals in New York City since 1900 (New
York City: Oxford Press, 1999).
8 Opdycke, No One Was Turned Away, 77.
9 Ibid., 101.
10 Alan M. Kraut and Deborah A. Kraut, Covenant of Care: Newark Beth Israel and the Jewish Hospital in America
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2007); Charles Rosenberg, The Care of Strangers: The Rise of
America’s Hospital System (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Rosemary Stevens, In Sickness and in Wealth: American
Hospitals in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books 1989), 131.
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by public hospitals, namely the insecurity of funds for patient care. Private urban hospitals
began to treat more Medicaid patients and the decreased reimbursement rates began to
affect the budget. However, one of the latent effects of treating a large number of poor
patients was the decrease in patients who had the ability to pay in full. Economist Andrew
Sfekas examined the possibility that private pay patients avoided hospitals with high
numbers of Medicaid patients. He found that privately insured patients did exactly that.11
These patients may have feared their own costs increased at these hospitals, to make up for
the poorer patients. Economists David Dranove and William D. White studied private
hospitals in California to measure the effects of increased numbers of Medicaid patients
had on the hospitals. They looked for any instances of “cost shifting,” charging private pay
patients more to make up for the poorer patients, any incidents of cutting services to
Medicaid patients, and whether or not hospitals treating high numbers of Medicaid patients
were more likely to close. They found that there was no cost shifting, in fact many private
patients paid less for services. But, some services for Medicaid patients were cut,
especially at hospitals with the highest number of Medicaid patients. Finally, they found
that hospitals treating a majority of Medicaid patients were more likely to close.12
That these hospitals were often in poor neighborhoods also kept wealthier patients
away. David Amrani, a physician at Mount Sinai, suggested that the hospital’s downtown
location kept Jewish patients away. He believed that the Jewish population living
northeast of downtown Milwaukee no longer felt comfortable at the hospital’s location.
The Board decided to make Mount Sinai Medical Center a “community hospital” by
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staying downtown and that is exactly what it became: a hospital for residents who were
predominantly black and poor.13 Amrani reported that when his wife was pregnant in
1981, their decision to have the baby at Mount Sinai elicited surprised reactions from
some of their Jewish acquaintances. He stated that the same people who had supported
the idea of keeping the hospital in the downtown area would not use it themselves
because of the “element” or the “urban population.”14 He noted that not all of their
Jewish cohort said such things, but a noticeable number did.15 He also thought that it
seemed that it was the native Milwaukee Jewish community members who avoided the
Mount Sinai neighborhood. Amrani and his fellow ex-New York residents grew up in a
large diverse city and patronized Mount Sinai after moving to Milwaukee.16
While it may be that members of the Jewish community did not use Mount Sinai
Medical Center in great numbers because it was downtown, it is clear that the people
responsible for making the decision to stay downtown knew exactly what patients would
use the hospital. Board member Pat Kerns, who attended the very meeting that chose to
keep Mount Sinai at the downtown location stated that, “We wanted to give something
back to, mainly the Black people really, at least half of the patients are Black, I would say
in that area.”17 It is unlikely that the Milwaukee Jewish community did not realize that
Mount Sinai would serve a majority of poor black patients. Dr. Harry Kanin noted that
when the decision was made to stay downtown, Mount Sinai “got mostly Title 19
(Medicaid) and indigent patients.”18 Dr. Jay Larkey noted that the location of Mount
Sinai was home to a large black population was common knowledge in the Milwaukee
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Jewish population.19
However, three major changes in indigent health care programs led to severe
financial shortfalls at urban hospitals. One of the most profound changes came in the
aftermath of the PL 93-641, federal legislation passed in 1974 as part of the Hill-Burton
Act discussed in the previous chapter. It gave the government the power to set
reimbursements on the medical care of Medicaid patients below the total cost of care. The
Reagan administration began changing health care funding in 1982. New federal
regulations on Medicare patients’ care automatically disallowed two percent of the total
cost of care, leaving the care provider to cover the balance. The creation of Diagnostic
Related Groups (DRGs) lowered the amount of reimbursement for Medicare patients
further through standardized medical coding. The changes represented an attempt to
regulate federal funding for state programs. They required a great deal of work in order to
remain in compliance with funding requirements. These changes led to the need for
Mount Sinai to merge.
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POLITICAL CHANGE, POLICY CHANGE
The election of Ronald Reagan as U.S. president in 1980 was a pivotal event in
history of American health care programs for the poor. The Republican governor from
California and former actor used his inaugural address to lay out his plans for “public
spending” and his intent to reevaluate current social programs:
Idle industries have cast workers into unemployment, human misery, and
personal indignity. Those who do work are denied a fair return for their
labor by a tax system which penalizes successful achievement and keeps
us from maintaining full productivity. But great as our tax burden is, it has
not kept pace with public spending. For decades we have piled on deficit
upon deficit, mortgaging our future and our children’s future for the
temporary convenience of the present. To continue this long trend is to
guarantee tremendous social, cultural, political and economic upheavals.
You and I, as individuals, can, by borrowing, live beyond our means, but
only for a limited period of time. Why then should we think that
collectively, as a nation, we’re not bound by that same limitation? We must
act today in order to preserve tomorrow. And let there be no
misunderstanding--we are going to begin to act, beginning today.20

One of the first changes made by the Reagan administration was to the Medicare
program. By 1982, government policy denied two percent of the total costs treating
Medicare patients. This policy placed the responsibility for the balance on the institution
providing care. Mount Sinai continued to treat Medicare patients and absorbed the
disallowed costs; the program that had once paid in full for caring for uninsured patients
was now adding to the hospital’s deficit.21 The same was true at other Milwaukee
hospitals; Medicare patients were adding to the deficit and the hospitals were left to cover
the shortfall.22

20 Ronald Reagan, “Inaugural Address,” in Representative American Speeches: 1980-81, ed. Owen Peterson (New York:
H.W Wilson, 1981), 12.
21 Newspaper clipping, “Federal Cost Cutting Pushes Up Deficits of Non Profit Hospitals,” Wall Street Journal,
February 9, 1982, Box 50, Folder 37, Sinai Samaritan Medical Center Records, Milwaukee Mss Collection 108,
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Libraries, Archives Department (hereafter cited as Sinai Samaritan Collection).
22 Newspaper clipping, “Planning Panel Urges Health Care Coalition” Milwaukee Journal, February 1, 1982, Box 50,

229

Hospitals felt the effects of the decreased federal commitment to Medicare and the
state regulations on Medicaid reimbursement almost immediately. J. Alexander
McMahon, President of the Chicago-based American Hospital Association remarked that
“When the government reduces payments or tightens eligibility rules for poor people,
non- profit institutions as well as public hospitals continue to treat them. An
underpayment simply becomes a non-payment.”23 The two major programs used by poor
people for health care services at Mount Sinai Medical Center were paying less, while
hospital leaders were limited in their ability to offset the loss through expansions or rate
increases. The hospitals were caught in a Catch-22 situation. If they treated more patients
on government programs, the hospitals lost more money, and they could not increase
rates for their services to raise money.
Local businesses, labor groups, and health insurance firms explored the possibility of
forming a collective group between themselves and Milwaukee’s hospitals. The goal was
to create coalitions between local businesses and Milwaukee health care institutions
treating poor patients in order to minimize the projected shortfalls due to disallowed care
costs at any one hospital. They tried to bargain for discounted rates for their services, with
the goal of “reining in escalating hospitals costs over the next decade.”24 In essence they
tried to create a network to share the burden of caring for underinsured patients on
Medicaid and Medicare.25
A subcommittee of leaders from Milwaukee institutions formed to discuss the plan

Folder 9, Sinai Samaritan Collection.
23 Newspaper clipping, “Federal Cost Cutting Pushes Up Deficits of Non Profit Hospitals,” Wall Street Journal,
February 9, 1982, Box 50, Folder 37, Sinai Samaritan Collection.
24 Newspaper clipping, “Planning Panel Urges Health Care Coalition” Milwaukee Journal, February 1, 1982, Box 50,
Folder 9, Sinai Samaritan Collection.
25 Newspaper clipping, “Planning Panel Urges Health Care Coalition,” Milwaukee Journal, February 1, 1982, Box 50,
Folder 9, Sinai Samaritan Collection.
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and noted that,
While such a recommendation acknowledges that consumers would have
less choice as to where they get their medical care. . .under the increased
competitiveness under such a plan ought to improve system- wide cost
effectiveness as hospitals provide services for the amount the purchasers
are willing to pay.26
The proposed coalition was an attempt to meet the care needs of patients on Medicare and
Medicaid while addressing the fiscal deficits created by underpayment for services at the
hospitals treating them. The rationale was that cooperation between hospitals would
lower hospital costs for all Milwaukee’s hospitals. The problem with the plan was that an
equitable way to direct poor patients to hospitals based on their particular health care
issue, not the closest hospital, was not found.27 The financial problems at many of
Milwaukee’s hospitals hindered any agreement between them. They all needed a great
deal of help, and the proposed agreement did not offer enough. The subcommittee report
stated,
Also recommended that if the state decided to eliminate freedom of choice
for Medicaid recipients in picking doctors and hospitals, the state should
direct those patients to hospitals with lower costs for specific services. For
example, the state could direct recipients to certain hospitals for high risk
pregnancy but to a different institution for tonsillectomies.28

This recommendation represented an attempt to address a major issue in the
treatment of the Medicare and Medicaid patients. It sought to compel Milwaukee’s
for-profit hospitals to care for them and absorb some of the shortfall from the government
insurance program. The financial difficulties at hospitals like Mount Sinai Medical Center
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highlighted the success of the private hospitals established under the provisions of the
Medicaid/Medicare legislation, and the creation of early hospital networks.
The financial incentives for private businesses to take over struggling hospitals were not
offset by any requirement that they accept Medicare/Medicaid patients. The acquisition of
hospitals by business groups led to the growth of early health care networks and created
hospitals that were free to deny medical services to those who could not pay in full.
Rosemary Stevens writes, “The notion that hospitals are simply businesses was fueled by
their financial success for most of the 1980s, by the financial environment in which they
operate[d].”29 David Amrani remarked that “businesses and business systems were able
to manage their hospitals and clinics in order to make them more profitable. They
changed medical practice in this town and all over.”30 One of the ways hospitals achieved
the goal of making a profit was to be selective about the patients treated. Richard
McDonald, President of McDonald, Davis & Associates, a Milwaukee advertising and
marketing group, remarked in 1985 that “There is an all out war in the making between
the providers of health care.” He feared that proprietary hospitals could and would make
it a priority to “turn down Medicaid recipients” in order to avoid any loss of revenue.31
That is exactly what happened. Mount Sinai Medical Center and other Milwaukee
hospitals treated more and more underinsured and uninsured patients, while other
hospitals in the area refused to care for patients using government insurance programs.32
The for-profit hospitals utilized the practices of the earliest private American hospitals in
order to maximize profits and reduce costs by running them as businesses and by refusing
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to care for Medicare and Medicaid patients to avoid underpayment.
In response to the report of the coalition of local business, labor and hospital leaders,
the Southeast Health Systems Agency (SEHSA) released its own “Hospital Blue Print for
the 1980s” in April of 1982 to address hospital costs and government insurance shortfalls.
The Blue Print’s suggestions attempted to consolidate health services in Milwaukee
without input or final say from any of the hospitals. While the hospitals could offer their
own ideas, the final decision came from the SEHSA.33 The hospitals were bound to any
decision made because of PL 93-641; as with the Deaconess/Passavant merger, other
Milwaukee hospitals accepted the recommendations of the SEHSA Blue Print or faced
the loss of any reimbursement for care.34
The Blue Print incident highlighted urban hospitals’ weakened efficacy in creating
revenue. The leaders and administrators at Milwaukee’s hospitals were now effectively
bound to the suggestions of the SEHSA. They could no longer act on plans of their own
and in some cases had to act against their own wishes. Some Milwaukee hospital leaders
were critical of the Blue Print; John Comesky, President of St. Michael Hospital, was
vocal in his opposition to the SEHSA plan; he questioned the premise of the Blue Print
that unused hospital beds or duplication of services increased cost by citing a study that
apparently showed, “Unstaffed hospital beds accounted for a very insignificant portion of
total hospital costs. Duplication was essential to provide reasonable access to hospitals. I
beg all who believe mergers, linkages, consolidations etc. in the health care field reduce
costs to read the literature and cite support for these ideas.”35
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The combined effects of government funding changes and the regulations on it were
both a blessing and a curse to hospitals like Mount Sinai; a blessing when the full cost of
care was covered, a curse when funds were cut to less than the costs to the hospital. Mount
Sinai was struggling in 1982, with both Medicare and Medicaid underpaying for care when
a new standard was introduced by the federal government.

STANDARD OF CARE
In 1983, federal legislation created a system meant to standardize care for Medicare
patients, the Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs). These groups evaluated clinical
conditions and set reimbursement rates designed to keep costs of care within a specific
range for hospital care.36 The DRGs prevented hospitals from charging more money for
procedures in order to increase revenue.37 David Amrani described the establishment of
the DRGs as “the roof falling in” when it came to what doctors and hospitals received in
reimbursement for their services.38 Before DRGs, doctors and hospitals set the rates for
care, billed the insurance companies for that amount, and received the total amount. The
DRGs created a system, using 467 diagnosis-related groups, to code the medical
condition and treatment and base reimbursement on what the DRG found reasonable
rather than actual cost.39 Stevens explains the DRGs as an attempt by the Reagan
administration to continue to cut the costs of Medicare by creating flat fees for services at
all hospitals: “In the 1980s, as in the 1920s, standardization was defined by the practical
politics of what can be regulated. Interweaving through the new standardization of
Sinai Samaritan Collection. It should be noted that in his statement, Comesky, cited “a study” but did not provide any
further information about his source used to rebut the recommendation in question.
36 Stevens, In Sickness and in Wealth, 323.
37
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hospitals by government has been an increased ability to measure health-service
utilization and financing.”40 Ostensibly, DRGs were intended to “level the playing field”
between hospitals by preventing any one hospital from claiming that any higher costs of
care at their facility were justified.41 The DRGs established nationwide standards on the
costs of care; all hospitals treating Medicare patients were responsible for any
discrepancy between the DRG-computed cost and the total cost to the hospital. The plan
grouped hospitals into regions and all hospitals in each region charged the same amount
of money for procedures.42 The DRG system gave the federal government the power to
establish prices for the health care of over twenty million Medicare recipients on the
assumption that their care could be sold as a standardized product, rather than as the
unpredictable and varied process of treating human beings.43
However, a senior systems analyst and a Vice President of Finance at
Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center in Chicago, Illinois predicted a very serious
problem. Cynthia Barnard, the analyst, and Truman Esmond, the Vice President, studied
the plan to implement DRGs on hospitals. They identified a problem with the creation of
the DRGs, namely one of timing. They determined that in their study it was unclear if
hospitals in their data set had collected information about the cost of hospital stays
concurrently or retrospectively, and that was vital in the case of setting reimbursement
rates. They believed that hospitals may have entered concurrent data, which only included
charges as of a few days before the patient was discharged.44 They believed that in order
for the DRGs to set appropriate rates, all hospitals had to submit retrospective data about
40
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total hospital costs for all diagnostic categories. Only then could the DRGs accurately
standardize hospital prices. This information was integral, without it, hospitals stood to
lose money.45 They concluded that “Until the data can be adequately received and
explained or replaced with appropriately retrospective data and the differences between
billing and clinical data eliminated, the current case mix based on DRGs cannot be used
to measure resource use and therefore will not accurately predict reimbursement needs.”46
Health Economist Sylvester E. Berki, in 1984, noted the fact that the issues raised by
Barnard and Esmond had not been addressed, and he commented that,
The basic effect of paying for care on the basis of a prospectively established
price per treated case (PPS) is that it changes, as if by magic, revenue centers into
cost centers. Additional days of stay and more intensive services before PPS were
sources of additional revenue. Under PPS, each additional day of stay and every
additional service is an addition to cost, a reduction in net revenue. What hospitals
before were motivated to maximize, now they will have to minimize. If under
retrospective cost- based reimbursement the hospital's role was to provide
facilities and personnel required to produce the maximum combination of services
physicians wished to order, now hospitals will wish to reduce the cost of treatment
both by reducing the amount of services and by producing them more efficiently.47

The use of DRGs to set prices led to Medicare patients themselves literally suffering
under the new guidelines. Sociologists Juanita B. Wood and Carroll L. Estes found that
hospitals discharged patients when they reached the end of their standardized care, not
when they were necessarily healthy. Their research indicated that patients were
readmitted after discharge and used additional medical resources, increasing the cost of
care at the hospital.48
The system challenged the right of the doctor to determine the course of care and
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length of hospital stay. Jay Larkey remarked that the new system of standardizing care
was less than optimal from his perspective as a doctor: “I’m a Socialist, he said. When I
was in the service, I never sent a bill to a patient, and I never had some high school
dropout telling me that I had to discharge a patient out of the hospital.”49 David Amrani
noted that hospital leaders at Mount Sinai Medical Center struggled with the regulations.
One problem was that those responsible for comprehending and explaining the
documentation involved with the new coding system were unable to do so.50 Brenda
Wagner, a staff member at Mount Sinai, remarked that the paperwork involved in getting
funds was very time-consuming, and the forms had to be filled out correctly in order to
avoid having the request denied. This was well before the Internet age; these forms were
typed and mailed through the United States Postal Service.51 Reimbursement was slow in
coming, and took a great deal of labor in order to secure.
Hospitals sought solutions to the shortfalls caused by the new “standards of care”
created by government regulations and the DRGs. Many hospitals, Mount Sinai Medical
Center included, had to adopt a “business model” approach in order to survive. In
October 1981, a Mount Sinai Status report stated that, “In response to continuous
concerns regarding reimbursement from the federal (Medicare) and state (Medicaid)
government, we have initiated additional steps to reduce payroll of the Medical Center
below the reduced budget which was submitted.”52 The steps included layoffs due to low
patient numbers and wage reductions for staff. The official statement about the steps
noted that, “Although we are concerned with the emotional and financial welfare of our
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employees, the realities of today’s economy have necessitated these extraordinary
steps.”53 Despite those “steps,” the deficit continued to grow.
The continued strain between the commitment to delivering health care to all in need
and the rising costs of providing that care without any increase in resources compelled
hospitals like Mount Sinai Medical Center to explore mergers or face closing. Lawrence
Tarnoff, Mount Sinai’s Vice President of Marketing Development, told a reporter, “In the
first six months [of 1984], total patient days dropped 9.5%. More and more hospitals are
becoming sensitive to the fact that you cannot do business the same way you did four or
five years ago. We realize we have to do business differently in order to maintain market
share.”54 The decrease in days spent in the hospital by paying patients added to the
hospital’s difficulties.
Mount Sinai was not the only Milwaukee hospital struggling at this time. In 1986,
many hospitals in Milwaukee were working together to stay open. An article published in
the Milwaukee Sentinel noted that “Facing increased competition, declining patients counts,
and unprecedented pressures to hold the line on costs, area hospitals are forming
affiliations with other medical institutions at an accelerated pace.”55 Mount Sinai formed
an alliance with Good Samaritan a year later. Bill Loebig, of Franciscan Hospital, remarked
that, “I think in the next five years, it is imperative that the Catholic hospitals in the
Milwaukee area be in some kind of alliance with one another. Virtually all hospitals will
have connections with some major national or regional system over the next ten to 15 years.
We are positioning our organization currently to look for meaningful partnerships and
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relationships that will vary across the spectrum from loose alliances to acquisitions.”56
There were too many struggling hospitals and not enough alliances. A 1985 Milwaukee
Sentinel article made a dire prediction about the future of the city’s hospitals. “By the year
1990,” it noted, “at least seven hospitals now in the Milwaukee area will have gone out of
business. Proprietary for-profit hospitals are on the increase; by 1995, 50% of the hospitals
in the country will be proprietary.”57 The changes in government policy for programs
covering indigent care resulted in a mounting deficit for Mount Sinai that could not be
covered as it once was: by increased revenue, expansion, or donation drives or other fund
raising. The new medical center, Good Samaritan Medical Center, despite early success,
was also struggling in 1985.
In the wake of increased costs of care, hospitals tried to increase the efficiency of their
operations. Jonathan Engel notes that hospitals tried different hospital operation models to
run their institutions. Hospitals adopted a more business oriented model in order to meet
the demands of accountability and care for all in need. As hospitals took a more
businesslike approach to health care, and federal and state funded poverty programs fell in
and out of favor with Americans, they felt squeezed between the need to remain both
financially solvent and accessible to those in need.58 The fiscal reality of caring for patients
as health care costs rose was often subordinate to caring for those in need.59 The adoption
of a more business centered model changed the way hospitals administered care; indeed,
hospitals became businesses, and acted accordingly. David Cutler and Jill Horwitz note that
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with this new business approach, hospitals had to adjust to these new fiscal realities, which
threatened the core missions of many public institutions, treating all in need, regardless of
ability to pay.60
The ramifications of the changes in both hospital ownership and operation models
were most readily seen in the process of merging long standing private hospitals into a
single institution within a hospital network. Many of the private hospitals in Milwaukee
had always operated under the auspices of religious orders or private ownership. The
creation of hospital systems made these hospitals part of an organization that had no
personal affiliation with the traditions of the hospitals or the communities that had
established them. As hospital systems streamlined operations in response to market forces
and heeded the call to maximize utilization, hospitals with decades of community service
faced difficult circumstances. Health care systems began buying struggling hospitals. The
Hill-Burton Act included incentives for systems to buy failing hospitals, including money
for renovations and tax breaks.61 Another goal of the new regulation was to avoid
duplication of services in cities. Jonathan Engel noted that it was intended to regulate
hospitals in urban areas in order to enable “new investment in health care infrastructure and
equipment through a newly created certificate-of-need [CON] process. A CON granted by
a local Health Systems Agency was now required for most new construction, purchasing of
major medical equipment, or institutional realignment.”62 A certificate of need was a
governmental designation that imposed limitations and offered benefits to certain
hospitals.63 Mount Sinai was designated as a vital part of Milwaukee’s hospital system,
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and was therefore unable to relocate without government approval.

64

The bill transferred

the power to regulate the operations of urban hospitals and make decisions about hospital
expansion and operations policy from the individual hospital boards and administration to
local government agencies. David Amrani pointed out that a CON was both good and bad
for Mount Sinai; good in that any plans for expansion had a better chance of being
approved, but any attempt to relocate after getting would not be approved.65

THE MERGER DISCUSSIONS
The decision to keep Mount Sinai in downtown Milwaukee was a conscious effort by
the Hospital Board to continue the original mission of the hospital, tzedakah for the
indigent patients. Many of those Interviewed believed that to be true. Pat Kerns remembers
attending the 1967 Board meeting that decided to keep Mount Sinai in downtown
Milwaukee: “The men that made that decision cared for the community, really cared about
the community. I’ll never forget that meeting, maybe two said no. We were accepted into
Milwaukee and we had a wonderful Jewish community, we still do, and this is part of the
whole thing.”66 He and the other board members believed that the decision to remain
downtown was a mitzvah to the non-Jewish community in Milwaukee.67
The mounting debt caused by years of decreased reimbursements resulted to two
alternatives for Mount Sinai’s leadership: merge with Good Samaritan Medical Center or
explore the possibility of relocating the hospital in Mequon. Both Kearns and Amrani
mentioned the land in Mequon. It was purchased by Aurora Health Care in 1979. While this
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land could have been used for a hospital, Amrani reiterated that there was no way to move
Mount Sinai to Mequon in light of the CON. Mount Sinai Medical Center was vital to
downtown Milwaukee’s health care system.68 Kerns recalls that it was the Board who
rejected any offer to relocate to Mequon.69 The hospital board rejected any plan to relocate
the hospital, so a merger appeared to be the only alternative for keeping the hospital open.70
Amrani remarked that by the time the decision about a merger was made, Mount Sinai
Hospital was needed in its downtown location. The hospital had received a Certificate of
Need in 1979, designating it as a vital hospital resource. “They couldn’t leave, there wasn’t
[sic] very many hospitals left!”71 Jay Larkey noted that of the six hospitals in the
downtown area in the 1960s and 1970s, only two remained: “St. Anthony’s at 10th and
Wells, Deaconess at 18th and Wisconsin Avenue, Lutheran on Wisconsin Avenue, West
Side Hospital on 24th and Wells, and Doctor’s Hospital on 27th and Wells, all closed.”72 By
1986, Mount Sinai Medical Center and Good Samaritan Medical Center were the only two
left. When they merged, only a single hospital remained to serve downtown Milwaukee.

MAKING MERGER EASIER
The merger between Mount Sinai Medical Center and Good Samaritan Medical Center
was not as protracted or contentious as the Deaconess and The Passavant. Mount Sinai
accepted the merger as a foregone conclusion, and this eased the process somewhat. The
effects of the Reagan administration policies on both hospitals made a merger seem
necessary. The ramifications for the Milwaukee Jewish community are relevant. The
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migration of Milwaukee’s Jewish community to other neighborhood and other hospitals
had significantly weakened the relationship between the community and Mount Sinai. The
Board remained Jewish, but the hospital was no longer the only hospital for Jewish doctors
and patients. David Amrani believes that “Society had changed, and there was no need for a
Jewish hospital in the way that the hospital was originally needed. The 1903 reasons for a
Jewish hospital did not exist in 1983. The reason there is not a great deal of involvement by
the Jewish doctors and their wives, from a Jewish perspective is that there isn’t, it’s a very
different animal now than it was even when I moved here thirty years ago.”73 And that is
what happened; the hospital stayed downtown and announced a merger with Good
Samaritan Medical Center in 1987.
Initial discussion between the two hospitals began in 1984. Leaders at both hospitals
met to study a possible merger. There were a few leadership clashes between the two
hospitals, but nothing like the conflict over the Deaconess/Passavant merger. On June 8,
1984, the two hospitals announced they were considering a merger to reduce health care
costs at each hospital. On July 18, 1984, Mount Sinai President Daniel Kane outlined six
major issues that needed to be studied before any merger. In a July 18, 1984 Milwaukee
Journal opinion column published by the Milwaukee Journal he claimed that “Self-interest
and practice, commitment of leadership, medical education and care, quality of care,
consumer education, and a cost benefit analysis of creating a single medical Center through
merger.”74 Eight days later the Journal reported that there were “anger signs” at Good
Samaritan Medical Center over the opinion piece and merger discussion. Good Samaritan
Medical Center leaders viewed Kane’s opinions as presumptuous. They halted merger
73
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discussions in order to allow both sides time to form committees to discuss the specifics of
a merger. On December 13, 1984, Mount Sinai announced that Daniel Kane had abruptly
resigned as President of Mount Sinai and the merger discussions stalled.75 Sarah Dean was
appointed acting president in January 1985, and merger talks began anew.76 Patient census
numbers at Mount Sinai Medical Center continued to decrease after 1984, putting
additional pressure on the hospital leadership to negotiate a satisfactory merger agreement.
Good Samaritan Medical Center was also struggling. In March 1985, the Deaconess
campus of Good Samaritan Medical Center closed.77 Both Mount Sinai and Good
Samaritan continued to treat a large number of poor patients, resulting in even more overall
debt. The deficits caused by decreased reimbursements created a large shortfall for the
hospitals. The shrinking number of total patients, combined with the underpayments from
federal and state health care programs forced the cash-strapped hospital to make a decision
on the proposed merger.78
The absence of a large scale concentrated effort from the Jewish community to help
Mount Sinai Medical Center in the years of 1984-87 is significant. After decades of
appealing to the Jewish community during fiscal crisis, there is no evidence of any sort of
appeal to help the hospital during the years leading up to the merger. No appeals for
donations, no fundraising drive, no appeal to the Jewish community of Milwaukee to save
their hospital. The leaders left to decide the fate of Wisconsin’s only Jewish hospital
approved the merger to continue to care for the indigent in Milwaukee. Good Samaritan
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Medical Center also needed the merger in order to avoid closure. Three Milwaukee
hospitals, Deaconess, The Passavant, and Mount Sinai, provided the foundation for the
Sinai Samaritan Medical Center. The histories of the community contributions to the three
Milwaukee hospitals that merged are not evident at Sinai Samaritan today.
On June 18, 1987, eighty-four years almost to the day, the Board announced the merger.
Mount Sinai Hospital Medical Center, Wisconsin’s first Jewish hospital, located at the
corner of 12th and Cedar since 1913, was merging with the Good Samaritan Medical Center.
The merger created Sinai Samaritan Medical Center. President of the Mount Sinai Board,
Stanley Kritzik, announced the merger in a short, concise letter that explained that this
necessary action would allow for the work at Mount Sinai to continue. As a stand-alone
medical institution, Mount Sinai Medical Center was “excellent but underutilized
downtown Milwaukee hospital. The goal of the merger is to form one high quality
organization capable of more efficiently meeting the community’s needs.”79 The merger
agreement consolidated the downtown medical Centers in order to efficiently utilize
departments within the existing facilities. The creation of Sinai Samaritan ended the history
the only Jewish hospital ever to operate in Wisconsin.
After decades of service to Milwaukee, the hospital buildings remained downtown to
continue the original mission of caring for those in need. The responsibility for funding that
mission passed from the Jewish community to government programs. The decreased
Jewish presence at Mount Sinai Medical Center had a profound impact on its Jewish
identity. The Rosenfeld Study of 1967 suggested that there was no need for a Jewish
hospital for Milwaukee’s Jewish physicians because other hospitals had lifted the ban on
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Jewish doctors. However, Mount Sinai Medical Center did need the Jewish doctors,
among others, in order to remain a Jewish hospital. Mount Sinai did not need to be
religious in order to be a Jewish hospital; it had always been Jewish because of the Jewish
Board members, Jewish doctors, Jewish patients and Jewish volunteers. The withdrawal
of Jewish doctors, patients, and volunteers from Mount Sinai paved the way for the
hospital’s merger in 1987 with a Christian one. Elliot Lubar resigned from his position at
Mount Sinai in 1982 stating, “I saw the handwriting on the wall, that this was not going
to be a Jewish hospital much longer. The commitment went away and that was because
the doctors went away.”80
The decrease in Jewish community support, particularly the volunteer hours and fund
raising, was significant in the decline of a sense of Jewish identity at Mount Sinai. The
number of volunteers at Mount Sinai Medical Center decreased by the 1980s. Fears about
personal safety is one possible explanations as to why the volunteers stopped coming to
Mount Sinai. David Amrani noted that while Jewish doctors continued to admit patients
to the hospital, albeit less frequently, the wives would not go. They cited the
neighborhood “down there” and safety concerns kept them away.81 The safety concerns
stemmed from incidents in the 1960s. Civil unrest and riots in 1967 in Milwaukee
influenced the attitudes of white suburban residents. In response to the overzealous
response of the Milwaukee Police Department to relatively minor protests, Mount Sinai
Medical Center worked with the Milwaukee police Department on a preparedness plan in
case of riot and a large number of casualties. However, there were no major riots in
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Milwaukee.82 Deindustrialization and increased poverty in Milwaukee led to urban blight
in many neighborhoods, including Mount Sinai’s.83 Lehman stated there were instances
of armed patients and an increase in the number of victims of violence treated at Mount
Sinai. She stated that it was random but, “it exists, right outside the hospital, and when it
does, it creeps into the hospital.”84 She also noted that Mount Sinai, like some of the best
hospitals in urban areas are in “horrible neighborhoods” including Walter Reed National
Military Medical Center in Washington D.C., where her son received medical services as
part of the military: “it is in a horrible neighborhood, but President Bill Clinton went
there for his care.”85 Mount Sinai was an excellent hospital in a declining
neighborhood.86
Changes in the lives of women are a salient reason for the decrease in female
volunteers during this time. Starting in 1970 women began to enter the paid labor force in
large numbers, even after having children. In 1970, thirty-nine percent of American
children had mothers who worked outside the home; by 2000, sixty-seven percent of
children had mothers in the paid labor market.87 Sociologists Vicki R. Schram and
Marilyn M. Dunsing noted that college education and a husband that did not support a
wife working outside the home increased the number of volunteer hours spent by married
women in the 1970s. Younger women were also more likely to volunteer than older.88 In
1965, the typical volunteer was married, female, aged 22-44 with a high school education
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and no employment outside the home. By 1974, the typical characteristics of a volunteer
changed little, the exception being she was now more likely to have a college education.89
Sociologists Thomas Rotolo and John Wilson found that employment status and
parenthood affected the number of volunteer hours. Women who worked part time
volunteered more time, but those who worked part time and had children of school age
volunteered more than homemakers with younger children.90
Many of the Mount Sinai Ladies Auxiliary members of the 1950s and 1960s were
educated, married and did not work for pay outside the home after the birth of their
children. They volunteered at the hospital for a variety of reasons, but not for a salary.
Some had attended college but did not pursue careers.91 Marilyn Kahn, a member of the
Ladies Auxiliary, remarked on the change saying, “It was drastic to me. It was difficult to
get volunteers, to get new volunteers. It was a great opportunity for young educated
women of my time who really wanted to contribute to the welfare of others; some loved
just being there. The new generation were not willing to be there as volunteers, and there
was no group to draw on after we got older.”92 Kahn remembered one instance in which
a younger woman was unwilling to serve on an art committee for the hospital as a
volunteer, despite having a degree in art. Her art degree provided the means to establish a
career.93 Young women in the late twentieth century used their educations to gain
employment, not to support exclusively volunteer activities. Volunteers at other Jewish
institutions also decreased at the same time; leadership at the Sisterhood group at
Congregation Emanu El B’ne Jeshurun reported that, “The end of the century [20th]
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brought important societal changes that slowed the activity of the Sisterhood under the
weight of time crippling schedules for young family women, a great many of whom also
filled jobs outside the home.”94 The decrease in women volunteers, Jewish doctors and,
patients weakened the Jewish presence at Mount Sinai. Their contributions to the hospital
had always been an aspect of Mount Sinai’s Jewish identity. The Milwaukee Jewish
population redirected resources that used to donated to Mount Sinai to institutions in their
own suburban areas. The Jewish identity of Mount Sinai waned without the historically
strong support of the community. The Star of David signified a sense of history and
Jewish identity, but the sponsorship of Mount Sinai by the Jewish population ended with
the merger. After eight decades, the work of the Jewish population of Milwaukee at Mount
Sinai Medical center concluded.
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CONCLUSION

THE MILWAUKEE JEWISH FEDERATION AND COMMUNITY BUILDING
The Milwaukee Jewish Federation is in the process of exploring ways to unite the
Jewish population in the state of Wisconsin. On June 26 and 27, 2011, approximately 300
members of the Wisconsin Jewish community met at the Milwaukee Public Museum for a
2 day “Jewish Summit.” The event, officially recognized by Mayor Tom Barrett as the
Milwaukee Jewish Summit Day, was advertised for weeks beforehand in the Wisconsin
Jewish Chronicle.1 The Milwaukee Jewish Federation, the current name of the former
Federated Charities, viewed the Summit as a chance for the Jews in Milwaukee and other
cities in Wisconsin to meet and discuss the future of the Wisconsin Jewish community.
The Federation collects donations for a variety of local, national, and international causes.
I attended this event. We received literature about current Milwaukee Jewish resources,
from adult day care services to two free adult admissions to Jewish Museum Milwaukee.
A booklet was distributed to all participants. The goal of the Summit was to ascertain the
needs of the diverse Jewish community and the city of Milwaukee. It stated that the
Summit’s first task was to “Uncover and identify our strengths so that we can understand
the elements that make our community special and give it life and meaning.” The second
purpose was “to dream a bold future for ourselves and for future generations emphasizing
our deepest hopes and desires for Jewish Milwaukee.” Finally, participants were to “to
engage ourselves in bringing about the future we want to see, so that our dreams can
come true.”2
The first day of the event included round table discussions between randomly
1
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selected groups. The Summit included a luncheon, with an Orthodox member of the
Milwaukee community on hand to insure the adherence to Kashrut laws. The summit was
held on Sunday and Monday, to ensure that those who observed Sabbath could attend.
Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and unaffiliated Jewish people spent two days
interacting in workshops and breakout sessions discussing Jewish identity and the state of
the Milwaukee Jewish community.
The Federation used the data collected from the Summit and created thirty-two
Dream Statements and eighteen Community Initiatives to bring together the Jewish
people of Milwaukee. They created a scale in order to measure the political, social, and
religious views of the attendees. Eighteen community initiatives were created using input
from the Summit scale including a concierge program for new Jewish residents in
Milwaukee to free Jewish education. There was no discussion of Mount Sinai Hospital.3
The Dream Statements include passages meant to invite individuals into the Jewish
community. For example,
In our Jewish community each individual member is valued. We embrace our
diversity and provide opportunities for all Jews, regardless of religious affiliation,
marital status, sexual orientation, skin tone or economic status. An individual’s
financial resources are not a barrier to participation in Jewish education, Jewish
social and cultural events and Jewish camping experiences. We provide for the
needs of people who live alone, who are elderly, mentally ill or disabled. We
collaborate to share our financial as well as personal resources. We ensure that all
members of our community are aware of volunteer opportunities, and we view our
human capital as a valuable resource to be efficiently managed. We immerse
ourselves in the Jewish values of tzedakah, pride in our Jewish heritage,
commitment to Israel and doing of good deeds.4
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Another statement describes the ideal Jewish community,
Our community will be a warm welcoming family, fulfilling the needs of all Jews as
we learn more about our Jewishness. This can be facilitated through collaboration
between institutions of the Jewish community (e.g., group purchasing, group
planning, shared facilities). – There would be education of needs and similarities
between the streams of Judaism to foster unity. Unity = respect of differences and
connection through our similarities as we work side by side on our shared goals. –
The values of community would be steeped in Tikkun Olam, tzedakah, and warmth. –
Education would be available to all regardless of cost. To accomplish this we would
use technology collaboration and volunteerism. – The elderly would have affordable
services based on innovative design mechanisms.5
The leaders of the Milwaukee Jewish Federation are trying to strengthen relationships
between diverse Jewish groups in Milwaukee. They are using scales, surveys, and other
means to try to define a collective Jewish identity and appealing to individuals,
welcoming them to a Jewish community. It is a good start. Sociologists Peter L. Berger
and Thomas Luckmann argued that identity, once crystallized, is maintained, modified, or
even reshaped by social relations. The social processes involved in both the formation
and the maintenance of identity are determined by social structure.6 In order to form
stronger relationships between these present day Jewish residents, it is crucial to create
opportunities to modify and reshape the social meanings of being from the East or West
Side. Federation leaders must acknowledge the history of the conflicted relationship
between East and West Side Jews, especially on matters of religious practice and ethnicity,
in order to create social bonds within their population. As the Federation moves forward
with these plans, it would be beneficial to their cause if leaders reacquainted themselves
with the history of stratification and conflict within the population, in order to address
5
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these same concerns as they seek to build a strong Jewish community.
Sociologist Ralph Segalman commented on the limitations of using scales for the
purpose of measuring identity. They are often constructed in order to measure the strength
of an individual’s connection to established Jewish organizations, rather than measuring
the strength of their Jewish identity.7 Sociologist Simon N. Herman believed that a better
way to measure an individuals’ Jewish identity was to measure the impact of participation
in Jewish organization on their lives.8 The scales constructed for the Summit also do not
reflect the contention religious diversity history as it relates to Milwaukee Jewish identity.
The social segregation and differences in religious observance within the Milwaukee
Jewish population remain crucial issues in light of the attempts at community building
today. The history of Jewish participation at the former Mount Sinai Hospital is missing
in their quest to define identity and build community. An articulate definition of identity
is important to the leaders of the Milwaukee Jewish Federation, they hope that by
defining Dream Statements and community initiatives, a collective Jewish identity will
take hold and increased Jewish collective action will be a part of that identity. This
research found that this will not be an easy process.
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ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES IN MILWAUKEE
The Jewish identity of Mount Sinai was not overtly religious. The available literature
and interviews from members of Milwaukee’s Jewish population reveal the original
mission of Mount Sinai was nonsectarian. Mount Sinai served the city of Milwaukee for
almost eighty-four years as a nonsectarian hospital. When Rabbi Caro approached
Abraham Slimmer for funds to establish the hospital, Slimmer insisted on a broad,
nonsectarian mission and matching community funds with his donations. The result of
that stipulation was that Mount Sinai Hospital was a nonsectarian hospital that received
support from the more affluent members of the Milwaukee Jewish community.
This research posited three distinct facets served as the foundation of Milwaukee
Jewish identity: the conflict within the community between East and West Side Jews; a
preference for Reform Jewish religious tradition by the first wave Western Europeans and
the social distance from the later Eastern European immigrants due to ethnic differences;
and philanthropy for all of the indigent of Milwaukee as a means of expressing civic
pride through their collective action at Mount Sinai Hospital. The most salient part of
early Milwaukee Jewish identity is not so much religiosity, but the conflict between the
two ethnically diverse Jewish groups. All three facets of Milwaukee Jewish identity
remain evident today.
The research of the early years of Jewish history in Milwaukee revealed discord
between two different groups of Jewish immigrants. Historian Avraham Barkai noted that
Germanic Jews acted with “The urgent aim was to wean newcomers, or at least their
children, from their alien ways. The underlying fear was that the Eastern European Jews
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would endanger their social status and achievements of the whole community.”9
Historian Daniel Soyer noted that the relationship between more Americanized first wave
German immigrants and later arrivals from Eastern Europe has been a subject of
scholarly debate. Historians generally recognize that after initial tension and even
hostility between the two groups, cooperative community action existed as the later
arrivals gained prosperity and took their place in positions of influence in their
communities.10 This was the case in Milwaukee. Country of origin and the timing of
arrival in Milwaukee were two crucial facets of the early immigrant experience. Rae C.
Ruscha, an East Side Reform leader, observed in 1951 that “At about this time [turn of
the century] I became conscious of the phrase, ‘East is East and West is West and never
the twain shall meet.’ For no reason, some Jews living east of the river became imbued
with the wierd [sic] notion that they were somewhat superior--of finer ilk than those
living west of the river. The cleavage, entirely without merit, produced a logical
resentment and resulted in somewhat strained attitudes.”11 Echoing Ruscha’s thoughts
sixty years later, Pat and Joan Kerns, an East Side Jewish couple, illustrated the lingering
divide between the two communities;
Joan: “Milwaukee was a very segregated city, it still is.”
Pat: “Not anymore.”
Joan: “A little bit, we still talk about people we were friends with.”
Pat: “That was way back.”
Joan: “They were West Side Jews.”
Pat: “We were just kidding.”
Joan: “Well, there is still a little bit of that mindset you know, never the twain shall
meet.”
Pat: “It has something to do with where their parents and grandparents came from.”
9 Avraham Barkai, Branching Out: German Jewish Immigration to the United States 1820-1914 (New York: Holmes
and Meier, 1994), 205.
10 Daniel Soyer, “Brownstones and Brownsville: Elite Philanthropy and Immigrant Constituents at the Hebrew
Educational Society of Brooklyn, 1899-1929,” American Jewish History 88, no.2 (June 2000): 182.
11 Rae C. Rauscha, “Those Serene, Placid Years Augured Tempestuous Changes,” Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle, Sept.
23, 1951. Cited in Polsky, “The Great Defense,” 78.
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Joan: “Did your parents have any friends from the West Side? NO!”
Pat: “No.”
Joan: “Pat’s mother was so happy when he met me because I was an East Side girl,
so it was a real division.
Pat: “The West Side boys used to come over because they wanted to date East Side
girls. You remember that?
Joan: ‘Sure, I went out with them.” [laughs]12
Class divisions and religiosity, were at the heart of the difference between the
original East and West Side Jewish populations. Milwaukee afforded the East Side Jewish
community many opportunities. Jewish businessmen, professionals, and politicians
established themselves within the city’s Germanic community on Milwaukee’s East Side.
The city granted suffrage to all male immigrants, Jews included, after a period of
residency and did not impose punitive taxes on Jewish businesses. Many East Side Jewish
men achieved financial success and established Mount Sinai to serve the indigent
members of the West Side Jewish immigrant wave.13 The hospital did not bridge the
social gap between the Jewish East and West. The East Side community provided support
for the care of those in need from the West Side. Some members of the West Side
community established successful businesses of their own. They contributed to the
hospital as well. Their success did not change the social differences in the community.
East Side Jewish parents still wanted their children to marry on the East Side.
However, the West Side Jews eventually had opportunities to climb the
socioeconomic ladder. The hospital was a meeting place for the Jewish population:
common ground. There, they were united in their support for the mission. Pat Kerns
related that with the right circumstances, namely religious affiliation and achieving
upward social mobility, one could come from a West Side Jewish family and join the East
12

Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011.
Louis J. Swichkow and Lloyd P. Gartner, The History of the Jews of Milwaukee (Philadelphia, PA: The Jewish
Publication Society of America, 1963), 109.
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Side.14 The West Side Jewish population grew quickly in the 1880s. The creation of
Mount Sinai Hospital, along with the Settlement and the Abraham Lincoln House, Jewish
Social Services, and the economic success of some West Side Jewish men allowed some
descendants of West Side Jews to join the East Side Jews in their new neighborhoods
north and east of downtown Milwaukee. Dr. Jay Larkey had Russian grandparents who
“envied the Germans.” He lived on the West Side but remembers that when he was
younger he took a streetcar from his home at 2763 N. 53rd Street to Emanu-El Temple for
Confirmation classes, instead of preparing for a Bar Mitzvah at nearby Beth Israel.15 He
was born and raised on the West Side, but his parents sent him to the Reform
congregation for religious education. Pat Kerns and Jay Larkey practiced Reform Judaism.
Pat Kerns grew up as a Reform Jewish man.16 Larkey’s parents put him on a streetcar to
get him across the Milwaukee River for religious education, and both define themselves
as East Side Jewish men.17 Religiosity, in the more traditional observance sense, divided
the Milwaukee Jewish community in the early decades of the Twentieth century, but
remained one viable option available to signify the Jewish history at the former Mount
Sinai in 1992.
This research revealed that in Milwaukee, the East and West Side Jewish populations,
historically divided along ethnic and class lines, formed a community at Mount Sinai
Hospital through their collective action to support their hospital. This support represented
one of the few collective community actions between the two groups, and the most
successful. The “Germans” and the “Russians” in Milwaukee did not eat, pray, or marry

14
15
16
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Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011.
Dr. Jay Larkey, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, August 17, 2011.
Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011.
Dr. Jay Larkey, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, August 17, 2011.
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one another in great numbers. They did, however, work together for the good of “their
hospital.” It is their historic care and support for, and pride in their hospital, that best
explains why a sense of Jewish identity mattered after the merger, why Sinai Samaritan
had a menorah. The “Jewish identity” of the hospital prior to the 1987 merger came from
the physical presence of the Jewish collective community. After the merger, after the
dissolution of the Jewish Board and the sharp decrease in Jewish collective action at the
hospital, Jewish ritual objects and observances replaced the people who used to make the
hospital Jewish just by being there. Mount Sinai Hospital served as an icon in Milwaukee,
representing the contributions of the Jewish population. Their commitment to the hospital
continued even after much of the Jewish population moved outside of the city. Milwaukee
Jewish gratitude for the opportunities provided by the city and the hospital explains their
dedication. It is an important part of the Jewish narrative in Milwaukee. The Jewish
community in Milwaukee continued to support the hospital even after relocating. It was
by choice, and in the words of Pat Kerns, a duty for the community to “give back” to the
people.18
Mount Sinai Hospital contributed to the creation of the Jewish medical profession in
Milwaukee. The Jewish doctors who worked at Mount Sinai cited anti-Semitism as a
prevailing factor in creating a Jewish hospital in Milwaukee; it was as much about
offering a place for Jewish doctors to practice as it was about treating Jewish patients.
Jewish doctors established medical practices and professional careers because of Mount
Sinai. Dr. Jay Larkey also noted the history of exclusion of Jewish doctors and the
importance of a Jewish hospital in Milwaukee. There was no other option available to
Jewish doctors,” You have to remember the essential part of this story is anti-Semitism.,
18

Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011.
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he said
And the Jewish doctors that practiced in the city of Milwaukee had to practice at
Mount Sinai or some of the smaller hospitals. They couldn’t get on the staff of the
major hospitals like St. Luke’s, St. Joe’s, Columbia; those were the upper echelon
hospitals. . .Jewish doctors could not get on staff at these major institutions so
they had to go to Mount Sinai Hospital.19
Dr. Harry Kanin related his early career in terms of the opportunity provided to Jewish
doctors in Milwaukee:
One of the motivations was not so much to take care of Jewish patients but also
provide a place a hospital for the Jewish doctors to work. Because they couldn’t,
they weren’t accepted as a rule at the other hospitals. By the time I came here that
was breaking down. There were Jewish doctors at various hospitals, not many but
a few. But the reason I decided to do my internship here was simply because it
was automatic; I just felt comfortable here.20

The plan to institute specific religious observations, closing for Jewish holidays and
erecting a Menorah for Hanukkah, in order to maintain Jewish identity, did not come
from any religious tradition at Mount Sinai over its eighty-four years of operation before
the merger.21 The attempt, in 1992 after the merger, to retain a “Jewish identity” does not
necessarily represent a shift of opinion regarding the more religious and traditional
Jewish observances in Milwaukee’s Jewish population. In the early years of Milwaukee
Jewish history, distinctive religious observances and traditions divided the East and West
Side Jewish residents. Dr. Harry Kanin recalls a sense of embarrassment on the part of
East Side Jews toward those who adhered to traditions from Europe.22

The East Side Jews, by virtue of being among the first to arrive, established
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themselves as the arbiters of what constituted Milwaukee Jewish identity, including
culturally acceptable religious expression. Many of the individuals Interviewed about
Mount Sinai Hospital for this project related similar narratives about the Jewish
community who founded it. They described the “German” Jews who built the hospital for
“Russian” Jews at the turn of the 20th century.23 During their Interview, Pat and Joan
Kerns reported that the Milwaukee Jewish community is now run by “The Russians” and
related their experience with a “Russian Rabbi” from Milwaukee. After giving him a
donation, he continued to call the Kerns until Joan finally told him not to call for
additional donations.24 The tone of that exchange was reminiscent of some of the
reported interaction between East Side German and West Side Russian Jews a century
ago.25 However, when asked if the Russians in Milwaukee today were those that had
arrived from the Soviet Union, he did not know for certain if that was accurate.26
The rational for the adoption of certain religious observances after the merger, the
religious traditions and observances proposed to retain “Jewish identity,” were most
likely less about religious practices and more about Milwaukee Jewish history. These
proposals represented an attempt to maintain the memory of Jewish contributions to
Milwaukee at Mount Sinai. The intent was not to establish a religious tradition at Sinai
Samaritan Hospital. It was designed to retain the Jewish past, after Jewish doctors
established themselves at other hospitals and Jewish philanthropy stopped providing for
indigent care. Milwaukee had a small Jewish population compared to Chicago, New York,

23

Dr. Harry Kanin, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011; Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by
author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011; Dr. Jay Larkey, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, August 17,
2011.
24
Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011.
25 Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011.
26 Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011.

260

Newark, and Boston and treated more Gentile patients than Jewish from the beginning.27
However, the Milwaukee Jewish residents established a hospital for those in need, even if
they did not use the hospital themselves. Jewish financial donations and Milwaukee’s
Jewish doctors and volunteers established a Jewish identity by virtue of their direct
support and presence at Mount Sinai. It was Jewish by virtue of their very visible
presence at Mount Sinai.

JEWISH COLLECTIVE ACTION AND HEALTH CARE TODAY
This research revealed the strength of Milwaukee Jewish collective action at Mount
Sinai Hospital. They built and sustained it despite the vast differences between members.
They donated time and money to this common cause at a time when East Side and West
Side residents did not socialize with one another. Their legacy is one of caring for those
in need in Milwaukee, and it is no wonder that the pride of those interviewed is evident. It
is tempting to assume that the revival of collective community action at Mount Sinai
Hospital by today’s Jewish population would have the same results today. That is, to
assert that if religious communities reclaimed their traditional roles in creating hospitals,
somehow, free care for the indigent would materialize, would be misguided.
Health care was once a community effort, but the sense of ownership and personal
connection that inspired the foundation of many American hospitals was weakened by the
growth of hospital systems. Increased government regulations and existing hospital
systems that also own physician networks limit the ability of any one community, no
matter how dedicated, to establish a new hospital. Doctors and patients are also bound by
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insurance plans, which dictate where they can practice and receive care, respectively.
However, the barriers to affordable health care for the poor in Milwaukee in 2016 are
actually similar to those in 1903. There is still a need for health care assistance for the
poor and no widespread community efforts to offer assistance. Hospitals, including
Aurora Sinai, now ration Emergency Department services. Patients with ear aches, sore
throats, and other minor complaints are referred to primary care facilities that many
cannot use because of their limited transportation options.28 Hospitals are businesses, and
have adjusted their policies to reflect that model. Government programs remain unreliable,
and the age old notion of worthy and unworthy poor lives on in a means tested system of
limiting health care for the poor. Scott Walker, the current governor of Wisconsin, has
declined to accept additional federal funds for Badger Care.29 This could result in lost
health insurance for current Badger Care participants and limits the chance of new
patients to get covered. Many Milwaukee residents remain in need of medical care. The
government programs that replaced collective community action fall short of providing
care. Hospitals like Aurora Sinai continue to treat patients, even as they lose money in the
process. The changes in the American hospital system and in funding for indigent care
distanced many private religious hospitals from their communities of origin, and Mount
Sinai was no different. The hospital changed names and ownership, but the needs of the
poor did not disappear. Sociologists Cal Clark and Rene McEldowney postulate that there
are three basic tenets of a comprehensive health care system. First, high quality care must
be provided; second, there should be universal access to that quality health care; and finally,
that high quality, freely accessed health care should be delivered at a reasonable price. The
28
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authors state this is the “trinity” of the health care sphere. The problem with the trinity,
these authors note, is that changes in one of the facets will often negatively impact the other
two parts of the whole.30 The rising cost of health care made delivering health care at a
“reasonable” price difficult for hospitals.
This was not always the case. Many American hospitals opened at the turn of the
twentieth century because local communities wanted them, and were willing to support
them. Hospitals today are a part of a health care industry. Government rules and
regulations affect funding for the health care systems that treat the poor. Now, Aurora
Sinai, the former community hospital, belongs to a large health network, Aurora Medical
Group. It continues to serve the people downtown Milwaukee, many of whom are
uninsured or depend on Badger Care, the means tested insurance program in Wisconsin.
Medical Ethicist David M. Craig noted an important development in the reform of U.S.
health care impacted nonprofits like Aurora Sinai. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
developed a new Schedule H for nonprofit hospitals as part of its revised Form 990, the
form that nonprofit organizations use to report the year’s financial activities in 2008. He
noted that
This revision responds, in part, to the scrutiny of nonprofit hospitals’ community
benefits practices, which has come from Congressional committees, state
legislators, Attorneys General, tax officials, and the Service Employees
International Union. These critics argue that tax-exempt hospitals should be
providing higher levels of uncompensated care to patients who are uninsured or
underinsured. Nonprofit hospital leaders have countered. They cite the various
benefits they already provide under the 1969 community benefit standard,
including rising amounts of uncompensated care. They also note that the standard
does not mandate charity care. Neither does the new Schedule H, but the form
signals a set of priorities with moral implications for the public responsibilities of
nonprofit hospitals, and treating poorer patients tops the list. Central to Schedule
H is the question, what level and what kinds of responsibilities do nonprofit
30
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providers have for the American health care safety net? This question has gained
traction as the number of uninsured and underinsured Americans rises and as
health care costs outpace public financing. The debate over community benefits
has been the special purview of health care insiders and policymakers, but it
anticipates important issues of access and public responsibility that loom large in
the national debate over health care reform.31

These changes sought to address problems with the Community Benefit Standard of
1969. The creation of safety net programs in 1965 prompted changes in nonprofit
operations. The Community Benefit Standard removed the provisions that required
nonprofits to offer patient care free of charge or below actual cost of care. It granted tax
exemption status to nonprofits that passed two tests. First, they had to operate as a
nonprofit, with an open medical staff and community board. Second, the nonprofit had to
promote health in the community it served.32 The issue raised by David M. Craig is that
there is no hard and fast rule about what exactly constitutes community benefit. He points
to three models of “moral conceptions” about nonprofits and their obligation to the
community at large, particularly hospitals as a way of determining what community
benefits nonprofits owe the public. The social contract model views the tax exempt status
of the nonprofit as a gift, and because of that gift, they owe the community and should
provide care for the indigent. The common good model, found in many Catholic hospitals,
believes that community benefits are part of the common good and include providing
health care to all in need. Charity care is an essential community benefit, but the main goal
is to improve health care delivery institutions by working with other groups to identify and
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respond to the needs of poor patients in under-served areas.33 Finally, the covenant model
is a more appropriate model to describe Jewish community efforts. These organizations
give priority to their original mission, in their communities.34
Mount Sinai Hospital was an important cooperative community accomplishment for
the Milwaukee Jewish community. The hospital served Milwaukee for eighty-four years
because of the support that came from a segregated and conflicted population. The two
groups worked together to support it. The Jewish population created the hospital through
collective community efforts. That effort created a sense of community between them that
did not exist elsewhere. David M. Craig’s research provides “moral models” that could be
used as a starting point for the revival of the once successful community health care
setting–the Dispensary. Katz noted that dispensaries closed as hospitals expanded their
facilities and opened specialized departments.35 Rosenberg believed that dispensaries
closed due to the increase in both the number of hospitals and the fact that hospitals
wanted to create opportunities for medical students.36 The Mount Sinai Dispensary
worked with other religious community organizations to meet a variety of health care
needs. In Milwaukee, patients with diabetes, asthma, high blood pressure, and other acute
conditions used the Dispensary and doctors and nurses received training.37 Social
workers assisted patients during their stay and after discharge. The staff of the Dispensary
worked with Jewish Social Services, and other hospitals to treat patients and provide
assistance. The Dispensary offered referrals for home care assistance, respite care for
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families with children, and outpatient follow up care.
The history of the Milwaukee Jewish Federation provides insight as to the
effectiveness of collective Jewish action. It began as the Hebrew Relief Association in
1889, and became Federated Charities in 1902. The charitable work of the organization
expanded and the name United Jewish Appeal was first used in 1938.38 It became the
Milwaukee Jewish Federation in 1970 as a response to the changing needs of the
Milwaukee Jewish community.39 Individual members of the Jewish community
continued to support the downtown Milwaukee hospital, but it no longer received support
from the Milwaukee Jewish Federation.
The Star of David on the hospital signified a Jewish presence at Mount Sinai to Dr.
David Amrani and led him to Milwaukee.40 The removal of the Star in September of
1988 did not so much end the Jewish identity of the hospital, it removed one of the most
obvious symbols of its Jewish past.41 When the historic fundraising efforts for indigent
care ended and Jewish doctors practiced at other hospitals, the proposed religious icons
and observances in 1992 represented a desire to preserve the Jewish history of Sinai
Samaritan. Despite the negative feelings of the founders of Mount Sinai toward the
religious traditions of some of their brethren, these traditions now represented a means to
preserve the Jewish legacy of the hospital.

38 Louis J. Swichkow and Louis P. Gartner, The History of the Jews in Milwaukee (Philadelphia, PA: The Jewish
Publication Society of America, 1963), 342.
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2009), 256-57.
40 Dr. David Amrani, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011.
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A COMMUNITY TRADITION
The tradition of philanthropy, one of the historic facets of Milwaukee Jewish identity,
continues today. Members of the Jewish population continued to contribute to the hospital
long after their families had left their original neighborhoods. Many Jewish residents had
long since relocated, taking many of their synagogues and community centers north of
downtown Milwaukee, outside of the city limits. Mount Sinai Hospital was one of the
few institutions left in Milwaukee that represented the Jewish community as a whole. The
shared sense of pride in the hospital on the part of those interviewed is evident. It was a
Jewish institution in that it represented the Milwaukee Jewish tradition of Tzedakah. It
was Jewish in that the Milwaukee Jewish community worked to keep it open. After the
merger, an effort was made to find a way to replace that participation and keep the
hospital Jewish in the eyes of the people of Milwaukee. The years of volunteer work and
the donation drives were no more, the overt Jewish support for the hospital ended. The
efforts in 1992 sought to remind those using Sinai Samaritan that the Jewish people of
Milwaukee established, supported and eventually surrendered the hospital for the good of
Milwaukee.
Sinai Samaritan is the only hospital in downtown Milwaukee. Their patients are
primarily underinsured or uninsured.42 Medical practices have also relocated from the
neighborhood. Many patients use Mount Sinai for routine illnesses and acute conditions
because it is the only medical facility to which they have access.43 Today, one “harsh
environmental condition” that contributes to poor health and high medical costs is lack of
primary care for the poor. Increasing the number of indigent patients with chronic
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conditions in primary care situations is one possible way to demonstrate community
benefit in Milwaukee. Physician Jane McCusker et al. found that uninsured patients
tended to use the Emergency Department for their health care needs. Patients with
chronic conditions like diabetes, asthma, and high blood pressure need primary care
doctors in order to manage their conditions. When given the opportunity to receive
primary care, patients with and without chronic conditions were more likely to seek
preventive care rather than go to an emergency room for treatment.44 In 1999, The East
Side Community Practice, in Gainesville, Florida, began providing free primary care to
patients admitted to the hospital through the emergency department. Physician Richard A.
Davidson et al. noted that those patients significantly decreased the number of emergency
room visits after entering into primary care.45 Emergency Departments are not designed
to treat chronic conditions; patients need primary care relationships for good outcomes.
George Hinton remarked, “We believe the ED [Emergency Department] is not the place
for managing diabetes, asthma and high blood pressure, episodic care. Patients need to
have medical homes. It is not as easy as it sounds because we don’t have enough [of
them]. So we just push them into a system that is already overloaded, so automatically
people end up right back here again.”46
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JEWISH COLLECTIVE COMMUNITY OPPORTUNITY
The Mount Sinai Dispensary, between 1935 and 1967, worked within the community
to meet a variety of health care needs. Patients with chronic and acute conditions,
accidental injuries, and emergency cases used the dispensary. The staff of the dispensary
worked with the hospital, Jewish Social Services, and other Milwaukee hospitals and
social service agencies to treat patients and provide assistance. Home care assistance,
respite care for families with children, and outpatient follow up care were offered at the
Mount Sinai Dispensary. Former Aurora Sinai President George Hinton believes that,
“The legacy of it [Mount Sinai] being a great hospital still remains; the pride of it is still
here, the years and years of greatness. The legacy of all the hospitals that came together
to form Aurora Sinai today [is] very much embedded here.”47
Health care was once a community effort in, but the sense of community that
founded many hospital has been weakened in light of the growth of hospital systems,
George Hinton believes that, “The evolution of systems have [sic] kind of taken way the
community feel of hospitals, and that is what I believe is trying to find that [sense of
community] again.”48 He envisions a community effort at Aurora Sinai to “connect with
the community. I’ve started that process because I want us to be perceived as part of a
community solution instead of just a building sitting here waiting for people to get sick.
The history of Sinai is not finished.”49
Aurora Sinai continues to treat many patients in its emergency department and is
currently exploring options to expand its services in community health initiatives, but
how committed the hospital is to caring for those patients remains unanswered. A
47
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Jewish-sponsored community health movement in Milwaukee could help both the
Jewish community and Aurora Sinai Medical Center continue the original mission of
Mount Sinai Hospital. Political action on behalf of those in need of stable primary care
for their chronic conditions and wellness programs to prevent those conditions are all
viable possibilities. The Milwaukee Jewish Federation is invested in strengthening the
Wisconsin Jewish community. Mount Sinai, now Aurora, does have a history of
strengthening community ties; it strengthened the ties between two very different
Jewish communities. The opportunity to revive the relationship between the Jewish
Community and Milwaukee exists at Aurora Sinai Medical Center through
participation and support of a community based health care program. The divided
Jewish community created a hospital, a united Jewish community could, in the future,
rebuild the community health care system of Mount Sinai in Milwaukee, on a
foundation wide in scope.
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